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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates whether and how corporate strategy affects analyst 
behaviour, ranging from the coverage decision to forecasting efficiency. Both firm and 
industry level strategic information are important inputs to analyst reports which are 
useful to investors in a market where information asymmetry exists between the firms 
and their (potential) shareholders. In this thesis, I employ Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) 
strategy typology to identify three types of firms (or industries): those adopting an 
innovation-focused ‘Prospector’ strategy, those pursuing cost-efficient ‘Defender’ 
strategy and those adopting ‘other strategies’ (‘Analyzer’ and ‘Reactor’ strategies). 
 The first study in this thesis examines how firm strategy and industry strategic orientation 
affect the demand for analyst coverage and the task complexity analysts face if they 
choose to covering a firm. I find that Prospector firms receive, on average, higher analyst 
coverage, than Defender firms, but are less likely to be covered by expert analysts. These 
findings suggest that the reduced task complexity associated with Prospectors’ superior 
discretionary disclosure outweighs any impact of task complexity from these firms’ 
greater inherent uncertainty. Defenders low analyst coverage, but abnormally high 
coverage from experts suggests that the high task complexity from weaker disclosure 
dominates the low task complexity arising from Defenders’ relatively stable operations. 
I find similar effects for the association between industry strategic orientation and analyst 
coverage.  
The second study investigates whether industry strategic orientation moderates the impact 
of firm-level strategy on the analyst coverage decision and analyst forecast accuracy. I 
find that firms adopting a Defender strategy in an industry with the opposite strategic 
orientation (Prospector-oriented industries) receive abnormally low analyst coverage, 
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which I attribute largely to reduced value of information spillovers. I also find (weaker) 
evidence that firms adopting an extreme of the same nature as the industry orientation 
(‘Extreme Prospectors’ and ‘Extreme Defenders’) are associated with lower forecast 
accuracy. In Defender-oriented industries, I find evidence consistent with the  potential 
impact on profitability of pursuing a strategy contrary to the industry orientation (i.e. a 
Prospector strategy) reducing both analyst coverage and forecast accuracy. 
The final study investigates how firm strategy affects asymmetric cost behaviour, and in 
turn, whether analysts’ understanding of strategy and its association with asymmetric cost 
behaviour, reduces the bias in their forecasts. I find that forecast optimism is, on average, 
increasing in the degree of cost stickiness, suggesting analyst do not perfectly incorporate 
realised cost stickiness in their earnings forecasts. Saliently, I find that analyst forecast 
bias for firms for which cost stickiness is most predictable (Prospectors) are less sensitive 
to the incidence of cost stickiness than is the case for other firms, and that the opposite is 
true for firms for which cost stickiness is less likely to prevail (Defenders), and thus 
should be more of a shock to analysts.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
My thesis is a three-paper-style dissertation that examines whether and how corporate 
strategy affects analyst behaviour. Security analysts produce research reports, including 
performance forecasts and recommendations, which investors use to make investment 
decisions (Beunza and Garud 2007). In preparing their reports, analysts gather 
information from a variety of information sources, such as company management, 
financial statements and industry publications, and are expected to develop expertise in 
identifying the factors that drive the profits and stock returns of their covered firms (Boni 
2005). Thus, where information asymmetry exists between the firms and their (potential) 
shareholders, analyst reports provide investors information incremental to that present in 
financial statements (Hugon and Muslu 2010). This makes it important to understand 
what factors affect analyst behaviour: from the choice of firms to cover through to the 
quality of the performance forecasts they produce. 
Broadly, corporate strategy refers to a unifying theme that gives coherence and direction 
to the actions and decisions of an organisation (Grant 2016). For the purpose of this thesis, 
I focus on the strategic typology developed by Miles and Snow (1978, 2003). Miles and 
Snow (1978, 2003) categorise corporate strategies into three potentially efficient types, 
representing ranges on a strategy continuum (Prospectors, Analyzers and Defenders) and 
a residual strategic type (Reactors). Prior accounting literature (e.g. Ittner et al. 1997 and 
Bentley et al. 2013) has used archival data to develop empirical proxies for these strategic 
types. My study focuses on the innovation-oriented strategy adopted by Prospectors and 
the efficiency-oriented strategy adopted by Defenders, which represent the two endpoints 
on the strategy continuum, to emphasise the distinctiveness of the available corporate 
strategies. Prospectors are constantly engaged in innovation and responding to their 
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environment with large investments in human capital and which have a decentralised 
organisational structure. Defenders pursue cost-efficient technology, which they apply to 
focused and stable product ranges, and employ a highly specialised and formalised 
organisational structure. Analyzers seek a balanced strategy between that of Prospectors 
and Defenders and have emphasis on both efficiency and innovation; while Reactors are 
firms that are either unable to, or choose not to, pursue one of the three potentially 
efficient strategies. Thus far, it has proven impossible to use archival data to distinguish 
Analyzers from Reactors and both types are collectively classified as ‘other firms’ and 
are the base group against which analyst response to firms following Prospector and 
Defender strategies are compared.  
Both the analyst literature (e.g. Roger and Grant 1997 and Bradshaw et al. 2011) and 
observed practice (e.g. discussion in analyst reports) suggest that analysts consider 
corporate strategy in their forecasting process. For example, Bradshaw et al. (2011) 
suggests nonfinancial information like corporate strategy are important inputs to analysts’ 
stock valuation process and can affect the analyst coverage decision and forecasting 
behaviour. In practice, analyst reports frequently include a discrete section focussing on 
strategy analysis, which frequently includes discussion consistent with the strategic 
typologies proposed in the management literature. Thus, my thesis examines the impacts 
of corporate strategy on analyst behaviour by addressing three key research questions: 
RQ1: How does corporate strategy (at both firm and industry-average level) affect the 
analyst coverage decision? 
RQ2: How does the intersection of firm and industry level strategy information affect 
analyst behaviour? 
RQ3: How does corporate strategy affect: i) firms’ asymmetric cost behaviour, and ii) 
the association between asymmetric cost behaviour and analyst forecast efficiency?  
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Below, I provide a brief summary of each study in respond to the three key research 
questions in the follow sections. 
 
1.1. Study 1 Corporate Strategy and the Analyst Coverage 
Decision 
Study 1 examines whether and how corporate strategy affects the analyst coverage 
decision by addressing three specific questions: 1) How do firms’ strategic choices affect 
the analyst coverage decision through value-adding (demand) and task complexity 
(supply) effects? 2) How does the strategic orientation of an industry affect analysts’ 
decision to cover firms in that industry?, and 3) Does analyst expertise moderate the 
impacts of strategy on coverage, and thereby provide evidence of the relative importance 
of task complexity and value-adding? 
Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) suggest that business strategy, as identified by Miles and 
Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic typology, impacts firm’s inherent information asymmetry 
and disclosure quality and that each of these affect the number of analysts following a 
firm. Primarily, Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) find that analyst coverage is increasing in 
the extent to which firms tend towards innovation-intense strategies (the Prospector end 
of the strategy continuum).  My study extends Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) by further 
investigating the separate effects of strategy on task complexity and inherent information 
asymmetry, and investigating the impact on analyst coverage of the strategic orientation 
of the industry of which the firm is a member. In the additional analysis in this study, I 
investigate an alternate explanation for the association between strategy and coverage – 
the likely correlation between strategy and investment banking incentives and find some 
(albeit weak) evidence consistent with this possibility.  
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Firms that pursue a Prospector strategy (innovative firms) are associated with high ex 
ante information asymmetry (the level of information asymmetry associated directly with 
the nature of firms operations absent any voluntary disclosure), which increases the 
potential value-added by analyst reports, but also increases the complexity of the task 
facing the analyst. Prospectors are also associated with high levels of discretionary 
disclosure which reduces the potential value-added by analysts and task complexity. 
Conversely, Defenders (firms focussing on cost-efficiency) are associated with low ex 
ante information asymmetry which decreases the potential value-added for investors who 
use analyst reports, and the associated task complexity. Defenders, however, are likely to 
make relatively infrequent discretionary disclosures, which increases the value-added by 
analyst coverage but also the complexity of the coverage task. I compare both Prospectors 
and Defenders to the ‘other firms’ (Analysers and Reactors) to examine how those 
strategic impacts affect analysts’ choice to follow a firm. 
My empirical models use both a traditional regression of aggregate coverage (the number 
of analysts following a firm) against strategy indicators, as well as logit regressions 
modelling the probability that a given analyst will follow a particular firm in a given year. 
Consistent with Bentley-Goode et al.’s (2017) findings using an ordinal strategy measure, 
I find that Prospectors (innovative firms) receive greater analyst coverage than ‘other 
firms’ (Analysers and Reactors). This result is consistent with the ‘demand effect’ of  high 
inherent information asymmetry that of the higher task complexity associated with high 
inherent information asymmetry (‘supply effect’); and also with the reduced task 
complexity effect of high discretionary disclosure (‘supply effect’) dominating any 
reduction in potential value-adding to investors caused by greater access to public 
information (‘demand effect’). My results also suggest that Defenders (cost-oriented 
firms) receives lower analyst coverage than ‘other firms’ (Analysers and Reactors). This 
is consistent with the reduced task complexity (‘supply effect’) from low inherent 
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information asymmetry is offset by the reduced benefits from providing analyst services 
(‘demand effect’); and also with the increased ‘supply effect’ of low voluntary disclosure 
dominating potential ‘demand effect’.  
To further disentangle the strength of the strategic impacts from information asymmetry 
and discretionary disclosure on analysts’ choice to cover a firm, I use analyst expertise 
(proxied by general forecasting experience) to identify variation in the impacts of task 
complexity (from both information asymmetry and voluntary disclosure) when firms 
pursue different strategic choices. Prospectors should receive greater coverage from 
experts if the strategic impacts of information asymmetry dominate the net task 
complexity effects, because analyst experience should decrease the task complexity 
associated with covering firms that have high information asymmetry. Conversely, 
Defenders should receive abnormally high expert coverage if the disclosure impact 
dominates because analyst experience reduces the effect of higher task complexity caused 
by Defender’s poorer disclosure environment. My findings suggest that, relative to 
inexperienced analysts, expert analysts have a higher probability of covering Defenders. 
This implies that the strategic impact of discretionary disclosure has a stronger effect than 
that of the ex-ante information asymmetry associated with firm’s strategic choices when 
analysts make the decision to cover a firm. In my additional analysis, I use proxies for 
disclosure quantity and reporting quality to investigate the role of these characteristics 
more directly, and estimate, and find that both the quantity and quality of voluntary 
disclosures partial mediate the association between firms’ strategic choices and analyst 
coverage. However, the direct effects of corporate strategy remain significant. 
While Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) typology was developed for the purpose of 
identifying strategic variation within-industry, the management literature suggests there 
are key industry-specific strategic factors that determine the scope for firms’ success and 
survival, and which may condition the behaviour of all or many firms in an industry. Thus, 
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variation in strategic orientation may be observed at the industry level, this may impact 
on analysts’ choice to cover the firms in that industry. I define Prospector-oriented 
(Defender-oriented industries) industries as those where, relative to other industries, 
member firms exhibit attributes that are predominately consistent with a Prospector 
(Defender) strategy. Applying the same theory as in the case of firm-level strategic 
choices, I argue and find that the average firm in a Prospector-oriented (Defender-oriented) 
industry receives greater (lesser) coverage than ‘other firms’ (those in industries that have 
traits consistent with Analyzers or Reactors).   
As noted above, in my additional analysis I consider the potential impacts of analysts’ 
self-interested incentives to cover Prospectors (in preference to all other firms) arising 
from Prospectors’ greater likelihood of directing future investment banking business to 
the analysts’ employer. To test this proposition, I first use the assent of the Global 
Research Analyst Settlement (GS) as an indicator of a reduction in the strength of 
investment banking incentives. Results from this simple pre-post test suggest that 
Prospectors relative coverage increases after the GS, which does not support an 
investment banking explanation. However, when cross-sectional analyst attributes (e.g. 
brokersize) are accounted for I find that the abnormal analyst coverage for Prospectors 
by analysts employed by larger brokerages (who are more likely to provide investment 
banking services) has reduced in the post-GS period compared to other analysts, 
consistent with investment banking incentives affecting the relationship between strategy 
and coverage.  
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1.2. Study 2 Does Industry Strategic Orientation Affect the 
Association between Firm Strategy and Analyst Behaviour 
Study 2 is an exploratory study that examines whether industry strategic orientation 
moderates the association between firm-level strategy and analyst behavior (i.e. analyst 
coverage and forecast accuracy).  
Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) tested the association between corporate strategy and analyst 
coverage and analyst forecast accuracy, and found that innovative firms (Prospectors) are 
associated with greater analyst coverage and higher analyst forecast accuracy (lower 
absolute forecast errors). They attribute these findings primarily to supporting evidence 
that Prospectors have more frequent discretionary disclosures (in the form of management 
forecasts and press releases), and have greater press coverage, thereby reducing the 
complexity of the forecasting tasks faced by analysts. I extend this line of reasoning by 
examining whether the extent to which firm-level strategy conforms to (or differs from) 
the strategic orientation of the industry of which they are a member is associated with 
analyst coverage and forecast accuracy. In doing so, I argue that the industry strategic 
orientation may impact analysts’ expectation of firms’ future profitability and chance of 
survival (e.g. Amit and Schoemaker 1993) for firms pursing strategies opposite to that of 
the industry, as well as simpler task complexity effects, each of which may impact analyst 
coverage and forecast accuracy. 
The primary interest groups in this study are firms that operate in industries where 
strategic orientation is at either extreme of the strategy continuum. Within these industries, 
I identify two groups of firms: 1) Firms adopting an extreme firm-level strategy of the 
opposite nature to the industry orientation (e.g. a Defender firm in an industry with a 
Prospector orientation or a Prospector firm in an industry with a Defender orientation). I 
describe firms with these cases as exhibiting ‘industry strategic misalignment’, and 2) 
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Firms adopting an extreme firm-level strategy of the same nature of the industry 
orientation (e.g. a Prospector firm in an industry with a Prospector orientation, denoted 
‘Extreme Prospectors’ or a Defender firm an industry with a Defender orientation, 
denoted ‘Extreme Defenders’). Because both groups of firms pursue a strategy that is 
deviated from the main strategic focus of the industry, there may be significant 
incremental task complexity associated with the lower value of information spillovers. 
For example, in an industry where innovation is abnormally important, firms adopting a 
Defender strategy are likely to differ very significantly from their peers and the value of 
information spillovers from covering these peers is likely to be lower (Litov et al. 2012). 
On the other hand, Prospectors in an industry with innovative orientation (Extreme 
Prospectors) pursue a strategy that is highly innovation-focused relative to the 
entire market. The extreme uniqueness of this strategy may reduce the value of industry 
information spillovers (Litov et al. 2012) and potentially increase the riskiness of firm 
operations, and in turn, the complexity of the tasks facing analysts. Consequently, 
strategic misalignment and extreme strategies may increase task complexity above and 
beyond any complexity arising simply from firm-level strategic type, and this may in turn 
affect analyst coverage and forecast accuracy. Thus, one would expect that firms 
exhibiting industry strategic misalignment or following extreme strategies will be 
associated with lower analyst coverage and lower forecast accuracy than ‘other firms’. 
Further, because industry strategic orientation may also affect analysts’ expectation of 
firms’ future profitability and chance of survival (e.g. Amit and Schoemaker 1993), 
misaligned firms (whose firm strategy is of the opposite nature as the industry orientation) 
may receive even lower coverage than aligned firms due to low expectation of future 
profitability. Similar to Study One, I use analyst expertise to differentiate between the 
impacts of strategic misalignment from task complexity (the ‘task complexity effect’) and 
expectation of future profitability (the ‘profitability effect’).  
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To test hypotheses related to analyst coverage I employ models similar to those used in 
Study One and use OLS regression to tests the association between industry strategic 
orientation, firm strategy and analyst coverage and forecast accuracy. My results suggest 
that analysts are less likely to cover firms pursuing a business strategy that is not aligned 
with industry strategic orientation except for Extreme Defenders, and that this result is 
consistent with the contemporaneous existence of both profitability and task complexity 
explanations. I further perform tests of analyst expertise and show that for misaligned 
firms, the task complexity effect dominates the profitability explanation in Prospector-
oriented industries, while the profitability explanation dominates the task complexity 
effect in Defender-oriented industries.  
My tests of the association between industry strategic orientation, firm strategy and 
analyst forecast accuracy show that it is only in Defender-oriented industries that 
misaligned firms (Prospectors) experience lower forecast accuracy than ‘other firms’ in 
that industry, and that this association is not moderated by analyst expertise. Together, 
these findings suggest that industry strategic misalignment may have an impact on 
forecast accuracy arising from unexpectedly low profitability. My results also show that 
the expert analysts make more accurate forecasts for firms following extreme strategies 
(Extreme Prospectors and Extreme Defenders) than less-experienced analysts issue, 
supporting the task complexity explanation. Finally, consistent with Bentley-Goode et al. 
(2017), I find that Prospectors are, on average, associated with greater forecast accuracy 
than Defenders. However, I find no moderating association between firm strategy and 
accuracy, which may indicate there are other explanation of the observed association 
rather than the disclosure explanation argued by Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). 
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1.3. Study 3 Corporate Strategy, Cost Stickiness and Analyst 
Forecasts 
Study 3 examines whether corporate strategy has a moderating effect on the extent to 
which analysts understand and are able to predict the extent of firms’ asymmetric cost 
behavior, as reflected in a reduction in forecast bias associated with this cost behavior.  
Cost stickiness reflects the asymmetric behaviour of the cost to sales ratio when sales 
increase and decrease (Anderson et al. 2003); costs are described as ‘sticky’ (‘anti-sticky’) 
if the rate of change in costs when demand falls is smaller (greater) than the rate of change 
in sales when demand rises. Prior literature documents that greater cost stickiness is 
associated with lower forecast accuracy, because cost stickiness increases the variability 
of earnings (Weiss 2010), while Ciftci et al. (2016) find that analysts’ underestimate the 
extent to which cost stickiness impacts the relative variability of earnings and sales, and 
appear to have a poor understanding of sticky cost behaviour.  In this paper, I predict and 
show that Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic types are associated with 
systematically different degrees and directions and asymmetric cost behaviour. 
Prospectors, for example, focus on innovation and will typically have large R&D and 
marketing expenditures, which they are reluctant to cut in the short run and in turn, are 
more likely to exhibit sticky cost behaviour than firms following ‘other strategies’. I 
hypothesis that, if analysts recognise these differences in the likelihood of sticky cost 
behaviour occurring, that their forecasting performance should reflect this. I frame my 
hypotheses in terms of analyst forecast bias rather than accuracy as I show that theoretical 
relationship between analysts understanding of firms’ sticky cost behaviour and whether 
this should increase or decrease forecast accuracy depends on the relative likelihood of a 
sales decrease in the current period, whereas the forecast optimism is consistently 
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decreasing in the extent to which analysts understand and predict cost stickiness. 1  
Because Banker et al. (2014) show that direction of asymmetric cost behaviour is 
conditional upon the sign of prior earnings changes, I test my hypotheses on several sub-
samples that reflect the direction of prior and current sales changes.  
I find that, as predicted, forecast optimism is increasing in the incidence and level of cost 
stickiness. Saliently, I also find evidence that, in the cases where the combination of prior 
and current sales changes suggest that observed cost stickiness should be greatest 
(predicted by firms’ strategic choices), analyst forecasts for firms following strategies that 
suggest that the level of cost stickiness should be most easily predicted, exhibit forecast 
errors that are less sensitive to the impact of cost stickiness than is the case for ‘other 
firms’.  
In my additional analysis, I investigate whether there is any evidence that my earlier 
findings of differences in forecast accuracy across firms following different strategies 
may in part reflect the effects of cost stickiness. While I show significant association 
between accuracy, strategy type and cost stickiness across a sample of all firm-quarters, 
the unconditional effect of cost stickiness in insignificant, and makes a formal mediation 
analysis redundant.  
 
1.4. Contribution  
This thesis contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. Firstly, my thesis 
provides insights on how corporate strategy affects analyst behavior broadly, ranging 
from the coverage decision to forecasting efficiency. I provide deeper examination than 
                                                 
1 I do not employ the method of Ciftci et al. (2016) in testing my hypotheses, because the limited availability 
of analysts’ sales forecasts, combined with the onerous data requirements of the measures of corporate 
strategy employed, would result in a very small final sample.  
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the extant literature, of how firms’ strategic types affect investors’ demand for analyst 
coverage as well as the task complexity associated with covering and forecasting the 
earnings of firms employing different strategies. Bentley et al. (2017) examine only the 
demand side of impacts of corporate strategy on analyst coverage and forecast accuracy. 
However, my thesis also considers the supply side of effects of corporate strategy, which 
arise from variation in task complexity, and finds that the task complexity effect 
associated with firms’ discretionary disclosure is the dominant impact of corporate 
strategy on analyst coverage decision.   Further, I extend Bentley et al. (2017) by 
considering the potential impacts of corporate strategy on coverage arising from analysts’ 
incentives to encourage investment banking business. Secondly, the results from my 
thesis show the importance of industry-level strategic information, and the extent to 
which individual firms’ conformity with the strategic orientation of their industry affects 
analyst behavior. Finally, the results from Study 3 reveal how firms’ strategic types can 
be used to identify firms’ cost behavior and how analysts’ knowledge of this association 
affect their forecasting efficiency. Unlike Ciftci et al. (2016) who suggests that analysts 
have a poor understanding of the variability and stickiness of firms’ expenses as the 
degree of cost stickiness increases, I find evidence that analysts have the ability to 
recognise and accommodate at least some inherent differences in the likelihood of sticky 
cost behaviour across firms by strategic types. It is when firms (e.g. Defenders) exhibit 
abnormally high level of cost stickiness that analyst forecast efficiency is impaired by the 
positive association between cost stickiness and analyst forecast optimism. 
The results of my thesis may be of interest to investors, especially less sophisticated 
investors who are more likely to have limited knowledge of business strategy and its 
association with analyst behaviour, to better use strategic information provided by 
analysts in their decisions to follow analysts’ recommendation to buy/sell a stock. My 
results related to analyst incentives to obtain investment banking businesses for their 
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employers when they decide to cover firms following a particular strategy may help 
regulators who are interested in evaluating the validity of current regulatory policies 
intended to reduce the dysfunctional consequences of analysts’ incentive conflicts (e.g. 
NASD Rule 2711, Rule 351 and 472), as they can be used to assist them in determining 
whether observed bias arises from conscious misrepresentation or other sources.2 Finally, 
the findings my thesis also provide insights to academics in the area of corporate strategy 
and cost stickiness.  First, the results from my thesis shed a light on the current research 
in firm strategy by showing that the association between corporate strategy and forecast 
accuracy are not fully explained by firm disclosures (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017). My 
results also show that firms’ cost stickiness is likely to be a potential driver of this 
association.  Additionally, Study Three provides evidence that there is a systematic 
relationship between corporate strategy and cost stickiness that future research may 
consider to use as proxies for the likely incidence and level of cost stickiness. Finally, I 
contribute to the research methodology in analyst research by developing a new means of 
testing analyst coverage effects, modelling the individual analyst coverage decision. 
Researchers may consider to use this measure instead of the traditional aggregate measure 
of analyst coverage to examine the behaviour of individual analysts in their choice to 
cover a firm.  
 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 defines and describes the 
concept of business strategy, and explains the empirical proxies for corporate strategic 
types used in my thesis. Chapter 3 presents the first study examining the impacts of 
                                                 
2 The major policies consist of 1) prohibiting the conduct of linking analyst compensation based on specific 
investment banking transactions, 2) forbidding the covered firms from reviewing the analysts’ reports 
before publication except for checking factual accuracy, and 2) requiring analysts to disclose all potential 
conflicts of interest to NASD including the proposition of “Buy”, “Sell” and “Hold” recommendations. 
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corporate strategy on the analyst coverage decision, while Chapter 4 contains the second 
study, related to the impacts of industry strategic misalignment on both analyst coverage 
and forecasts. Then, I present the third study explaining the association between corporate 
strategy, cost stickiness and analyst forecasts in Chapter 5 and finally, conclude the thesis 
with some discussions of future research directions in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 Strategic Typologies 
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the concept of corporate strategy and the 
particular strategy measure employed in my thesis. I provide the definition of corporate 
strategy in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 introduce the types of strategies classified by Miles 
and Snow (1978, 2003). Then, I provide descriptions and empirical descriptive of industry 
strategic orientation in Section 2.3. After that, the relevance of corporate strategy to 
analyst behaviour both academically and practically are discussed in Section 2.4 and I 
finally conclude this chapter in Section 2.5.  
 
2.1. Corporate Strategy 
Strategy is a unifying theme that gives coherence and direction to the actions and 
decisions of an individual or an organisation (Grant 2016). In an organisational context, 
business strategy describes how companies compete in their respective market 
environments by solving entrepreneurial, engineering and administrative problems (Miles 
and Snow 1978, 2003). The management literature provides comprehensive discussion 
regarding the roles of strategy in an organisational setting. For instance, Porter (1980, 
2008) suggests that a firm’s business strategy comprises their attempts to identify and 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage within their market. Porter provides specific 
examples of what a firm’s strategy should be if the firm aims to achieve a competitive 
advantage through cost leadership (minimising production cost to achieve maximum 
efficiency) or product differentiation (focusing on innovation to create uniqueness as 
perceived by the customers). March (1991) describes strategy by considering how 
businesses approach and facilitate organisational learning, through exploration of new 
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technologies or exploitation of current expertise. Common to all conceptualisations of 
business strategy is the implicit acceptance that strategy comprises the means by which a 
firm tries to achieve its objectives.  
 
2.2. Strategic Typologies 
The management literature provides several typologies of business strategy. For example, 
Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) typology identifying efficiency-oriented (‘Defender’) and 
innovation-oriented (‘Prospector’) strategies to cope with changes in the environment; 
Porter’s (1980, 2008) cost leadership and product differentiation strategies to develop 
sustainable advantages; March’s (1991) exploration and exploitation strategies  that 
facilitate organisational learning and; Tracy and Wiersema’s (1995) operational 
excellence, product leadership and customer intimacy strategies in pursuit of market 
dominance. Although their strategic focuses differ, these typologies overlap. Miles and 
Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic typology is employed in my thesis, for reasons discussed 
below.  
Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic typology identifies four business strategies, each 
reflecting responses to the entrepreneurial, engineering and administrative problems a 
firm faces in their given environment. A firm’s ‘entrepreneurial problem’ describes the 
challenges it faces regarding the selection of products and markets in which to operate to 
achieve superior performance (Miles and Snow 2003, p.21). For a given entrepreneurial 
strategy, the ‘engineering problem’ concerns how the firm operationalises their product 
or service selection. It includes the identification of appropriate technology to produce 
and distribute the chosen products or services and how to form new information, 
communication and control linkages (or modify existing linkages) to ensure proper 
operation of the technology (Miles and Snow 2003, p.22). Finally, the ‘administrative 
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problem’ focuses on the design of organisational structures and processes within which 
to rationalise and stabilise the activities identified by the solutions to the entrepreneurial 
and engineering problems, and to allow these solutions to evolve as needed (Miles and 
Snow 2003, p. 23). 
Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) identify four generic strategies reflecting attempted 
solutions to the three problems described above. ‘Defenders’ focus on efficiency as a 
solution to their entrepreneurial problems, while ‘Prospectors’ continually seek to 
innovate and move into new markets. Between these extremes are ‘Analyzers’ who seek 
a balance between efficiency and innovation. Finally, ‘Reactors’ represent a ‘residual’ 
type of firm behaviour who are either unable to, or choose not to pursue the three well-
defined strategies described above. Consistent with prior research in management and 
accounting (e.g. Ittner et al. 1997 and Bentley et al. 2013), I focus on firms who follow 
the ‘Defender’ and ‘Prospector’ strategies, and which present the two extremes of the 
strategy continuum. In my thesis, firms pursuing the other two strategies are classified as 
‘other firms’ and present the base group against whom the impact of the extreme 
strategies is compared. Below, I explain the strategic approach of Defenders and 
Prospectors in greater details. 
Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) define Defenders as focused and stable firms, with a limited 
range of products and customers, a cost-efficient technology, and a highly specialised and 
formalised organisational structure. The key to solving Defender’s ‘entrepreneurial 
problem’ is determining how to penetrate the firm’s current segment/market domain to 
seal off a proportion of the total market and create a stable set of products and customers. 
Growth and expansion are optional as long as there is no adverse impact on the current 
market position. In relation to the ‘engineering problem’, Defenders invest heavily in 
production or distributive technology to enhance efficiency. Similar to their attitude 
towards the entrepreneurial problem, Defenders only consider exploring broader market 
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opportunities if they can do so using their current core technology and efficiency in the 
new market can be achieved. Because of the heavy demand for production efficiency, 
Defenders appreciate mechanical and routinised process in preference to using human 
capital. The ‘administrative problem’ of Defenders is centred around determining how to 
maintain tight control to achieve efficiency. Finance and production are the two most 
important departments of the firm.  A hierarchy of centralised control systems are applied 
and follow a strict plan-act-evaluate sequence. As there is little pressure for growth and 
expansion, the top management of Defenders normally exhibit longer tenure and pay 
relatively little attention to industry and market conditions unless they have a severe 
impact on the firm.  
At the opposite end of the strategy spectrum, Prospectors are constantly engaged in a 
process of enacting and responding to their environment (Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). 
The ‘entrepreneurial problem’ facing Prospectors is to determine how to locate and 
exploit new products and market opportunities, even though the new products may 
replace some of the current products. Miles and Snow (2003, p.56) suggest that 
“maintaining a reputation as an innovator in product and market development may be as 
important, perhaps even more important, than high profitability” in the short run. 
Consistent with its ‘entrepreneurial problem’, Prospectors’ ‘engineering problem’ is to 
develop strategies that avoid long-term commitment to a single technological process, 
which may constrain their ability to capture new market opportunities. Therefore, 
Prospectors require a larger employee base, with diversified knowledge and expertise, to 
increase their technological flexibility and enable them to respond swiftly and effectively 
to change. To compensate the flexibility in production, Prospectors normally operate at a 
less efficient level than Defenders. Further, as Prospectors typically have numerous and 
diverse products and services, their administrative problem focuses on the facilitation and 
coordination between divisions.  A decentralised control system is applied to allow fast 
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responses to problem and the corresponding labour movements. Thus, Prospector’s 
average labour tenure is normally shorter than that of Defenders. Prospectors regard their 
research and development (R&D) and marketing departments as the most crucial 
functional areas in the firm. Also, as Prospectors often need to face new environments 
with little existing specialist knowledge, they design their planning process using an 
evaluate-act-plan sequence to evaluate the market condition before action and strict 
planning. 
Falling between Defenders and Prospectors in the strategy continuum are Analyzers. 
Analyzers aim to minimise risk while maximising the opportunity for profit. The key to 
Analyzers’ approach is balance, reflected in attempts to achieve product efficiency for 
traditional products, while exploiting new products after Prospectors go into the new 
market (Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). Therefore, Analyzers possess some of the attributes 
of both Defenders and Prospectors. Consequently, it is empirically challenging to 
distinguish firms pursuing this type of strategy using archival data. Finally, Reactors 
represent firms following a ‘residual’ strategy, and whose pattern of adjustment to the 
environment is both inconsistent and unstable (Miles and Snow 2003, p.81). Miles and 
Snow (1978, 2003) suggest that firms pursuing each of three potentially efficient have 
consistent and stable responses to the three business problems. However, Reactors do not 
have a set of consistent response mechanisms that they can put into effect when facing a 
changing environment. Therefore, Reactors respond to change as it occurs and this can 
lead to an inconsistency between the current response to changing environment and the 
firm’s ultimate strategy. For example, Reactors may attempt to employ an innovative 
solution to the ‘entrepreneurial problem’, while attempting to solve the ‘engineering 
problem’ by investing heavily in fixed capital. Such a combination of responses is likely 
to result in failure. Because of that, Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) suggest that to survive, 
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firms need to adopt one of the other three strategies eventually, and consequently the 
Reactor strategy is assumed to be a short-term and inefficient one. 
Following prior accounting literature (e.g. Ittner et al. 1997, Bentely et al. 2013 and 
Bentley-Goode et al. 2017), I focus on the Defender and Prospector strategies as they are 
relatively easily identified from archival data. Further, because Defenders and 
Prospectors are ‘extreme’ strategies, it is more likely that they be associated with 
measurable economic effects. Firms pursuing the other strategies (Analyzers and 
Reactors) are classified as a third group called ‘other firms’ and serve as a base group for 
comparison in my study. 
I employ Miles and Snow’s strategic typology for several seasons. First, Miles and 
Snow’s strategic framework focuses on within-industry differences in strategy, structure 
and process (Miles and Snow 2003, p.4). Analysts are known to specialise by industry, 
and thus the unit of analysis in Miles and Snow’s strategic typology assists in controlling 
for industry effects which may otherwise contaminate empirical analysis.  
Second, Miles and Snow’s strategic framework is more suitable for prediction, 
generalisation and theory building than the strategy concepts of Porter (1996) and 
Siggelkow (2001, 2002). Miles and Snow’s strategic framework is based on firm’s 
adaptive cycle consisting of three general organisational problems (entrepreneurial, 
engineering and administrative), and can be used to deduce the types of observable 
activities firms should be engaging in to achieve their ultimate goals. Because Miles and 
Snow’s framework deduct from three general organisational problems, it does not 
constrain the types of activities a firm conducts; whereas, Porter’s (1996) and 
Siggelkow’s (2001, 2002) conceptualisations are based on firm’s business activities. 
Porter’s (1996) strategic concept suggests firm’s success is based on reinforcing its 
chosen strategy with a host of “activities”, for example, functional policies, staff decisions, 
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structure, to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. Porter specifies the business 
activities and uses several firms for illustrations. Siggelkow (2001, 2002) extends Porter’s 
work by extending the set of activities and uses two firms as examples. It is likely that 
their conceptualisations of business strategy can only be applied to firms performing the 
same set of activities and this reduces external generalisability. Thus, Miles and Snow’s 
strategic framework is more suitable for the purpose of my study.  
Further, Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic framework has been used in previous 
archival accounting studies. Ittner et al. (1997) adapt Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) 
typology to examine how management’s bonus contracts are affected by business strategy. 
Ittner et al. (1997) develop an empirical measure of strategy to identify the two strategic 
types by reference to the level of research and development (R&D) investment, the size 
of employee base, historical growth of revenues and the volume of new product or service 
introduction. Later, Bentley et al. (2013) employed Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) 
strategic typology to examine the relationship between business strategy, financial 
reporting irregularities and audit effort. Bentley et al. (2013) extend Ittner et al. (1997)’s 
four factor measure, adding proxies for variation in the number of staff employed and 
capital intensity. Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) use a similar strategy metric to examine the 
impact of strategy on firms’ information environment. Thus, I follow this method and 
produce a composite measure of business strategy that allows the cross-sectional 
discrimination of strategic types. Firms that are not identified as either Defender or 
Prospectors are categorised as ‘other firms’ and form the ‘base case’ in my analysis. 
 
2.3. Industry Strategic Orientation 
Apart from examining individual firms’ strategic choices, I also investigate whether the 
entire industry that firms are belonged to exhibit strategic tendencies. The management 
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literature recognises that the impacts of corporate strategy are not restricted to firm level 
strategies, but are a joint product of firm strategic choices and industry characteristics (e.g. 
Porter 1980, Carroll et al.1992 and Amit and Schoemaker 1993). For example, Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993) suggest that firms’ choices of corporate strategy are conditional on 
industry characteristics which affects firms’ strategic choices in managing resources and 
developing capabilities. Because industries vary in the particular resources and 
capabilities required for success, it is likely for industries to exhibit specific 
characteristics that affect how firms in an industry optimally manage resources and 
develop capabilities and these strategic traits form the ‘strategic orientation’ of that 
industry (Amit and Schoemaker 1993). 
To capture the ‘industry strategic orientation’, I apply Miles and Snow’s (2003) strategic 
typology to describe industry’s strategic tendencies into three types (Prospector-oriented 
industry, Defender-oriented industry and ‘other industries’). An industry is defined as 
Prospector-oriented industry if that industry predominantly consists of traits that are 
consistent with a Prospector strategy; while a Defender-oriented industry is an industry 
that is predominantly consists of characteristics that are consistent with a Defender 
strategy. Similar to the classification for firm strategic choices, all other industries that 
are likely to exhibit traits that are consistent with an Analyzer or Reactor strategy are 
grouped together as ‘other industries’. The management literature provides some 
examples of the potential characteristics of a Prospector-oriented (Defender-oriented) 
industry. For example, the computer equipment industry (SIC code: 35-36) is a potential 
Prospector-oriented industry.  The strategic traits for computer industries are 1) timely 
introduction of innovative products (Vessey 1991, Klingebiel and Joseph 2016) and 2) a 
flexible business process system (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995 and Boons et al. 2013). 
These characteristics are consistent with the features of a Prospector strategy (e.g. 
innovation focus and decentralised or organisational structure). For Defender-oriented 
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industries, the management literature implies the wholesalers and retailers (SIC codes: 
51-59) of physical goods exhibit characteristics that are similar to a Defender-oriented 
industry. For example, the wholesalers and retailers require firms to 1) achieve economies 
of scale (Lewis and Thomas 1990 and Burt 2010), and 2) retain market share for key 
products (Segal-Horn 1987, Carroll et al. 1992 and Murray et al. 2010). These strategic 
traits are consistent with the descriptions of a Defender strategy by Miles and Snow 
(2003), such as emphasis on production efficiency and penetrating deeper into the current 
market. 
I employ a modified measure of the strategy metric developed by Bentley et al. (2013) to 
capture the average level of strategic tendency of an industry. Consistent with the firm 
level strategy measure, I produce a composite measure of industry strategic tendencies 
that allows the cross-sectional discrimination of ‘industry strategic orientations’. Similar 
to the firm level measure, industries that are not identified as either Prospector-oriented 
or Defender-oriented industry are classified as ‘other industries’ and form the control 
group in my analysis.  
Table 2.1 provides a frequency analysis of Prospector-oriented industries and Defender-
oriented industries throughout 1980 to 2015 based on two-digit historical SIC codes. The 
table shows how many times an industry is categorised as Prospector-oriented (Defender-
oriented) industries over the sample period (36 years). There are 76 times that a two-digit 
SIC industry is classified as being Prospector-oriented during the study period. The 
service industry group (SICH: 70-89) represents about 65% of the total Prospector-
oriented industries. Within the service industries, the business services industry (SICH: 
73), which includes computer software companies, demonstrates traits of Prospector-
oriented industries most consistently for 18 years, and then the engineering, accounting, 
research, management and related service industry (SICH: 87) for 9 years. Another 
relatively large group of Prospector-oriented industries are from the transportation and 
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communications services group (SICH: 40-48) representing about 16% of the total 
sample. There are 8 times that the manufacturing industry group (SICH: 20-39) is 
classified as Prospectors-oriented and these industries are generally from the computer 
equipment industry (SICH: 36) and SICH 38, the industry that consists of manufacturers 
of instruments, photographic, medical goods and watches and clocks.  
Table 2.1 Table for Frequency of Prospector-oriented Industries and Defender-
oriented Industries from 1980 to 2015 
Two-digit 
SICH code Industry Composition 
Prospector-oriented 
Industries  
Defender-oriented 
Industries 
 
 Number Proportion Number Proportion 
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 2 2.63% 10 1.74% 
10-14 Mining 0 0.00% 98 17.07% 
15-17 Construction 0 0.00% 29 5.05% 
20-39 Manufacturing 8 10.53% 258 44.95% 
40-48 Transportation and 
Communications services 12 15.79% 60 10.45% 
50-51 Wholesale trade 0 0.00% 45 7.84% 
52-59 Retail trade 0 0.00% 25 4.36% 
70-89 Services 49 64.47% 49 8.54% 
99 Others 5 6.58% 0 0.00% 
Total   76 100.00% 574 100.00% 
 
On the other hand, there are 574 incidences of Defender-oriented industries observed 
between 1980 and 2015. As expected, the manufacturing industry group (SICH: 20-39) 
contributes about 45% of the total Defender-oriented industries. More importantly, their 
appearances are extremely consistent over the sample period. For instance, SICH 24 
lumber and wood products industry and SICH 32 stone, clay, glass and concrete products 
industry both fall into the category of Defender-oriented industry for all 36 years in my 
sample. Also, the lumber and wood product industry (SICH: 24) are Defender-oriented 
industries for 34 years, 30 years for petroleum refining industry (SICH: 29), 23 years for 
rubber and miscellaneous plastic products industry (SICH: 30) and 26 years for primary 
metal industry (SICH: 33). The second largest group of Defender-oriented industries are 
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from the mining group (SICH: 10-14), where the industry of mining and quarrying of 
non-metallic mineral (SICH: 14) is also appeared as Defender-oriental industries all 
throughout the sample period. Finally, the wholesalers and retailers (SICH: 50-59) 
represent of about 12% of the total Defender-oriented industries, in which the wholesale 
trade – nondurable goods industry (SICH: 51) exhibits the highest frequently of being 
classified as a Defender-oriented industry (for 29 years).  
In summary, there is a higher incidence of Defender-oriented industries than Prospector-
oriented industries in my study period and the classification of Defender-oriented 
industries are more stable and consistent compared to the one for Prospector-oriented 
industries. 
 
2.4. The Relevance of Corporate Strategy to Analyst 
Behaviour 
In my study, ‘analyst behaviour’ refers to actions and decisions affecting the quality of 
analysts’ report (proxied by forecast accuracy and forecast bias) and their decision to 
follow a firm. Forecast accuracy is defined as the negative of the absolute difference 
between forecast performance measures and actual performance. Forecast bias is defined 
as the signed difference between actual performance and forecast performance. Analysts’ 
coverage decision refers to analysts’ decision to issue investment reports for a particular 
firm.  
It is well known that analysts are trained to perform strategy analysis. The CFA 
examination, for instance, a standard entrance exam for professional analysts, requires 
demonstrated knowledge of strategy analysis. Further, it is evident that analysts consider 
firm’s business strategy during the forecasting process. Scholarly papers such as Roger 
and Grant (1997), suggest that analysts use a substantial amount of non-financial 
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information published in the management discussion and analysis section of annual report 
to justify their earnings forecasts. Indeed, Bradshaw et al. (2011, p.5) suggest that strategy 
analysis is one of the key value-adding activities that analysts perform in their forecasting 
process:  
Analysis encompasses the process through which the analyst considers a company’s 
strategy… future prospects for sales and earnings growth, and ultimately a valuation and 
purchase or sell recommendation. 
 
Strategy analysis is plainly evident in the text of analyst reports, which frequently include 
a separate section discussing issues related to the covered firm’s strategy. For example, 
Morningstar analyst reports include a discrete section titled ‘Economic Moat’, which 
frequently contains discussion consistent with the strategic typologies proposed in the 
management literature. For example, in the Morningstar report ‘Economic Moat’ for 
AGL on 10th August 2017 (p.3), it states that AGL has “a narrow Morningstar economic 
moat rating, underpinned by its low-cost thermal generation capacity, which contributes 
the vast majority of the firm's earnings. The relatively concentrated market and cost 
advantages from vertical integration also support excess returns.” This discussion of 
AGL’s business strategy appears consistent with a Defender strategy as AGL focus on 
the management of demand and supply chain to achieve product efficiency.  
Analysts also discuss strategy-related information throughout the balance of their reports. 
For example, phrases like “defensive earnings”, “low-cost production”, which are quite 
consistent with Miles and Snow’s (2003) descriptions of a Defender, appear frequently 
throughout AGL’s report. These evidence seem to support analysts try to differentiate 
firms by business strategies. It therefore seems reasonable to predict that analysts 
incorporate firm’s strategy in their forecasting process and this may have an impact on 
forecast accuracy. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the concept of corporate strategy and why corporate 
strategy may affect analyst behaviour. For the purpose of my dissertation, corporate 
strategy is defined as the unifying theme or objectives that gives coherent and direction 
to the action and decisions of an organisation (Grant 2016). I employ the Miles and 
Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic typology to classify firms (industries) into three strategic 
groups: Prospectors (Prospector-oriented industries), Defender (Defender-oriented 
industries) and ‘other firms’ (‘other industries’) - Analyzers and Reactors to examine the 
impacts of corporate strategy on analyst behaviour including their coverage decision, 
forecast accuracy and forecast bias. To operationalise the strategic classification 
empirically, the measure developed by Ittner et al. (1997) and modified by Bentley et al. 
(2013) is used in later hypothesis testing. I also derive a measure of industry-level strategy 
measure based on the firm strategy measure from Bentley et al. (2013). The first study of 
my dissertation “Corporate Strategy and the Analyst Coverage Decision” is presented in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Study 1: Corporate Strategy and the 
Analyst Coverage Decision 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Study One examines whether and how corporate strategy affects the analyst coverage 
decision. Security analysts produce research reports, including performance forecasts and 
recommendations, which investors may use to make investment decisions (Beunza and 
Garud 2007). In doing so, they gather and analyse information from a variety of sources, 
such as company management, financial statements and industry publications, and are 
expected to develop expertise in identifying the factors that drive the profits and stock 
returns of their covered firms (Boni 2005). Thus, where information asymmetry exists 
between firms and their shareholders, analyst reports provide investors information 
incremental to that present in financial statements (Hugon and Muslu 2010). The 
significant reliance of retail investors on analyst reports makes it important to understand 
what factors affect analyst behaviour when producing these research reports. However, 
in addition to studying the behaviour of analysts who follow a given firm, analysts’ 
decision regarding whether to cover a firm has clear implications for the firm’s 
information environment and its valuation. Prior literature views analyst coverage as both 
an outcome of firms’ disclosure quality (Healy et al. 1999, Heflin et al. 2005 and Brown 
and Hillegeist 2007) and a driver of firms’ reporting quality and cost of capital (e.g. 
Bowen et al. 2008, and Lobo et al. 2012).  
Business strategy refers to a unifying theme that gives coherence and direction to the 
actions and decisions of an organisation (Grant 2016). For the purpose of this study, I 
focus on the strategic typologies developed by Miles and Snow (1978, 2003), who 
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categorise corporate strategies into three potentially effective types (Prospector, Analyzer 
and Defender) and a residual strategy (Reactor). I focus on the innovation-oriented 
strategy of ‘Prospectors’ and the efficiency-oriented strategy of ‘Defenders’, which 
represent the two endpoints of the strategy continuum, to emphasise the distinctiveness 
of firms that follow different corporate strategies. Prospectors are constantly engaged in 
innovation and who seek to respond profitably to a changing environment by investing in 
human capital and adopting decentralised organisational structures. Defenders have a 
focused and stable product range, and who pursue cost-efficient technologies, using 
highly specialised and formalised organisational structures. Analyzers seek a balanced 
strategy between Prospectors and Defenders and emphasise both efficiency and 
innovation; while Reactors are firms that are either unable to, or choose not to, pursue 
one of the three effective strategy types. In my study, both Analyzers and Reactors are 
collectively classified as ‘other firms’ and represent the third strategic group for 
comparison.3  
Prior literature finds that firm characteristics such as the level of R&D expenditure and 
disclosure quantity and quality affect the aggregate analyst coverage of a firm (e.g. Lang 
and Lundholm 1996 and Barth et al. 2001). In particular, Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) 
argue that corporate strategy can affect the number of analysts that choose to cover a 
particular firm through the impacts of informational value-adding and task complexity. 
Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) suggest that corporate strategy partly determines the level of 
uncertainty a firm faces, which can lead to mispricing; and also the needs demand for 
external financing which provides incentives to voluntarily disclose information to the 
market participates in order to reduce information cost of financing.   
                                                 
3 Thus far, the challenge of distinguishing Analysers and Reactors using archival data has proved intractable.  
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I begin my study by replicating Bentley-Goode et al.’s (2017) examination of the 
aggregate association between the corporate strategy and the analyst coverage decision, 
and then move on to examine other potential explanations for the association between 
strategy and coverage, including industry and firm level task complexity effects not 
directly considered in Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) and analysts’ private incentives (such 
as those relating to investment banking transactions). 
Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) consider separately the higher investor demand associated 
with greater information asymmetry (the ‘value-adding’ or ‘demand’ effect) affecting 
Prospectors, and reductions in task complexity (the ‘supply’ effect) caused by Prospectors’ 
more forthcoming disclosure policy.  However, I argue and show that strategy also affects 
analysts task complexity at a more fundamental level; the greater ex ante information 
asymmetry attaching to Prospectors logically increases the complexity of analysts’ task, 
before considering the potentially mitigating role of superior disclosure.  To distinguish 
the task complexity and value-adding effects of strategy on coverage decisions, I study 
the behavior of analysts conditional on proxies for their expertise. Following a long line 
of literature (Mikhail et al. 1997, Clement 1999, Jacob et al. 1999 and Clement et al. 2007, 
Drake and Myers 2011, Kim et al. 2011 and Keskek et al. 2013) I argue that analyst 
expertise affects their ability to deal with complex tasks, and thus to the extent that the 
impact of strategy on coverage is contingent on analyst expertise, a complexity 
explanation becomes more convincing. I also show that the task complexity from low 
disclosure dominates the complexity from ex ante information asymmetry in determining 
analyst coverage as my results show that expert analysts are more likely to cover 
Defenders than Prospectors. Finally, I perform additional mediation analysis to provide 
more direct evidence of the partial mediating effect of disclosure on the association 
between strategy and coverage. 
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The second aspect in which my study differs from that of Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) is 
my examination of industry-level effects. Casual observation and survey-based evidence 
suggests that analysts use a significant amount of industry level information when valuing 
a firm (Brown et al. 2015). Boni and Womack (2006) suggest that analyst’s ability to 
acquire and analyse industry-wide information provides spillover effects on top of their 
ability to process firm level information. I define industry-level strategy as a function of 
the average strategic propensities of all the firms who are members of an industry.4 
Understanding industry strategic orientation is crucial for analysts as they tend to follow 
firms by industries and it seems likely that there will be cross-sectional variation across 
industries in the importance of innovation and cost-efficiency. 5  Thus, the average 
strategic propensity of an industry, can affect the value-added by analyst reports and the 
complexity of the task analysts face, and thereby impact coverage decisions. The results 
from tests using industry-level strategic orientation are consistent with firm-level findings. 
However, the value-added and task complexity effects do not fully describe the potential 
impacts of corporate strategy on the analyst coverage decision. A substantial stream of 
literature suggests that analysts may be motivated to obtain private information from 
management, or to induce share trading or investment banking business for their 
employer, and these will affect their coverage decision (Previts et al. 1994, Lang and 
Lundholm 1996, McNichols and O’Brien 1997, Hayes 1998, Hong et al. 2000, Barth et 
al 2001 and Das et al. 2006). The demand for external financing from firms following an 
innovation-focused strategy (Prospectors) can induce analysts to follow these firms to 
attempt to gain current or future investment banking deals rather than as a result of 
                                                 
4 For example, telecommunication industry has a strategic orientation of innovation and new product 
development, whereas manufacturing industry has a strategic orientation of cost efficiency and stable 
product range. 
5 In Study 2, I extend my analysis of industry effects to consider the extent to which a firm’s strategy is 
consistent with overall industry strategic tendencies. Firms that adopt strategy consistent with the industry 
strategic orientation are more likely to be associated with information spillover effects and lower task 
complexity (Merkley et al. 2017). Further, misalignment between firm and industry strategy can suggest a 
greater chance of future business failure, which negatively affects coverage. 
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investor demand. Thus, in my additional analysis, I examine the relationship between 
corporate strategy and the analyst coverage decision through the impact of analyst 
incentives, as proxied by the size of the analysts’ employer, the covered firm’s likely 
demand for finance and whether the coverage decision occurred before or after key 
regulatory events. The results from my additional tests suggest that, following the Global 
Research Analyst Settlement (which reduced investment banking incentives) there was a 
reduction in the average size of brokers covering for Prospectors, but the aggregate 
coverage for Prospectors actually increased. Thus, the evidence of an investment banking 
explanation for the association between strategy and coverage is, at best, mixed.  
My study makes several contributions to the literature and practice. First, corporate 
strategy is an important input to the forecasting process (Bradshaw 2011), and knowledge 
of its role is potentially valuable to investors. Thus, it is important to understand the 
impact of firms’ chosen strategy on analysts’ decision to cover a firm or industry, before 
proceeding to study the impact of strategy on analyst behaviour for firms that they have 
chosen to cover. My study contributes to the literature by developing a compressive 
theoretical framework describing how corporate strategy affects the analyst coverage 
decision that future research can employ and adapt. It also contributes to the analyst 
literature by considering both the unintentional (i.e. value adding and task complexity) 
and intentional (i.e. investment banking incentives) factors derived from corporate 
strategy. The results from my study provide insights to the concurrent debate on the 
influence of analysts in their role as information intermediaries (Shane 2016). I extend 
the literature by suggesting that: 1) analysts in general cover firms for reasons that 
improve capital market efficiency (value-adding and task complexity-related reasons); 
however, 2) analysts employed by large brokerage houses might also cover firms in 
pursuit of investment banking opportunities, which may be detrimental to market 
efficiency. Further, my study makes a methodological contribution to analyst research by 
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developing a novel method of testing analyst coverage effects, modelling the individual 
analyst coverage decision, which future research may apply when examining the impact 
of analyst personal traits. Finally, the results from my study might be also of interest to 
investors interested in understanding the extent of investment banking incentive on 
reports provided by analysts employed by large brokerage houses. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: I develop hypotheses related to 
corporate strategy and analyst coverage in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 introduce the models 
and measurement of variables used to test the proposed hypotheses. Then, I describe the 
sample selection process in Section 3.4 following with the descriptive statistics in Section 
3.5. The results from testing all the hypotheses are presented in Section 3.6. Finally, I 
conclude this study in Section 3.7. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis Development 
In this section, I develop hypotheses regarding business strategy and the analyst coverage 
decision. I begin by discussing a maintained hypothesis consistent with Bentley-Goode 
et al. (2017), who examine the impact of firm strategy on aggregate analyst coverage, and 
further refine the theory relevant to their predictions. I then develop hypotheses regarding 
how average strategic propensities within an industry provide incremental information 
about member firms and thus analysts’ decision to cover a firm. Finally, I develop 
hypotheses concerning whether the relative expertise of analysts following a firm varies 
according to strategy, which may help separate competing explanations for the 
association between analyst coverage and firm or industry-level strategy. 
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3.1.1. Corporate Strategy and the Analyst Coverage Decision 
To examine the association between a firm’s strategy and the number of analysts that 
choose to cover the firm, I initially consider underlying information asymmetry and 
disclosure behaviour and explain how these may affect analysts’ decision to follow the 
firm. I provide a more comprehensive analysis of how corporate strategy affects the 
analyst coverage decision than Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). Consistent with Bentley-
Goode et al. (2017), I start by explaining the impact of corporate strategy on firms’ 
inherent riskiness and level of information asymmetry that exists as a function of the 
nature of their operations which, in turn, may affect the number of analysts covering a 
particular firm (I describe the level of information asymmetry inherent in a firm’s 
operations as ‘ex ante information asymmetry’). Then, based on the findings in Bentley-
Goode et al. (2017) which suggests that corporate strategy also affects disclosure policy, 
and thus analysts task complexity, I explain how firms’ disclosure frequency and quality 
can impact analyst coverage. I then identify a competing effect of disclosure; while 
superior disclosure per se decreases analysts’ task complexity, it also reduces ex post 
information asymmetry (the level of information asymmetry after considering the level 
of voluntary disclosure) and potentially reduces demand for analyst services.  
3.1.1.1. Ex Ante Information Asymmetry and Analyst Coverage 
Prior literature documents that the inherent riskiness of a firm’s operations may affect the 
level of information asymmetry the firm faces, and can thereby impact the number of 
analysts who choose to cover the firm (e.g. Previts et al. 1994, Chung and Jo 1996 and 
Barth et al. 2001). For example, analysts prefer to follow firms with smooth earnings 
(Previts et al. 1994), better financial performance (Chung and Jo 1996) and high R&D 
expenditures (Barth et al. 2001). However, most of these studies focus on firm 
characteristics associated with specific financial or reporting decisions such as R&D 
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expenditures, discretionary accruals and off-balance sheet assets. Organisational theory 
suggests that risks arise more generally and result from every decision the firm makes, 
such as how to cope with the external environment, what business strategy to pursue, and 
how to design the reward system (Simons 1987). Thus, nonfinancial information like that 
pertaining to corporate strategy may capture risks that cannot be easily described and/or 
explained by singular risk proxies like earnings quality or cash flow volatility. For 
example, Miles and Snow (2003) identify Prospectors as firms that focus on exploring 
new markets, and which require large investment in product innovation. These activities 
are inherently associated with greater outcome uncertainty compared to the business 
operations of Defenders, who operate in a narrow environment in which they have 
efficient resources and knowledge. Accounting literature also provides evidence that 
Prospectors are more likely to use less sustainable tax strategies, reflecting the riskiness 
of Prospectors’ underlying business activities and, in turn have higher tax risks than firms 
following other types of strategies (Neuman et al. 2012 and Higgins et al. 2015). 
Consequently, in the absence of any systematic difference in disclosure quality, managers 
(or other insiders) of Prospectors should enjoy a greater information advantage over 
outside investors regarding the distribution of future cash flows than is the case with other 
strategy types. For the purpose of this thesis, the inherent level of information asymmetry, 
before considering any impact of voluntary disclosure, is referred to as ‘ex ante 
information asymmetry’.6 
Prior literature has documented how information asymmetry can affect the demand for 
analysts’ services. Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) argue that analysts may have a greater 
incentive to cover Prospector firms, and thereby help to reduce the relatively large ex ante 
information asymmetry. Covering firms with larger ex ante information asymmetry is 
                                                 
6 It is ‘ex ante’ in the sense that it is the level of information asymmetry that exists before considering the 
impact of voluntary disclosure by the firm.  
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thus seen as a response to investors’ demand for information, and providing high quality 
coverage for such firms improves their professional rankings and reputation (e.g. Mikhail 
et al. 2004, Leone and Wu 2007 and Emery and Li 2009) and may attract greater trading 
commissions for their employers (Eccles 1988).  
In addition to the effect of pure outcome uncertainty, firm’s strategic choice can also 
influence the quality of firms’ mandatory financial reporting information, and thus ex 
ante information asymmetry, and analysts’ choice to follow a firm. Organisational theory 
suggests that firms’ strategic choices affect the major risks associated with firms’ 
operations (Simons 1999) and this can, consequently, affect the precision of information 
mandatorily provided in financial reports. Prior disclosure literature has documented that 
characteristics of firms’ mandatory financial reports, such as the level of R&D 
expenditures and/or physical assets, determine the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and outside investors (e.g. Aboody and Lev 2000 and Kothari et al. 
2002), and this affects analysts’ willing to gather private information and in turn, their 
coverage decision (e.g., Barth et al. 2001).  Prospectors are likely to invest heavily in 
innovation which leads to high intangible assets such as R&D, which are associated with 
greater difficulty in fair-value estimation because of the uniqueness of these assets and 
the absence of active secondary market (e.g. Aboody and Lev 2000 and Barth et al. 2001). 
Barth et al. (2001) find that stock of firms with greater R&D expenditure is at greater risk 
of mispricing because the valuation difficulties attaching to these assets results in firms 
typically failing to provide fair value estimates of the economic assets arising from these 
investments, and imprecise estimates of value in the case of purchased R&D. Therefore, 
the failure to recognise or disclose fair value estimates of R&D expenditures associated 
with the innovative activities, and the imprecise estimates of the value of R&D when it is 
separately disclosed further reduce the usefulness of mandatory financial reporting for 
Prospectors. This can distort investors’ expectations of the value of Prospectors’ stock 
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and create greater potential for mispricing. Consequently, in the absence of discretionary 
differences in reporting quality, Prospectors are expected to be associated with higher 
information asymmetry which, in turn, attracts analysts to follow these firms to obtain 
greater reward from their efforts when providing expert stock valuations (Barth et al. 
2001).  
Conversely, Miles and Snow (2003) suggest that Defenders normally have a fixed and 
narrow product range and focus on achieving production efficiency by relying heavily on 
physical asset investments. Defenders may thus be associated with relatively low ex ante 
information asymmetry, because the more modest variability in their business operations 
suggests lower outcome uncertainty (Higgins et al. 2015) and lower risks in estimating 
the value of physical asset investments. Consequently, the demand for analysts’ services 
is likely to be lower for Defenders. Therefore, if ex ante information asymmetry drives 
the ultimate impacts of corporate strategy on the analyst coverage decision, Prospectors 
should receive the most coverage and Defenders should receive the least coverage. ‘Other 
firms’ (Analysers and Reactors) lie in the middle of the strategy continuum and should 
receive less coverage than Prospectors and greater coverage than Defenders.  
It is important to recognise that although greater ex ante information asymmetry leads to 
greater analyst coverage through demand effects, information asymmetry also affects the 
task complexity facing analysts, which is positively associated with the level of effort 
required to cover a firm (Barth et al. 2001). Considered in isolation, greater task 
complexity reduces analyst coverage. Therefore, greater information asymmetry is 
associated with two competing effects on the analyst coverage decision: 1) a positive 
effect on the benefits to investors accruing to the analysts’ services (the ‘demand effect’), 
and 2) a positive effect on the cost of providing those services, due to greater task 
complexity (the ‘supply effect’). The following table summarises the predictions for the 
demand and supply effects on the analyst coverage decision under the strategic impact on 
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ex ante information asymmetry. As discussed above, Prospectors should be associated 
with high level of ex ante information asymmetry, which leads to greater value-added by 
the provision of coverage and  thus higher following, but also leads to higher task 
complexity, which reduces analyst coverage. Conversely, Defenders should be associated 
with low levels of ex ante information asymmetry, which leads to coverage adding less 
value for investors, but also lower task complexity which reduces the cost of providing 
coverage. 
Strategic Impacts of Ex Ante Information Asymmetry (IA) on Analyst Coverage 
Prospector 
(High IA) 
High Demand  +ve Coverage 
High Supply Cost -ve Coverage 
Defender 
(Low IA) 
Low Demand  -ve Coverage 
Low Supply Cost +ve Coverage 
 
While in theory either demand or supply effects could dominate, Barth et al. (2001) 
provides empirical evidence that incurring high R&D expenditure receive greater 
coverage, even though they require greater effort to cover. This indicates that in the case 
of R&D expenditures, the ‘demand effect’ dominates analysts’ decision to cover a firm. 
Thus, in the absence of discretionary disclosures, I predict that Prospectors should have 
greater analyst coverage than other firms because the benefits of reducing ex ante 
information asymmetry outweigh the cost of covering. 
3.1.1.2. Voluntary Disclosure and Analyst Coverage 
In addition to the inherent operational characteristics and properties of mandatory 
financial reports associated with strategic types, corporate strategy can influence firms’ 
voluntary disclosure decisions, and in turn, affect analysts’ decision to follow the firm. 
Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) find that Prospectors issue more frequent management 
earnings guidance and press releases and receive more press and analyst coverage. They 
argue that Prospectors are more willing to make voluntary disclosure than Defenders 
because of their greater reliance on external financing to fund market expansion. This, 
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combined with higher ex ante information asymmetry implies that, Prospectors have 
greater incentive to disclose information voluntarily in order to reduce firm’s cost of 
capital (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017).   
In addition to correlations with financing requirements, Miles and Snow’s (2003) 
strategic types can affect the structure of firms’ management compensation plans (e.g. 
Ittner et al. 1997, Rajagopalan 1997, Singh and Agarwal 2002, Bentley et al. 2013 and 
Bentley-Goode et al.  2017).  This observation, combined with evidence that management 
compensation plans affects firms’ incentives to provide voluntary disclosure, and thus, 
the number of analysts that follow a firm (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996 and Nagar et al. 
2003), suggests a further connection between strategy and analyst coverage, which I 
explain in more detail below.  
Miles and Snow (2003, p.28) suggest that firms’ success relies on the consistency between 
the corporate strategy employed and the organisation structure and processes developed. 
This implies that corporate strategy determines how managers should design their 
organisational structure and processes, which includes the design of the management 
reward system. For example, Prospectors are more likely to invest in innovative projects 
which are subject to high outcome uncertainty and may take a long time to achieve the 
expected returns. This requires the design of incentive plans to encourage risk taking and 
allow a longer-term horizon to yield positive returns (Rajagopalan 1997). Therefore, 
Rajagopalan (1997) and Singh and Agarwal (2002) suggest and find that Prospectors who 
employ a long-term, stock-based incentive plan (e.g. stock options) are associated with 
better performance than firms who claim to follow a Prospective strategy, but fail to have 
a consistent incentive plan to facilitate their business activities (e.g. Reactors).  
Conversely, Miles and Snow (2003) suggests that Defenders are less focused on growth 
and expansion and pay more attention to production efficiency. This implies that 
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Defender’s operations are associated with lower outcome uncertainty and higher 
likelihood to obtain positive returns in short horizon. Therefore, Defenders are relatively 
likely to use accounting-based performance measures and cash bonus in their 
management compensation plans to stimulate firm performance (Rajagopalan 1997).  
Prior disclosure literature suggests that the design of management compensation plans 
impacts firms’ incentive to provide discretionary disclosures (e.g. Noe 1999 and Nagar et 
al. 2003). Nagar et al. (2003) suggests the use of stock-based incentives elicit both good 
news disclosure (to boost stock price) and bad news disclosure (to avoid investor penalties 
on silenced and potential litigation costs) of the firms. Therefore, Prospectors’ use of 
stock-based compensation plans will increase their incentives to make discretionary 
disclosures, while Defenders’ use of accounting-based compensation plans should lead to 
lower disclosure. 
Additionally, corporate strategy may affect firm’s voluntary disclosures through product 
visibility effects. Miles and Snow (2003) suggests that Prospectors tend to invest heavily 
in marketing to promote their new products and services. One way of increasing product 
visibility is through frequent press releases (Bentley-Goode et al.  2017). On the other 
hand, the need for Prospector to increase product exposures attract external press 
coverage as management are likely to voluntarily provide information through internal 
disclosure mechanisms like to ones discussed above (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017). This 
implies that Prospectors may also be more willing to provide further explanation and 
engage in a greater amount of communications in response to analyst and investor queries 
than are Defenders, who have a relatively fixed product range that is likely to be better 
understood by the market.  
In summary, firms with more innovative strategies have stronger incentives to provide 
discretionary disclosures because of: 1) a greater demand for external financing (Bentley-
  
41 
 
Goode et al. 2017), 2) a greater use of market-based management compensation plans 
(Rajagopalan 1997) and 3) a greater need to increase product visibility (Bentley-Goode 
et al. 2017). Further, prior analyst literature documents that firms’ willingness to provide 
discretionary disclosures affects the analyst coverage decision through both demand and 
supply effects (e.g. Diamond 1985, Lang and Lundholm 1996 and Botosan and Harris 
2000). First, frequent discretionary disclosures attract analyst coverage by reducing 
analysts’ task complexity (the ‘supply’ effect). For example, Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
find that analysts prefer to follow firms with more forthcoming voluntarily disclosure and 
direct investor communications. Therefore, Prospectors, who are more likely to make 
more frequent discretionary disclosures, should attract greater numbers of analysts than 
all other firms, because the voluntary disclosures reduce analysts’ task complexity. 
Conversely, Defenders, who are less likely to make voluntary disclosures, should receive 
the lowest coverage. On the other hand, Diamond (1985) models firm’s disclosure 
function and suggests that greater volume of firm disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry. This, in turn, reduces analyst incentives to acquire and process private 
information and leads to lower coverage. If this demand effect dominates, Prospectors 
should experience a lower level of analyst coverage than all other firms.  
The following table summarises the predictions for the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ effects on 
the analyst coverage decision under the strategic impact of discretionary disclosures 
(‘DD’). As discussed above, Prospectors should be associated with more frequent 
discretionary discourses, which leads to lower demand and lower analyst following, but 
also lower cost of supply, increasing analyst coverage. Conversely, Defenders should be 
associated with lower frequency of discretionary disclosures, which suggests a high 
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value-added effect and thus higher demand and coverage, but also high task complexity 
which discourages analyst following.7  
Strategic Impacts Discretionary Disclosure (DD) on Analyst Coverage 
Prospector 
(High DD) 
Low Demand -ve Coverage 
Low Supply Cost +ve Coverage 
Defender 
(Low DD) 
High Demand +ve Coverage 
High Supply Cost -ve Coverage 
 
3.1.1.3. Summary of Firms’ Strategic Choice and the Analyst Coverage Decision 
In summary, firms’ corporate strategy may influence analysts’ coverage decision through 
two channels: 1) an association with the level of ex ante information asymmetry, and 2) 
an association with the frequency of firms’ discretionary disclosures.8 The two impacts 
affect analysts’ choice to follow a firm through competing effects on demand for analyst 
services and the cost of supplying those services. A summary of the expected prediction 
are provided in the following table. 
 
Summary of the Predictions of Strategic Impacts on Analyst Coverage 
Prospectors VS other firms 
High IA  High Demand  +ve Coverage 
High Supply Cost -ve Coverage 
High DD Low Demand -ve Coverage 
Low Supply Cost +ve Coverage 
                                                 
7 It is also possible that, the quality (as well as the quantity) of voluntary disclosure differ by strategic types, 
and that this in turn, impact analysts’ decision to follow a firm. Bentley et al. (2013) find that Prospectors 
have more frequent financial statement irregularity than Defenders, as measured by shareholder lawsuits, 
SEC enforcement actions and accounting restatements. Higgins et al. (2015) provide evidence that 
Prospectors are more aggressively engaged in tax-avoidance behaviours including low book and cash 
effective tax rates (ETRs), higher permanent book-tax differences, more additions to uncertain tax benefits 
and operations in tax haven countries. To test the propositions related to the mediating effect of voluntary 
disclosures on the relationship between corporate strategy and analyst coverage, I perform additional tests 
of mediation effect using three proxies of voluntary disclosures: numbers of earnings guidance issued, 
accrual quality and bog index (Bonsall et al. 2017) which capture both the quantitative and qualitative 
effects of voluntary disclosure. 
8 Apart from impacts derived from firm characteristics, analysts may have self-interested incentives to 
cover Prospectors rather than all other firms because of the potential investment banking business they can 
bring to their employers. I predict the first hypothesis excluding the strategic impacts from investment 
banking incentives. I will provide more discussions and predictions for investment banking incentives in a 
later section. 
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Defenders VS other firms 
Low IA  Low Demand -ve Coverage 
Low Supply Cost +ve Coverage 
Low DD  High Demand +ve Coverage 
High Supply Cost -ve Coverage 
  
Thus, when analysts are considering whether to cover a Prospector, the greater demand 
arising from high information asymmetry, and the reduced cost of supply resulting from 
firm’s greater discretionary disclosure each should increase coverage. Whereas, greater 
coverage of Defenders may result from the lower cost of supply associated with low ex 
ante information asymmetry and / or greater demand arising from limited discretionary 
disclosures. Thus, if the aforementioned factors dominate the theoretically competing 
effects (e.g. higher supply cost due to ex ante information asymmetry for Prospectors), it 
is possible for analysts to cover both Prospectors and Defenders more than ‘other firms’ 
(the Analysers and Reactors). However, given that Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) find that 
coverage is increasing in the extent to which firms display Prospector-like attributes, I 
propose two maintained hypotheses that are consistent with their findings.9  Thus, H1Fp 
and H1Fd predict that:
10 
H1Fp: Prospectors receive greater analyst coverage than ‘other firms’ within the same 
industry. 
H1Fd: Defenders receive lower analyst coverage than ‘other firms’ within the same 
industry. 
 
                                                 
9 Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) frame their hypotheses around the levels of an ordinal variable increasing in 
the extent to which firms resemble Prospectors. My study follows earlier research and focuses on groups 
of firms defined by the levels of the ordinal strategy measure. Further details are provided in the 
methodology section of this study. 
10 The suffixes in my hypothesis names indicate the level at which strategic types are identified (F = firm-
level; I = industry-level), and the strategic types that are the focus of the hypothesis (p = Prospector; d = 
Defender).  
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Although firm’s strategic choices may induce two competing effects on the analyst 
coverage decision, the results from the hypothesis tests may potentially indicate the 
relative strengths of each effect. If I find Prospectors receive more coverage than ‘other 
firms’ (Analysers and Reactors) and Defenders, this would provide evidence that either 
(or both) the ‘demand effect’ dominates the strategic impact of ex ante information 
asymmetry  and/or the ‘supply effect’ dominates the voluntary disclosure impact of the 
firm’s strategic choices on the analyst coverage decision. If, counter to prediction, I find 
that Defenders receive more coverage than ‘other firms’ and Prospectors, this would 
suggest that the strategic impact of ex ante information asymmetry is dominated by the 
‘TC effect’ and the strategic impact of voluntary disclosure is dominated by the ‘Demand 
effect’.  
I later develop hypotheses concerning coverage by expert analysts designed to shed 
further light on the driving forces behind the coverage decision.  
3.1.1.4. Industry Strategic Orientation  
In addition to individual firms’ strategic choices, entire industries may exhibit strategic 
tendencies, which may affect the likelihood that analysts cover their constituent firms. 
The management literature recognises that the impacts of corporate strategy are not 
restricted to firm’s strategic choices, but are also jointly determined by industry 
characteristics (e.g. Porter 1980, Carroll et al.1992 and Amit and Schoemaker 1993). 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) explain how strategic decisions conditioned by industry 
characteristics affects the riskiness and profitability of a firm. They argue that the 
profitability arising from a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage is determined by 
strategic choices in managing resources and developing capabilities. The identity of the 
particular resources and capabilities required for success frequently differ across 
industries (Amit and Schoemaker 1993, p.36). The industry-specific characteristics that 
  
45 
 
affect how firms in an industry optimally manage resources and develop capabilities are 
referred to as “Strategic Industry Factors”, and are defined as the strategic choices 
“determined at the market level through complex interactions among the firms’ 
competitors, customers, regulators, innovators external to the industry, and other 
stakeholders” (Amit and Schoemaker 1993, p.36).  Because the market is imperfect and 
subject to causes of market failures, such as moral hazard (Akerlof 1970), asset 
specialisation (Klein et al. 1978) and sunk costs (Caves et al. 1984), asymmetric 
distributions of resources and capabilities across firms occur, which affects the 
profitability of some firms in the industry more than others. Therefore, Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993) argue that the overlap between firms’ strategic choices and the SIFs 
is a key determinant of the profitability of individual firms. This indicates that the industry 
strategic factors affect the scope for profitability in the whole industry, and encourages a 
certain degree of common strategy across surviving firms.  A successful corporate 
strategy that produces sustainable profitability should be developed by analysing the 
characteristics and dynamics of industry strategic factors and the firm’s strategic choices 
in an integrated manner (Carroll et al.1992).  Thus, if firms in an industry tend to exhibit 
similar strategic traits, information related to the typical industry strategy and firm’s 
strategic congruence are crucial to valuation.  
Miles and Snow’s (2003) strategic typology classifies firm’s strategic choices into four 
types (Prospector, Defender, Analyser and Reactor) within an industry. However, 
applying the theory developed by Amit and Schoemaker (1993), it appears plausible that 
industries may also possess strategic tendencies. I describe these tendencies as the 
‘industry strategic orientation’. When an industry predominantly consists of traits that are 
consistent with a Prospector (Defender) strategy, it is defined as a Prospector-oriented 
(Defender-oriented) industry.  
  
46 
 
For example, the computer equipment industry (SIC code: 35-36) is a potential 
Prospector-oriented industry. The key industry strategic factors for computer industry are: 
1) timely introduction of innovative products (Vessey 1991, Klingebiel and Joseph 2016) 
and 2) a flexible business process system (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995 and Boons et al. 
2013). Vessey (1991) suggests that the timing of product introduction has severe impacts 
on firms’ future profitability. For example, firms that delay the introduction of a high-
technology product by six month than the market expected time of introduction, will 
suffer a 33% reduction in profits over a five-year period compared to firms that are on 
time (Vessey 1991). First-mover advantages and related impacts on customer switching-
costs in this industry have been recognised for many years (Lieberman and Montgomey 
1988, Kerin et al. 1992, Suarez and Lanzolla 2007 and Vecchiato 2015). Additionally, 
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) argue that rapid product innovation supported by a business 
model that support acceleration of the adoptive process are crucial to the firms’ survival. 
Therefore, firms in computer industry need to use a flexible strategic model to stimulate 
creativity and allows flexibility to improve the adoptive process. Consequently, these key 
strategic factors are consistent with the features of Prospector strategy (e.g. innovation 
focus and decentralised or organisational structure); and the strategic choices of firms in 
this industry cannot vary too far from these key factors if they are to survive. 
Conversely, wholesalers and retailers of physical goods (SIC codes: 51-59) are more 
likely to be Defender-orientated. The key industry strategic factors for many of these 
firms are: 1) economies of scale (Lewis and Thomas 1990 and Burt 2010), and 2) 
retaining market share for key products (Segal-Horn 1987, Carroll et al. 1992 and Murray 
et al. 2010). Economies of scale reflect the efficiency with which a firm deploys its 
resources and develops capability to establish competitive advantage within an industry, 
and are achieved (for retailers) by increasing average store size and capital intensity 
(Lewis and Thomas 1990). This is consistent with the focus of a Defender strategy as 
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Defenders emphasis on production efficiency and price discrimination to deter 
competitors (Miles and Snow 2003). Further, success in the retail grocery industry relies 
on the market share a firm can obtain and the focus of its product range (Segal-Horn 1987 
and Carroll et al. 1992). This behaviour is consistent with Defenders as they achieve 
growth by “penetrating deeper into their current market” (Miles and Snow 2003, p.38). 
Both of these Defender-like strategic factors in wholesale and retail industries implies 
that firms need to employ a strategy capturing these features to increase their likelihood 
of survival. 
To sum up, the corporate strategy employed by a firm is jointly determined by 
management’s strategic choices within an industry and the strategic factors that constrain 
the profitability of that industry. Therefore, information about the industry strategic 
orientation is essential to the valuation of a firm and plausibly affects analysts’ decision 
to follow firms in an industry. In reality, analysts are observed to cluster their coverage 
by industry to develop a specialisation in a particularly industry. It is also evident (e.g. in 
I/B/E/S) that analysts issue industry-level stock recommendations upon the demand of 
their employers.11 Additionally, investors value industry information and analysis that 
analysts provide. In particular, hedge funds and mutual funds are analyst’s biggest clients 
and they extremely value the industry knowledge and information sell-side analysts 
produce (Brown et al. 2015). As an important characteristic of an industry, the 
information about industry strategic orientation should have an impact on analysts’ choice 
to cover firms in an industry and this may help analysts to improve their ranking and 
reputation among investors (Mikhail et al. 2004, Leone and Wu 2007 and Emery and Li 
2009).  
                                                 
11 The industry recommendation refers to analysts’ opinion on the outlook of a particularly industry. This 
is recorded in the “etext” field in the I/B/E/S recommendation file. The field contains the text of the firm 
recommendation and the industry recommendation separated by a slash if the brokerage is issuing industry 
recommendation. Examples for industry recommendation can be “attractive” or “cautious”. 
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Applying the same logic as in previous sections, average industry strategic orientation 
should have the same set of effects on the analyst coverage decision as the impacts from 
firms’ strategic choices. Thus, the two aspects that the industry strategic orientation may 
affect the numbers of analysts follow an industry are: 1) the average level of ex ante 
information asymmetry, 2) the average frequency and quality of firm’s voluntary 
disclosures. The competing ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ effects documented in the previous 
section may also exist the industry level. For a Prospector-oriented industry, demand is 
encouraged due to the level of ex ante information asymmetry; and supply costs are lower 
due to greater voluntary disclosure. Consequently, I propose two hypotheses regarding 
the impacts of industry strategic orientation on analyst coverage, consistent with the firm 
strategy-level predictions developed above:   
H1Ip: Firms in a Prospector-oriented industry receive greater analyst coverage than 
firms in ‘other industries’. 
H1Id: Firms in a Defender-oriented industry receive lower analyst coverage than firms in 
‘other industries’. 
3.1.1. Corporate Strategy, Analyst Expertise and the Analyst Coverage 
Decision 
To attempt to distinguish the impacts of corporate strategy on the analyst coverage 
decision, I use variation in analyst expertise to generate predictions regarding the relative 
impacts of task complexity derived from ex ante information asymmetry and 
discretionary disclosure. Prior analyst literature has identified a number of analyst 
attributes that can be used as an indicator of analyst expertise (e.g. general experience, 
firm-specific experience and the number of firms an analyst follows), and these attributes 
affect analysts’ ability to deal with task complexity. I focus on the analysts general 
experience, measured by the number of years of forecasting experience, as prior literature 
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suggests that this can influence the analysts’ ability to deal with task complexity (Clement 
1999, Clement and Tse 2003, 2005, Kim et al. 2011, Drake and Myers 2011 and Casey 
2013) and, in turn, their coverage decision (e.g. Clement 1999 and Drake Myers 2011).12  
3.1.1.1. Corporate Strategy and Expert Coverage  
As previously discussed, corporate strategy affects the analyst coverage decision through 
two channels: 1) the level of ex ante information asymmetry and 2) the frequency of 
discretionary disclosure, and there are competing ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ effects 
associated with each of the broader impacts. Prior literature suggests that analysts’ general 
experience increases their ability to cope with more complex tasks by developing better 
analytical skills and relationships with management (e.g. Clement 1999), while having 
no logical impact on the level of ex ante information asymmetry that investors in a firm 
faces. Therefore, observing the differences in analyst following between experienced and 
junior analysts may help to disentangle the two impacts and infer which impact dominates 
the ultimate impacts of corporate strategy on analysts’ decision to follow a firm.  
Before discussing how analyst experience may help disentangle the two strategic impacts, 
I briefly discuss prior literature examining analysts’ motivation to cover firms with high 
task complexity. Intuitively, analysts’ motivation to take on a more difficult task should 
be the reward of higher compensation. However, prior literature on forecast accuracy 
documents inconclusive results with regards to the relationship between analyst 
compensation and task difficulty. Mikhail et al. (1999), Hong et al. (2000) and Hong and 
Kubik (2003) find analyst forecast accuracy is associated with analyst job turnover and 
career prospects that are linked to compensation. A more recent study by Groysberg et al. 
                                                 
12 Most of the other proxies for expertise identified in the literature are either not suitable for use in 
explaining the decision to cover an individual firm or, in the case of broker size, are correlated with 
investment banking incentives (which I test separately in my additional analysis). Even though firm-specific 
experience is a strong indicator of analyst expertise, it can only exist after analyst starts to cover the firm. 
The number of firms and industries covered by an analyst are endogenous to the coverage decision.  
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(2011) focussing on high-status investment banks suggests that analyst forecast accuracy 
is not a determinant of analysts’ upward career prospects, but does influence the 
possibility of being terminated (analyst turnover). This means analysts will not get higher 
compensation by simply providing accurate forecasts. However, it is possible that the 
reward associated with have high quality forecasts are already captured in the coverage 
decision. Experienced analysts may be rewarded for performing more difficult tasks when 
they first choose to follow the firms. In summary, experienced analysts should be more 
likely to follow firms with high task complexity than junior analysts. 
Based on the arguments in Section 3.1.1.3, Prospectors are expected to be associated with 
higher cost of supply due to their greater ex ante information asymmetry channel, but 
lower cost of supply arising from their more frequent discretionary disclosures. Therefore, 
if there is any net impact of task complexity on Prospector coverage, it should be 
predictably associated with the expertise of the analysts providing that coverage, because 
experienced analysts possess greater skills in dealing with less precise information 
(Clement 1999), So, if the higher task complexity arising from greater information 
asymmetry dominates any reduction in complexity arising from better disclosure, 
Prospectors should be covered by relatively expert analysts, as per H2FPe and H2IPe: 
H2FPe: The likelihood that an analyst covers a Prospector is increasing in their 
experience. 
H2IPe: The likelihood that an analyst covers a firm in a Prospector-oriented industry is 
increasing in their experience. 
Conversely, if the reduction in task complexity associated with Prospectors’ superior 
disclosure dominates their higher task complexity arising from inherent information 
asymmetry, the opposite should be true, as per H2FPeALT and H2IPALT: 
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H2FPeALT: The likelihood that an analyst covers a Prospector is decreasing in their 
experience. 
H2IPeALT: The likelihood that an analyst covers a firm in a Prospector-oriented industry 
is decreasing in their experience. 
The likely strategic impacts of voluntary disclosure and inherent information asymmetry 
are of opposite directions for Defenders relative to the case for Prospectors. Defenders 
are associated with low inherent information asymmetry which leads to low task 
complexity, however their relatively poor disclosure environment implies relatively high 
task complexity (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017). Thus, if any net effect of task complexity 
on the coverage of Defenders is dominated by these firms poor disclosure environment, 
one would expect that Defenders would be covered by relatively expert analysts, as per 
H2FDe and H2FPe: 
H2FDe: The likelihood that an analyst covers a Defender is increasing in their experience. 
H2IDe: The likelihood that an analyst covers a firm in a Defender-oriented industry is 
increasing in their experience.  
Conversely, if the lower task complexity associated with lower inherent information 
asymmetry dominates the effects of weak disclosure, Defenders would be followed by 
relatively inexpert analysts, as per the alternate hypotheses below: 
H2FDeALT: The likelihood that an analyst covers a Defender is decreasing in their 
experience. 
H2IDeALT: The likelihood that an analyst covers a firm in a Defender-oriented industry is 
decreasing in their experience.  
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3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. Models for Testing Hypotheses 1F and 1I 
Hypotheses 1F and 1I examine the relationship between the firm’s strategic choices (H1F) 
and industry strategic orientation (H1I) and the analyst coverage decision.  H1Fp (H1Ip) 
predict that Prospectors (Prospector-oriented industries) should receive greater coverage 
than ‘other firms’ (‘other industries’), while H1Fd (H1Id) predicts that Defenders 
(Defender-oriented industries) receive lower coverage than ‘other firms’ (‘other 
industries’). To test these hypotheses, I adapt the model of Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), 
replacing the continuous measure of strategy with the dichotomous variables indicating 
firm strategic types. I use a similar approach for tests of industry strategic orientation. 
Model 1 is estimated using negative binomial regressions of firm-year observations of 
aggregate analyst coverage, defined as the number of analysts following a firm in a given 
year (hereafter the ‘aggregate coverage sample’).13 In Model 2, I use a logistic regression 
to estimate the probability of an individual analyst covering a firm during a year, 
conditional on its strategy and on that analyst covering at least one firm in the firm’s 
industry in the same year (hereafter the ‘individual  coverage sample’). The dependent 
variable is set equal to one if that analyst covers a firm, and otherwise equals zero. All 
models include year and industry fixed effects, and standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering by firm using the method of Petersen (2009). I also winsorised or transformed 
the dependent variables and control variables where appropriate. For brevity, year and 
industry subscripts have been omitted: 
AGG_COVERAGE = β0 + β1PROS_F (PROS_I) + β2DEF_F 
(DEF_I) + β3CFVOL + β4lnASSET + β5LOSS 
+ β6ROA + β7BTM + β8LEVERAGE + 
Model 1 
                                                 
13 Negative binomial regressions are used because the dependent variable is a type of ‘count data’, and OLS 
estimates may be biased when applied to this type of data. Nevertheless, the use of OLS on these samples 
does not result in any inferences different to those under negative binomial regressions.  
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β9FREE_CASH + β10EXT_FINANC+ 
β11VOLUME + ε 
INDIV_COVERAGE = β0 + β1PROS_F + β2DEF_F + β3CFVOL + 
β4lnASSET + β5LOSS + β6ROA + β7BTM + 
β8LEVERAGE + β9FREE_CASH + 
β10EXT_FINANC+ β11VOLUME + 
β12EXPERIENCE + β13BROKERSIZE + ε 
Model 2 
    
Where:     
AGG_COVERAGE = the number of analysts following the firm within the 90-
day window leading up to the earnings announcement. 
INDIV_COVERAGE = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if an analyst covers a firm 
during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model 
of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 to 30 where 
high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other 
firms) [Defender] firms, respectively. 
PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score 
is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise. 
DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score 
is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. 
IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level discrete strategy score, estimated using a 
method derived from Bentley et al. (2013). First, within 
each industry-year, I calculate the weighted-average values 
for each of the six strategy components using firms’ total 
assets as weights.  Then, I rank each industry mean within 
the year and use the rankings to calculate the industry 
strategy score the same manner as the firm ones. The score 
values ranging from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] 
values indicate Prospector strategy-oriented (other 
strategy-oriented) [Defender strategy-oriented] industries, 
respectively. 
PROS_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise.  
DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY 
score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. 
Controls:   
CFVOL = the covered firm’s cash flow volatility, calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s 
cash flows from operations over the past five years divided 
by total assets. 
lnASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets of the covered firm at 
the end of the year. 
LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if prior year income before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT: ib) is negative for the 
covered firm, and 0 otherwise.  
ROA = the covered firm’s return on assets, calculated as income 
before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) 
at the end of the year. 
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BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total 
common equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market 
capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT. 
LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of total debt (lt) scaled by total 
assets (at). 
FREE_CASH = the covered firm’s cash from operations (oancf) minus 
average capital expenditures (capx) for the last five years, 
scaled by current assets (act). 
EXT_FINANC = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the firm’s variable 
FREE_CASH for the covered firm is less than -0.5, and 0 
otherwise. 
VOLUME = the covered firm’s annual trading volume (cshtrm) of 
firm’s stock in million. 
Individual Analyst Attributes:  
EXPERIENCE = the numbers of years since the analysts’ forecasts first 
appeared in I/B/E/S. 
BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in 
a given financial year. 
 
H1Fp and H1Fd would be supported if the coefficients for PROS_F is significantly positive 
and that for DEF_F is negative and significant. The intercept, β0 captures average 
coverage of firms pursing other strategies (like Analysers and Reactors). Equivalent 
predictions are applied to industry strategic measures.  
The measurement of key variables is discussed below. 
3.3.1.1. Dependent Variable  
Aggregate Analyst Coverage 
The aggregate level of analyst coverage (AGG_COVERAGE) is defined as the number 
of analysts covering a firm (industry) during the window commencing 90 days before the 
annual earnings announcement and extending to the earnings announcement date.  
Individual Analyst Coverage 
The individual analyst coverage decision captures the probability that an individual 
analyst covers a particular firm in a given year, on the condition that the analyst covers at 
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least one other firm in the same industry-year.14  INDIV_COVERAGE is set equal to one 
if an analyst covers a firm, and zero otherwise.  
3.3.1.2. Test Variables 
Firm Strategy 
Following Ittner et al. (1997) and Bentley et al. (2013), firm strategic type is initially 
measured by estimating an ordinal strategy score (STRATEGY) for each firm-year, and 
identifying particular types by reference to ranges within the strategy score. 
Based on Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic typology, I first construct a discrete 
ordinal strategy score, STRATEGY, which is used to identify the strategic types. Six 
components are included in the STRATEGY score:  
 The ratio of research and development (R&D) expenditure to sales 
(COMPUSTAT: xrd/sale; Variable: RDS5) 
 The ratio of employees to sales (emp/sale; Variable: EMPS5) 
 The one-year percentage change in total sales as a historical growth measure 
(salet/salet-1-1)*100; Variable: REV5) 
 The ratio of sales, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (xsga) to sales 
(xsga/sale; Variable: SGA5) 
 The standard deviation of total employee (emp) as a measure of employee 
fluctuations (Variable: sd_EMPS5)  
 Net PPE scaled by total asset –inversed ranked  (ppent/at; Variable: CAP5) 
 
Prospectors are expected to have higher observed values for each of the six measures 
above. All six measures are computed using five-year rolling averages. Next, firms in 
                                                 
14 The requirement that the analyst follows at least one other firm in an industry-year is imposed to limit 
the sample to a workable size. Without this restriction, the sample size would be the number of analysts on 
I/B/E/S x number of firms x 26 years, and the unconditional probability of coverage for each firm would 
be exceptionally small. 
  
56 
 
each two-digit SIC industry-year are ranked according to each of the six measures and 
assigned to quintiles. For the net PPE measure, I reverse the quintile ranks, so that for all 
component variables a higher rank indicates a greater propensity to adopt a Prospector 
strategy.  Within each firm-year-measure those observations in the highest quintile are 
assigned a score of 5, and those in the lowest quintile a score of 1.  The composite 
STRATEGY score is the sum of the six quintile rankings and, by construction, has a 
maximum of 30 and a minimum value of 6. 
Following Bentley et al.  (2013), I identify the three strategy types described in Miles and 
Snow (1978, 2003) as: scores ranging from 24 to 30 inclusive – Prospectors; scores 
ranging from 13 and 23 inclusive – other firms; and scores ranging from 6 to 12 – 
Defenders. Therefore, my two dichotomous test variables measuring strategic types are 
defined as follows:  PROS_F is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the discrete STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and otherwise 0; and DEF_F is a dummy variable, equal to 1 
if the discrete STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, otherwise 0. The main test 
variables for the set of H1F tests are the indicator variables for PROS_F and DEF_F. 
Industry Strategic Orientation 
The industry strategic orientation measure is developed using similar logic to the measure 
of firm’s strategy used in Bentley et al.  (2013), and represents an estimate of the industry-
average discrete strategy score based on the strategy scores of all the firms in an industry 
each year. Following the logic of the firm-level approach, I calculate the (total asset) 
weighted-average value of the six components of strategy score for each two-digit SIC 
industry by years using the five-year average values of all the firm’s composite variables 
in that industry-year. Then, the two-digit SIC industries are ranked according to each of 
the six composite measures every year and assigned to quintiles. The composite 
IND_STRATEGY score is the sum of the six quintile rankings and, by construction, has 
a maximum of 30 and a minimum value of 6. Industries score a range from 24 to 30 
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inclusive – Prospector-oriented industry; score a range from 13 to 23 inclusive – industry 
with other strategic orientation; and score a range from 6 to 12 – Defender-oriented 
industry. Therefore, my two dichotomous test variables measuring industry strategic 
orientation are defined as follows:  PROS_I is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the discrete 
IND_STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and otherwise 0; and DEF_I is a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if the discrete IND_STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, otherwise 
0. I use both the IND_STRATEGY score and the two indicator variables for 
IND_PROSPECTOR and IND_DEFENDER as test variables for the set of tests for H1I. 
3.3.1.3. Control Variables 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Aboody and Lev 2000, Barth et al. 2001 and Bentley-
Goode et al. 2017), Models 1(a) and (b) control for firm characteristics that are likely to 
impact information asymmetry, and which may potentially be correlated with strategy. 
These control variables are described below. 
CFVOL 
Consistent with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), cash flow volatility is measured by the 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s cash flow from operation over 
the past five years divided by total assets (CFVOL). A positive association between the 
number of analyst following a firm (COVERAGE) and cash flow volatility is expected 
as cash flow volatility is associated with high information asymmetry and price volatility 
which attracts analysts to follow the firm (Eccles 1988 and Wang 1993). CFVOL is also 
conceivably correlated with corporate strategy. Prospectors are expected to be associated 
with higher cash flow volatility because of the riskiness and outcome uncertainties 
associated with R&D investments, while Defenders focus on a stable product market 
which ensure them to have more persistent cash flows (Miles and Snow 2003).  
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lnASSET 
I also control for firm size using the natural logarithm of total assets (lnASSET) (Bentley-
Goode et al. 2017). Thus, I will use the market capitalisation as a control in additional 
tests. The coefficient of lnASSET is expected to be positive as investors are more likely 
to demand for information of large firms and analysts gain more benefits such as superior 
professional rankings and reputation by covering these firms (Mikhail et al. 2004, Leone 
and Wu 2007, Emery and Li 2009).15 
3.3.2. Firm Performance 
To control for the impact of other firm characteristics on firm’s voluntary disclosure, I 
include two controls for firm performance (Verrecchia 1983).  Return on assets (ROA), 
calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total asset is employed as a 
control for profitability (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017). Following Bentley-Goode et al. 
(2017), I also control for the impact of bad news on discretionary disclosures (e.g. Skinner 
1994) by including a dummy for loss-making firm-years. The variable LOSS equals one 
if the firm’s income before extraordinary items was negative in the prior year, and zero 
otherwise. A positive (negative) relationship between the number of analysts following 
the firm and ROA (LOSS) is expected as analysts are more likely to follow firms with 
better financial performances (Chung and Jo 1996). 
Firm Growth 
The firm’s growth opportunities affect the numbers of analyst following a firm (e.g. Barth 
et al. 2001). Prior analyst literature, for example Aboody and Lev (2000) and Barth et al. 
(2001) use the change in sales as a proxy for firm growth. However, Miles and Snow’s 
(2003) typology implies that the change in sales is strongly correlated with corporate 
                                                 
15 Prior analyst literature examining the analyst coverage decision predominately uses the natural logarithm 
of firm’s market capitalisation as a control for firm size (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996 and Barth et al. 
2001). The results reported later in this study are not substantively affected if I use market capitalisation, 
rather than total assets, as the basis of my size control. 
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strategy. For example, Prospector’s key strategic focus is product market expansion 
which increase volatilities of change in sales, whereas Defenders are more like to stick 
with a fixed product range to earn a persistent level of sales (Miles and Snow 2003). 
Because of that, change in sales is one of the component used in calculation the strategy 
score measure as well. To avoid potential multicollinearity, I use the book-to-market ratio 
(BTM) as a proxy for firm growth, consistent with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). BTM 
equals to the firm’s total common equity outstanding divided by market capitalisation 
from COMPUSTAT. The coefficient of BTM is expected to be negative as analysts are 
more likely to follow firms with opportunities of future growth (Barth et al. 2001). 
Demand for External Financing 
Prior literature suggests firms’ reliance on external financing affects firm’s discretionary 
disclosure and information asymmetry (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). I use 
LEVERAGE, measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets, as my first proxy for 
firm’s demand for external financing (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017). Firms’ demand for 
external financing may be associated with strategic choices. Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) 
argues that Prospectors are more likely to require external financing to fund their R&D 
investments and this affects the choices of analysts to follow a firm in two ways. First, 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) suggests that firms makes more discretionary disclosure 
to reduce their cost of capital and that reduces the ex-ante information asymmetry of that 
firm. If the reduction in information asymmetry dominates, I expect a negative 
relationship between the coverage decision and leverage as the benefits from making 
profitable recommendations are lower (Eccles 1988). On the other hand, firm’s financing 
requirements are also associated with higher probability of investment banking 
opportunities for analysts’ employers (e.g. Lin and McNichols and Kothari and 
Kolasinski 2008). If the incentives for investment banking opportunities dominates, I 
expect a positive relationship between analyst following and leverage.  
  
60 
 
To further control for the potential impact of external financing on the analyst coverage 
decision, I use free cash flow (FREE_CASH) and an indicator variable for financial 
distress (EXT_FINANC) to capture the needs for external financing following Bentley-
Goode et al.  (2016). FREE_CASH is measure by the cash from operation minus the 
capital expenditure scaled by current assets to capture the liquidity of the firm. As firms 
that have a negative free cash flow are more likely to be under financial distress. Thus, 
EXT_FINAC is an indicator variable that set equal to one if the scaled free cash flow of 
the firm is below -0.5. Similar to LEVERAGE, I expect a positive relationship between 
the number of analyst followings and FREE_CASH if negative free cash flow indicates 
more disclosures to reduce firm’s cost of capital. This leads to lower analyst coverage as 
the benefits of making profitable recommendations are lower (Eccles 1988). I expect a 
negative relationship between the analyst following and FREE_CASH if negative free 
cash flow indicates potential investment banking opportunities (e.g. SEOs) which 
increases analyst followings. Different from FREE_CASH, EXT_FINAC is a direct 
measure of firm’s financial distress which should reflect the impact of analyst incentives 
for investment banking opportunities on the analyst coverage decision.  
Analyst Attributes 
Consistent with Barth et al. (2001), I control for the potential incentive for analysts to 
generate trading commissions for their brokerage houses by increasing the trading volume 
of the covered stock. Thus, VOLUME measures the annual trading volume of the firm’s 
stock, in millions of shares. A positive relationship is expected between the analyst 
coverage decision and trading volume as analysts are more likely to cover firms with high 
trading volume to maximise the trading commissions received by their brokerage houses.  
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Additional Controls Used in Models of the Individual Analyst Coverage Decision 
To control for the impact of individual analyst attributes on their choices to follow a firm, 
I include two controls, general experience (EXPERIENCE) and the size of analyst’s 
employers (BROKERSIZE) in the model that uses the individual analyst coverage sample. 
Based on prior literature, general experience of analyst is measured by the number years 
that an analyst exists in the I/B/E/S (Clement 1999, Clement and Tse 2003, 2005, Kim et 
al. 2011, Drake and Myers 2011 and Casey 2012). A positive relationship between the 
probability of an analyst to follow a firm and general experience is expected as 
experienced analysts possess better ability and takes less effort to cover a firm (Clement 
1999 and Drake and Myers 2011). EXPERIENCE is also conceivably correlated with 
corporate strategy as the high task complexity associated with Prospectors’ high ex ante 
information asymmetry might be mitigated by analyst experiences on the jobs. 
As discussed in hypothesis development section, the characteristics of analyst’s 
employers (BROKERSIZE) can influence analyst following through the reduction of task 
complexity (e.g. Clement 1999 and Drake and Myers 2011) and the incentives associated 
with investment banking opportunities (e.g. Lin and McNichols 1998 and Kothari and 
Kolasinski 2008). BROKERSIZE is also potentially correlated with corporate strategy as 
large brokerage houses might provide resources to reduce analyst’s task complexity. For 
example, the reputation and administrative assistance offered by large brokerage houses 
can reduce the difficult for assists to access private information in Defender firms 
(Clement 1999 and Drake and Myers 2011). The size of a brokerage house 
(BROKERSIZE) is measured by the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house 
who provide forecasts to I/B/E/S in a given financial year. A positive association is 
expected between the individual analyst coverage decision and the size of a brokerage 
house as large brokerage house have more resources to reduce analyst’s cost to cover a 
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firm and might be associated with greater incentive to obtain investment banking 
opportunities.  
3.3.2. Models for Testing Hypotheses 2F and 2I 
Hypotheses 2F and 2I examine how analyst expertise differentiates the strategic impacts 
of ex ante information asymmetry and discretionary disclosure on the analyst coverage 
decision. The proxy for analyst expertise is analysts’ general experience. H2FPe (H2IPe) 
predicts that Prospectors (Prospector-oriented industries) should receive more coverage 
from relatively experienced analysts if the task complexity effects arising  from ex ante 
information asymmetry  dominates task complexity effects arising from superior 
disclosure, while alternate forms of each hypothesis make an opposite prediction. H2FDe 
(H2IDe) predicts that Defenders (Defender-oriented industries) should receive more 
coverage from experienced analysts if the increased task complexity arising from these 
firms expected poor disclosure dominate the similar effects arising from Defenders’ lesser 
degree of ex ante information asymmetry. To test these hypotheses, I first regress the 
average expertise of analysts following a firm in a given year, against the strategy 
measures and control variables which include the simple level of analyst coverage for that 
firm. Model 3 is estimated on the aggregate coverage sample. I then employ Model 4, 
which regresses individual analysts’ choice to cover a firm, against the interaction 
between analyst expertise and firms’ strategic choices with other control variables. Model 
4 is estimated the individual coverage sample using logistic regression. For brevity, year 
and industry subscripts have been omitted: 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE = β0 + β1PROS_F (PROS_I) + β2DEF_F 
(DEF_I)  + β4COVERAGE + 
β5MEAN_BROKERSIZE + 
ΣβiCONTROLS + ε 
Model 3 
INDIV_COVERAGE = β0 + β1PROS_F + β2DEF_F + 
β3EXPERIENCE+  β4PROS_F* 
Model 4 
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EXPERIENCE + β5DEF_F* 
EXPERIENCE + Σ βiCONTROLS + ε 
    
Where:   
MEAN_EXPERIENCE = the average years of forecasting experience recorded in 
I/B/E/S of all analysts who follows a firm during the 
financial year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’. 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE = the average number of analysts employed by a brokerage 
house in a given year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’. 
EXPERIENCE = The proxy for analyst expertise in the ‘individual 
coverage sample’, which is measured by the numbers of 
years that an analyst exists in the I/B/E/S. 
PROS_F* 
EXPERIENCE 
= an interaction variable of the Prospector dummy and 
count variable EXPERIENCE to capture the incremental 
effect of Prospector strategy modified by analyst 
expertise. 
DEF_F* 
EXPERIENCE 
= an interaction variable of the Defender dummy and count 
variable EXPERIENCE) to capture the incremental effect 
of Defender strategy modified by analyst expertise. 
COVERAGE = the AGG_COVERAGE variable in Model 1 for testing 
H1 which is the number of analysts following the firm 
counted during the 90 days before the earnings 
announcement. 
 
All other variables are defined as per the discussion of Models 1 and 2. 
In Model 3, H2FPe would be supported if the coefficient on PROS_F is positive and 
significant, while H2FDe   would be supported if the coefficient on DEF_F is positive and 
significant.  For tests using the individual coverage sample, a significant positive 
coefficient for PROS_F* EXPERIENCE would support H2FPe, while finding the 
coefficient on DEF_F* EXPERIENCE to be significantly positive would support H2FDe. 
The coefficient for the main effect of EXPERIENCE in Model 4 captures the impact of 
analyst expertise on analysts’ decision to follow firms pursuing ‘other strategies’. 
The equivalent predictions are applied to the model for industry strategic measures. 
The measurement of variables not previously introduced is discussed in the following 
sections.  
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3.3.2.1. Dependent Variable in Model 3 - MEAN_EXPERIENCE 
Model 3 regresses the average expertise of analysts following a firm in a given year, 
against the strategy measures with control variables which include the number of analysts 
covering the firm. Following Clement (1999), I use analyst general experience as a proxy 
for analyst expertise. The expertise of an individual analyst is estimated as the number of 
years elapsed since the analyst first appeared in the I/B/E/S Forecast Detail History File. 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE is the average of experience of all analysts following the firm 
during the particular year. 
3.3.2.2. Additional Control Variables in Model 3 
COVERAGE 
COVERAGE is an additional control variable employed in Model 1 for testing 
Hypotheses 2F and 2I, which is consistent with the measure of AGG_COVERAGE 
variable in Model 1 for testing H1F and H1I. It measures the number of analysts following 
the firm during the 90-day window leading to the earnings announcement. 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 
I control for the average size of analysts’ employers because it is correlated with analysts’ 
general experience. Large brokerage houses are likely to have more experienced analysts 
than small brokerage houses (Clement and Tse 2003). Corresponding to the average 
general experience (MEAN_EXPERIENCE), MEAN_BROKERSIZE is defined as the 
average number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a given financial year in 
the aggregate coverage sample.  
3.3.2.3. EXPERIENCE in Model 4 
Model 4 is the regression for the probability of an individual analyst to cover a firm 
including the interaction between analyst expertise and firm’s strategic choice. In Model 
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4, EXPERIENCE measures the analyst general experience which captures the impact of 
analyst expertise on moderating the relationship between corporate strategy and the 
analyst coverage decision. It is defined as the numbers of years since the analyst initially 
issued a forecast that was recorded in I/B/E/S. PROS_F*EXPERIENCE is the interaction 
between analyst general experience and Prospector dummy.  It captures the incremental 
effect of Prospector strategy modified by analyst expertise. 
3.3.2.4. Test Variable in Model 4 
DEF_F*EXPERIENCE is the test variable in Model 2 measured by the interaction 
between Defender dummy and count variable EXPERIENCE. It captures the incremental 
effect of Defender strategy modified by analyst general experience. Thus, the sign of the 
coefficients for DEF_F*EXPERIENCE indicates whether experienced analysts covers 
more (less) Defenders than junior analysts.  
 
 
3.4. Data Collection and Sample Selection 
The data for analyst attributes are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (hereafter ‘I/B/E/S’), while the data for financial reporting variables and stock 
price are obtained from Compustat and CRSP respectively. Regression models for all 
hypotheses are first estimated on a firm-year sample in which the dependent variable 
represents the number of analysts following a firm in a given year (the ‘aggregate 
coverage sample’). The data collection and sample derivation of this sample are described 
in Section 3.4.1. I also report tests of the probability of an individual analyst covering a 
firm conditional on its strategy and on the analyst following at least one firm in the firm’s 
industry in the same year (the ‘individual coverage sample’), for  which observations 
  
66 
 
represent analyst-firm-year combinations. The data collection and sample derivation for 
this sample are provided in Section 3.4.2.  
3.4.1. The Aggregate Coverage Sample 
The derivation of my aggregate coverage sample is described in Table 3.1. The data for 
my aggregate coverage sample is drawn from U.S firms in the Compustat Annual 
Fundamental file between 1980 and 2015. Consistent with Bentley et al. (2013), the data 
collection period begins in year 1980 because most of the data required to calculate the 
strategy measures are consistently recorded from 1980s. However, the sample used for 
hypothesis testing starts in 1987, because of the use of 5-year moving window used in the 
strategy measures and the availability of cash flow statement data from the late 1980s.  I 
follow the approach of Bentley et al. (2013) to construct the sample. The initial sample 
comprises 379,098 firm-years with non-negative sales and assets. To calculate the 
strategy measure, I use the historical SIC codes to identify the industry that firms are 
operating in. However, about 36% of firm-years are missing historical SICs. Instead of 
excluding these firms like Bentley et al.  (2013) and Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), I replace 
the missing historical SIC codes with firm’s current SIC code to preserve observations. 
However, because almost half of the missing historical SIC codes (about 45%) occur 
during the period of 1980 and 1990, this modification causes a relatively small difference 
between my final sample those reported in Bentley et al. (2013) and Bentley-Goode et al. 
(2017). I then exclude the utilities and financial industries (with historical SIC 4900-4999 
and 6000-6999) to avoid the impact of regulation on firm’s strategic choices. Consistent 
with Bentley et al.  (2013, p. 20), I require at least three years of non-missing observations 
within the five-year window and six years of consecutive financial years in Compustat 
database for each of the strategic component used to compute the strategy scores to 
calculate a five-year rolling average. However, after following this sample selection 
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process, the sample attrition is about 10% greater than in Bentley et al. (2013). The 
difference is due to the treatment of missing R&D values.16 Bentley et al.  (2013) and 
Bentley-Goode (2017) replace missing R&D expenditures with zero, as is common in 
prior literature. However, Koh and Reeb (2015) find that about 10.5% of the missing 
R&D firms possess patent records and this percentage is 14 times greater than the firms 
actually record a zero R&D expenditure in Compustat. After controlling for missing data 
for firms without the five-year rolling averages of all six component of the strategy scores, 
my sample for the strategy measure is 70,402 from 1987 to 2015. Even though the earliest 
strategy score available calculated is for 1984, 1987 is the earliest year for which data for 
the cash flow volatility control variable is available, and the first year for which there is 
five years of prior cash flow data is 1992. Thus, after the calculation of five-year rolling 
average, the final for observations that have a strategy score is 60,177 from 1992 to 2015. 
This is because I need to first five years from 1987 to 1991 to calculate rolling average 
for the STRATEGY score. I also use this sample to construct the industry strategic 
orientation because the sample selection process for industry strategic orientation is 
identical to the one for the firm’s strategic score.  
Table 3.1 Sample Selection for the Aggregate Coverage Sample 
Panel A: Sample Selection from COMPUSTAT for Aggregate Coverage 
Descriptions Observations 
Compustat data for years 1980 and 2015 (negative sales and assets) 378,779 
Less Utilties and Financial Industries (historical SIC 4900-99 amd 
6000-999) 
(106,826) 
Less required 5 year rolling average data for STRATEGY measure (196,587) 
Less missing value for all 6 STRATGY component variables per 
company-year 
(5,063) 
Less years control variables first to have data from 1992 (10,126) 
Total Observations for STRATEGY composite score dataset 
(1992-2015) 
60,177 
  
                                                 
16 I have corresponded with Kathleen Bentley-Goode (nee Bentley) to confirm the treatment of R&D in 
their samples. 
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Panel B: Sample Selection from IBES   
Firms with forecasts in the 90-day window prior to earnings 
announcement (1991-2015) 
93,295 
  
Panel C: Matching of Data from IBES to COMPUSTAT 
Number of observations from Compustat (per Panel A) 60,177 
Less firms with no analyst following during the 90-day window 
prior to earnings announcement 
(25,187) 
  
Total Observations for STRATEGY composite score with 
analyst coverage  
34,990 
  
Less: Missing values from control variables (7,758) 
  
Final Sample for the aggregate analyst coverage (firm-years) 27,232 
 
The sample of observations of analyst coverage is obtained from the I/B/E/S Forecast 
Detail History file. I calculate the number of analysts following a firm within the window 
commencing 90 days prior to the annual earnings announcement and terminating at the 
announcement date. There are 93,295 firm-years with analyst coverage during that 
window between 1992 and 2015.17 Matching the analyst coverage and strategy samples 
further reduces the sample available for testing because only relatively large and mature 
firms receivable analyst coverage and have enough data to compute the strategy score. 
Finally, after considering control variables, the final sample for the aggregate analyst 
coverage sample is 27,232 firm-year observations representing 4,088 unique firms.18  
                                                 
17 To maintain consistency with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), I exclude from my sample firms that are not 
followed by any analysts. My results are not substantively affected if I include these observations in the 
sample as zero-coverage firms.  
18 There are other causes of minor differences in my sampling approach relative to Bentley-Good et al. 
(2016). Unlike Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), I do not need restrict my sample to firms covered by at least 
three analysts in order to calculate forecast dispersion, nor do I need to match the sample with data from 
First Call. I also include additional controls for analyst incentives (e.g. VOLUME) to capture their potential 
impact on analyst coverage decision. 
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3.4.2. The Individual Coverage Sample 
I present the sample selection of the individual coverage sample in Table 3.2. When 
constructing the individual coverage sample, the derivation of the strategy score sample 
is identical to that used in the aggregate coverage sample. The total sample for firms with 
composite strategy scores is 60,117 (Pane A, Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Sample Selection for the Individual Coverage Sample 
 
Panel B of Table 3.2 describes the procedures used in constructing the sample that 
presents individual analysts’ choice to cover a firm. All data are obtained from the I/B/E/S 
Forecast Detail History File. I first restrict this sample to analyst-firm-years where the 
analyst follows at least one firm in the industry-year of which the firm-year is a member 
(1,114,567 analyst-firm-years). For each firm, I then expand and fill the panel in null form, 
such that analysts who follow at least one other firm in the same industry-year, but do not 
Panel A: Sample Selection from COMPUSTAT for Individual Coverage 
Descriptions  Observations  
Total Observations for STRATEGY composite score dataset (1992-
2015) 60,177 
  
Panel B: Sample Selection from IBES   
Numbers of individual analysts following a firm per industry-year 1,114,567 
Generate sample representing whether an analyst covers a firm per 
industry-year (no. of analysts-firm-year)   51,817,229  
  
Panel C: Matching of Data from COMPUSTAT to IBES 
Generate sample for representing whether an analyst covers a firm per 
industry-year (per Panel B)     51,817,229  
Less missing STRATEGY composite score dataset (28,061,763) 
  
Total Observations for STRATEGY composite score with at least one 
analyst choose to cover the firm 23,755,466 
  
Less:  Missing values from control variables (6,936,844) 
Final Sample for the individual analyst coverage (analyst-firm-years) 16,818,622 
  
70 
 
follow this particular firm, are represented by a null observation for the dependent 
variable. This results in an intermediate sample of 51,817,229 analyst-firm-year 
observations. After merging with the strategy score and control variable data, the final 
sample available for hypothesis testing using ‘the individual coverage sample’ is 
16,818,622 observations.  
 
3.5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This section presents the descriptive statistics and main results of this study. Section 3.5.1 
and 3.5.2 provides the descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation matrix for both 
the aggregate coverage sample and the individual coverage sample, for variables involved 
in the hypothesis testing.  
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3 provides the industry composition for the sample used to calculate strategy 
scores by two-digit historical SIC codes and Fama and French 17 industry classifications. 
My strategy score sample consists of 60,177 total firm-year observations, which includes 
4,833 Prospector firm-years and 5,501 Defender firm-years. The remaining sample 
includes firms following other strategies (Analysers or Reactors). Compared to Bentley 
et al. (2013), there are fewer Prospectors in my sample.19 This is driven largely by my 
decision to exclude firms with missing R&D data instead of replacing them with zero. 
This decision reduces (increases) the proportion of Prospectors (Defenders) in my sample.   
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that the percentage of Prospectors and Defenders varies by 
industry. For example, about 15% of the Defenders are from retail-based industries (SICH: 
                                                 
19 Bentley-Goode et al.  (2013) report lower numbers of Defenders than Prospectors where the Defenders 
represent only 6% of their sample compared to about 9% in my sample. 
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Table 3.3 Table for Industry Composition 
          
Panel A SICH Industry Classification         
Two-digit 
SICH code Industry Composition Full Sample Prospectors Defenders 
  (N=60,177) (N=4,833) (N=5,501) 
  Number Proportion Number Proportion 
Proportion 
Industry Number Proportion 
Proportion 
Industry 
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 122 0.20% 9 0.19% 7.38% 46 0.84% 37.70% 
10-14 Mining 712 1.18% 46 0.95% 6.46% 106 1.93% 14.89% 
15-17 Construction 177 0.29% 7 0.14% 3.95% 48 0.87% 27.12% 
20-39 Manufacturing 38024 63.19% 3505 72.52% 9.22% 2967 53.94% 7.80% 
40-48 
Transportation and 
Communications services 904 1.50% 91 1.88% 10.07% 123 2.24% 13.61% 
50-51 Wholesale trade 2410 4.00% 154 3.19% 6.39% 292 5.31% 12.12% 
52-59 Retail trade 6322 10.51% 105 2.17% 1.66% 819 14.89% 12.95% 
70-89 Services 11267 18.72% 901 18.64% 8.00% 1081 19.65% 9.59% 
99 Others 239 0.40% 15 0.31% 6.28% 19 0.35% 7.95% 
Total  60177 100.00% 4833 100.00%  5501 100.00%  
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Panel B Fama and French 17  Industry Classification        
 Industry Composition Full Sample Prospectors Defenders 
  (N=60,177) (N=4,833) (N=5,501) 
  Number Proportion Number Proportion 
Proportion 
Industry Number Proportion 
Proportion 
Industry 
1 Food 1385 2.30% 93 1.92% 6.71% 159 2.89% 11.48% 
2 Mining and Minerals 255 0.42% 6 0.12% 2.35% 43 0.78% 16.86% 
3 Oil and Petroleum 885 1.47% 59 1.22% 6.67% 160 2.91% 18.08% 
4 
Clothes Textiles, Apparel & 
Footwear 526 0.87% 22 0.46% 4.18% 52 0.95% 9.89% 
5 Consumer Durables 2099 3.49% 125 2.59% 5.96% 291 5.29% 13.86% 
6 Chemicals 1811 3.01% 65 1.34% 3.59% 651 11.83% 35.95% 
7 Drugs, Soap, Perfumes and Tobacco 2977 4.95% 415 8.59% 13.94% 180 3.27% 6.05% 
8 
Construction and Construction 
Materials 1487 2.47% 60 1.24% 4.03% 233 4.24% 15.67% 
9 Steel Work etc. 820 1.36% 99 2.05% 12.07% 102 1.85% 12.44% 
10 Fabricated Products 678 1.13% 50 1.03% 7.37% 65 1.18% 9.59% 
11 Machinery and Business Equipment 15277 25.39% 986 20.40% 6.45% 738 13.42% 4.83% 
12 Automobiles 1487 2.47% 90 1.86% 6.05% 92 1.67% 6.19% 
13 Transportation 787 1.31% 44 0.91% 5.59% 103 1.87% 13.09% 
15 Retail Stores 5798 9.63% 99 2.05% 1.71% 742 13.49% 12.80% 
17 Others 23905 39.72% 2620 54.21% 10.96% 1890 34.36% 7.91% 
Total  60177 100.00% 4833 100.00%  5501 100.00%  
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52-59), whereas only about 2% of the Prospectors are from the same industry. Given that 
these industries represents 10.5% of the total sample, it is clear that Defenders 
(Prospectors) are over-represented (under-represented). Consistent with Bentley et al. 
(2013), I use the Fama and French 17 industry classifications to construct the fixed effects 
in the regressions. Therefore, I also provide the descriptive using the Fama and French 
17 industry classifications in Panel B of Table 3.3.  Consistent with the results from using 
two-digit SIC classification. Industry 5 (consumer durables), 6 (chemicals), 8 
(construction and construction materials) and 15 (retail stores) contain greater proportion 
of Defenders compared to the total sample, whereas Industry 7 (drugs, soaps, perfumes 
and tobacco) and 17 (other, including sectors like business services) possess a greater 
percentage of Prospectors than the total sample. I also identify industries (by two-digit 
SIC code) that are classified as Prospector-oriented or Defender-oriented at various times 
throughout the sample period. Untabulated results suggest that most of the large industry 
sectors identified with Defender (Prospector) concentration have been classified as 
Defender-oriented (Prospector-oriented) industries during the sample period. Examples 
for Defender-oriented industries are chemicals and allied products (SIC code: 28) and 
wholesale trade – durable goods (SIC code: 50), while examples for Prospector- oriented 
industries are industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment (SIC code: 
35) and business services (SIC code: 73). 
Table 3.4 and 3.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the STRATEGY composite 
measure and its components at both firm and industry levels. The means and medians of 
the STRATEGY scores over the full sample, and the Prospectors and Defenders 
subsamples are similar to those reported in the Bentley et al. (2013). However, the means 
for the components of STRATEGY in my sample are generally greater than those 
reported in Bentley et al. (2013). For most of the six STRATEGY components, 
Prospectors and Defenders have significantly different means and medians except for the  
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Firms’ Strategy Scores 
Panel A Firm Strategy Scores (N=60,177)   
 Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
STRATEGY 17.590 3.947 6 9 15 17 20 27 30 
PROS_F 0.080 0.272 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_F 0.091 0.288 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
RDS5 0.5866 14.142 0 0.000 0.006 0.039 0.136 4.980 1794.949 
EMPS5 0.0131 0.122 0 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.090 17.274 
REV5 76.9279 2421.689 -1119.548 -27.431 2.261 10.153 24.208 530.201 291305.200 
SGA5 1.5268 22.790 0.002 0.038 0.190 0.315 0.534 14.036 1935.540 
CAP5 0.2243 0.180 0 0.010 0.088 0.175 0.310 0.793 0.991 
sd_ EMP5 1.3535 5.504 0 0.001 0.034 0.148 0.723 20.499 231.381 
 
Panel B Prospector (N=4,833)        
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
STRATEGY 25.302 1.244 24 24 24 25 26 29 30 
RDS5 4.2400 39.754 0 0.000 0.147 0.383 1.190 57.483 1794.949 
EMPS5 0.0418 0.179 0.00134 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.023 0.641 4.067 
REV5 462.4725 5674.649 -154.587 -0.813 28.272 59.395 147.097 4583.520 257712.500 
SGA5 8.3988 55.791 0.030 0.130 0.586 1.245 3.051 117.461 1628.110 
CAP5 0.1104 0.098 0 0.003 0.045 0.082 0.142 0.497 0.719 
sd_ EMP5 0.8135 4.114 0 0.001 0.018 0.061 0.234 14.595 84.680 
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Panel C Defender (N=5,501)      
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
STRATEGY 10.896 1.257 6 7 10 11 12 12 12 
RDS5 0.0178 0.029 0 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.023 0.137 0.364 
EMPS5 0.0065 0.048 0 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.031 2.759 
REV5 28.3176 1085.236 -74.355 -23.029 -1.758 2.958 8.014 50.359 63780.620 
SGA5 0.2192 0.666 0.002 0.021 0.100 0.175 0.258 0.757 36.468 
CAP5 0.3601 0.209 0.000141 0.024 0.198 0.329 0.498 0.853 0.991 
sd_ EMP5 0.7679 5.575 0 0.000 0.022 0.085 0.344 11.810 223.607 
 
Panel D The Mean Comparison of Firm Life Cycle Stage by Strategy Types 
Variable Full Sample PROSPECTORS DEFENDERS Other Firms 
 
(N=57,966) (N=4,582) (N=5,266) (N=48,118) 
STRATEGY 17.743 25.279 11.013 17.566 
PROS_F 0.073 1 0 0 
DEF_F 0.072 0 1 0 
INTRODUCTION 0.087 0.261 0.047 0.151 
GROWTH 0.320 0.291 0.254 0.270 
MATURE 0.453 0.166 0.592 0.402 
SHAKEOUT 0.089 0.077 0.081 0.103 
DECLINE 0.051 0.204 0.026 0.074 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for the Industry Strategy Scores 
Panel A  Industry Strategy Scores (N=60,177) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
IND_STRATEGY 17.150 4.160 6 8 14 17 20 27 28 
PROS_I 0.077 0.266 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.135 0.341 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
RDS5_I 0.0695 0.057 0 0.000 0.013 0.065 0.110 0.212 1.455 
EMPS5_I 0.0062 0.018 0 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.033 2.759 
REV5_I 29.4435 400.112 -49.791 -1.036 9.028 12.586 17.085 64.162 63780.620 
SGA5_I 0.2906 0.391 0.010 0.066 0.204 0.256 0.346 0.699 36.468 
CAP5_I 0.2516 0.133 0.000141 0.095 0.170 0.221 0.283 0.681 0.924 
sd_ EMP5_I 9.0011 9.956 0 0.550 4.542 7.127 9.851 56.511 121.476 
 
 
Panel B Prospector-oriented Industries (N=4,607)   
Variable           Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
IND_STRATEGY 25.177 1.262 24 24 24 25 27 27 28 
RDS5_I 0.1451 0.058 0.048079 0.096 0.110 0.115 0.201 0.256 1.455 
EMPS5_I 0.0057 0.003 0.003202 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.015 0.087 
REV5_I 38.9730 163.430 7.926 12.610 14.181 30.376 52.062 89.486 6351.697 
SGA5_I 0.4586 0.128 0.232 0.252 0.404 0.431 0.460 0.699 3.867 
CAP5_I 0.1483 0.042 0.017659 0.096 0.100 0.157 0.183 0.243 0.243 
sd_ EMP5_I 8.5160 3.886 0.049331 1.170 4.565 9.430 10.346 15.459 15.459 
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Panel C Defender-oriented Industries (N=8,101)    
Variable           Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
IND_STRATEGY 10.666 1.542 6 6 10 11 12 12 12 
RDS5_I 0.0201 0.024 0 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.022 0.125 0.125 
EMPS5_I 0.0042 0.003 0 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.020 0.043 
REV5_I 8.2454 7.174 -21.748 -3.666 4.363 7.622 10.392 40.080 49.162 
SGA5_I 0.1528 0.066 0.010 0.050 0.113 0.140 0.183 0.368 0.368 
CAP5_I 0.3454 0.149 0.000141 0.092 0.235 0.319 0.461 0.704 0.924 
sd_ EMP5_I 7.6061 11.231 0 0.420 2.267 4.211 7.107 63.186 74.901 
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mean of standard deviations of total number of employees [sd_EMP5]. Nevertheless, the 
mean, median and standard deviation of sd_EMP5 for the total sample are comparable to 
Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). The only difference is that my sample reports lower mean 
(but similar median) in the Prospector sample and greater mean in the Defender sample. 
This might be due to treatment of missing R&D data that changes the composition of 
Prospectors and Defenders included in my sample. For industry STRATEGY scores, 
Prospectors and Defenders show great differences in mean and median values across all 
the six STRATEGY components. There are 66 two-digit SIC industries in the sample 
(excluding financial and utilities sectors), while 8 industries are ever be classified as a 
Prospector-oriented industry and 34 industries are identified as Defender-oriented 
industry during the sample period.   
I also provide a mean comparison table showing firms’ life cycle stages in the full sample 
and the sub-samples by firms’ strategy types in Panel D of Table 3.4. Firm life cycles are 
distinct phases that present firms’ path of evolution over time (Gort and Klepper 1983) 
and prior literature suggests the change of life cycle stages arises from strategic activities 
undertaken by the firm (Dickinson 2011). Therefore, I examines how corporate strategy 
may be associated with the life cycle stages the firm. For this purpose I use indicators of 
firm life cycle stage derived by Dickinson (2011): INTRODUCTION, GROWTH, 
MATURE, SHAKEOUT and DECLINE. The sample for the STRATEGY measure drops 
to 57,966 observations after including the firm life cycle measures. The distribution of 
firms’ life cycles for Prospectors are different from the full sample, where about 26.1% 
of the Prospectors are at INTRODUCTION stage compared to the economy-wide average 
of 8.7%. Also, about 16.6% of Prospectors are at MATURE stage when the majority of 
the companies are MATURE firms (about 45.3%) in the full sample. Conversely, the 
behaviour of Defenders and ‘Other Firms’ are quite consistent with an average firm in the 
full sample. Together, these results seem to suggest that there is at least some association 
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between firms’ strategic choice and life cycle, and consequently I control for firm life 
cycle stage in robustness tests in all three studies in my thesis.  
The descriptive statistics for the aggregate coverage sample used in hypothesis testing are 
shown in Table 3.6. The mean coverage for Prospectors and Defenders are very similar 
while Prospectors have a higher median than Defenders. However, the average and 
median experience of analysts (MEAN_EXPERIENCE) covering Defenders are slightly 
higher than the analysts covering Prospectors (Panel B and C, Table 3.6). There are no 
mean (p = 0.388) and median (p = 1.000) differences between the indicators for 
Prospector and Defender status before and after the GS which indicates the STRATEGY 
measure is consistent throughout the sample period.20 All the means and medians of the 
control variables are significantly different between the Prospectors and Defenders at 5% 
significant. For the industry strategic orientation, both the means and medians of coverage 
and expert coverages for Defender-oriented industries are higher than those for 
Prospector-oriented industries at 1% significance suggesting analysts seem to cover more 
Defender-oriented industries. However, the mean difference of coverage between 
Prospector-oriented industries and Defender-oriented industries are not statistically 
significant. Prospector-oriented industries and Defender-oriented industries show 
significant differences in mean and median values across all control variables except for 
BTM and FREE_CASH at significant level of 5%.  This indicates that there are no 
abnormal growth and differences in free cash flow between Prospector-oriented industries 
and Defender-oriented industries.  
                                                 
20 The Global Settlement (GS) is effective on 28th April, 2003. 
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Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics for the Aggregate Coverage Sample 
Panel A Strategy Score (N=27,232) 
Variable           Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 6.776 6.599 1 1 2 4 9 29 55 
STRATEGY 17.738 3.736 6 10 15 18 20 27 30 
PROS_F 0.073 0.260 0 0.000 0 0 0.000 1 1 
DEF_F 0.072 0.258 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
IND_STRATEGY 17.027 4.077 6 8 14 17 19 27 28 
PROS_I 0.069 0.253 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.135 0.342 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 10.155 4.817 0 0 7 10.000 13 24 33 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 59.355 42.519 1 3 29.500 52.400 79.667 224.500 396 
CFVOL -3.062 0.841 -7.371 -4.957 -3.617 -3.092 -2.545 -0.850 1.572 
lnASSET 6.588 1.928 -0.112 2.737 5.200 6.433 7.820 11.568 12.906 
LOSS 0.255 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA 0.006 0.220 -5.227 -0.829 -0.002 0.048 0.088 0.259 0.297 
BTM 0.839 2.730 -197.307 -1.758 0.440 0.767 1.244 4.233 27.426 
LEVERAGE 0.466 0.253 0.016 0.067 0.282 0.452 0.611 1.153 5.048 
FREE_CASH 0.072 0.321 -6.490 -1.033 -0.011 0.100 0.208 0.718 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.034 0.180 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 332.351 1034.142 0.022 1.296 24.368 74.673 232.819 4437.998 21586.800 
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Panel B Prospectors (N=1,984) 
 Variable  Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 5.974 5.877 1 1 2 4 8 27 39 
STRATEGY 25.283 1.297 24 24 24 25 26 29 30 
IND_STRATEGY 17.277 4.184 6 8 14 17 20 27 27 
PROS_I 0.065 0.247 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.141 0.348 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 9.021 4.634 0 0 6 8.600 11.915 22 32 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 52.656 35.950 1 3 25.775 47.310 71.367 171.500 396 
CFVOL -2.320 1.079 -5.942 -4.638 -3.086 -2.285 -1.567 0.243 1.572 
lnASSET 5.551 1.825 -0.112 2.044 4.292 5.308 6.674 10.430 11.861 
LOSS 0.603 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA -0.197 0.464 -5.227 -2.015 -0.286 -0.056 0.050 0.257 0.297 
BTM 0.693 1.593 -46.673 -1.520 0.298 0.553 1.049 3.823 11.858 
LEVERAGE 0.422 0.331 0.022 0.043 0.194 0.365 0.563 1.595 4.597 
FREE_CASH -0.175 0.552 -6.490 -2.400 -0.324 -0.036 0.122 0.583 1.383 
EXT_FINANC 0.162 0.368 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 282.700 785.828 0.319 3.026 34.867 88.789 252.961 2939.929 21003.130 
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Panel C Defenders (N=1,959) 
Variable           Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 5.385 5.374 1 1 2 3 7 23 34 
STRATEGY 11.001 1.227 6 7 10 11 12 12 12 
IND_STRATEGY 16.172 4.351 6 7 13 16 19 26 28 
PROS_I 0.058 0.234 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.200 0.400 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 10.793 5.236 0 0 7 11.000 14 26 30 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 60.825 44.177 1 2 27.286 53.000 86 203.500 312 
CFVOL -3.257 0.705 -6.117 -5.022 -3.713 -3.237 -2.793 -1.645 -0.971 
lnASSET 6.707 1.830 1.468 2.979 5.405 6.675 7.837 11.795 12.757 
LOSS 0.211 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA 0.035 0.101 -1.064 -0.365 0.008 0.047 0.078 0.269 0.297 
BTM 0.927 4.951 -197.307 -3.982 0.548 0.970 1.527 5.670 19.217 
LEVERAGE 0.554 0.239 0.036 0.102 0.392 0.541 0.693 1.255 2.457 
FREE_CASH 0.096 0.342 -4.764 -0.930 -0.002 0.094 0.210 1.094 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.024 0.153 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 217.796 695.956 0.167 0.786 12.736 41.764 139.100 2947.707 13092.300 
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Panel D Prospector-oriented Industries (N=1,877) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 6.745 7.223 1 1 2 4 9 33 47 
STRATEGY 18.063 3.631 8 10 16 18 21 27 30 
IND_STRATEGY 0.069 0.253 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
PROS_I 0.061 0.239 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 24.998 1.220 24 24 24 24 26 27 28 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 9.462 4.834 0 0 6 9 12.278 24 33 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 49.615 32.166 1 2 24 46.792 68.000 139.333 289 
CFVOL -2.781 0.873 -5.451 -4.731 -3.331 -2.823 -2.236 -0.491 1.304 
lnASSET 5.815 1.763 -0.112 2.351 4.597 5.666 6.907 11.192 12.080 
LOSS 0.361 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA -0.039 0.367 -5.227 -1.610 -0.050 0.037 0.088 0.297 0.297 
BTM 0.765 0.918 -6.083 -1.056 0.264 0.592 1.039 4.073 11.858 
LEVERAGE 0.416 0.234 0.021 0.074 0.256 0.381 0.531 1.082 3.366 
FREE_CASH 0.088 0.345 -5.353 -1.145 -0.002 0.127 0.254 0.791 1.625 
EXT_FINANC 0.043 0.203 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 344.453 1087.807 0.167 1.420 28.034 75.780 221.070 5330.829 15861.150 
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Panel E Defender-oriented Industries (N=3,687) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max   
     
   
AGG_COVERAGE 6.940 6.316 1 1 2 5 10 27 38 
STRATEGY 17.567 3.996 6 9 15 18 20 27 29 
IND_STRATEGY 0.076 0.265 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
PROS_I 0.106 0.308 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 10.640 1.558 6 6 10 11 12 12 12 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 10.850 4.598 0 1 8 11 13.800 23 30 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 73.805 50.435 1 4 38 66.667 97.000 262 396 
CFVOL -3.322 0.755 -6.317 -5.087 -3.807 -3.338 -2.856 -1.337 0.316 
lnASSET 7.453 1.857 1.622 3.438 6.180 7.320 8.583 12.407 12.906 
LOSS 0.175 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA 0.036 0.104 -1.454 -0.393 0.014 0.048 0.079 0.207 0.297 
BTM 0.735 3.002 -61.555 -5.264 0.430 0.732 1.187 5.558 27.426 
LEVERAGE 0.564 0.222 0.035 0.105 0.423 0.566 0.690 1.173 2.746 
FREE_CASH 0.097 0.248 -4.005 -0.716 0.009 0.107 0.205 0.695 1.977 
EXT_FINANC 0.017 0.128 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 251.455 647.700 0.171 0.951 22.887 73.355 218.703 2957.246 12741.110 
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Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for the Individual Coverage Sample 
 
Full Sample (N=16,818,622) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
INDIV_COVERAGE 0.017 0.130 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
STRATEGY 17.886 3.718 6 10 15 18 20 27 30 
PROS_F 0.079 0.270 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_F 0.062 0.242 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
IND_STRATEGY 18.714 3.962 6 10 16 18 22 27 27 
PROS_I 0.130 0.337 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.055 0.228 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 8.795 7.566 0 0 2 7 14 29 33 
BROKERSIZE 58.680 65.956 1 1 14 33 84 314 397 
CFVOL -2.896 0.871 -7.371 -4.838 -3.473 -2.936 -2.368 -0.660 3.613 
lnASSET 6.112 1.961 0.271 2.366 4.686 5.892 7.398 11.198 12.906 
LOSS 0.316 0.465 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA -0.023 0.284 -5.227 -1.140 -0.030 0.041 0.085 0.272 0.297 
BTM 0.905 2.682 -334.511 -1.441 0.442 0.792 1.297 4.172 332.166 
LEVERAGE 0.434 0.266 0.011 0.062 0.247 0.405 0.573 1.169 6.725 
FREE_CASH 0.042 0.351 -8.617 -1.256 -0.033 0.087 0.194 0.628 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.043 0.202 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 321.845 1101.281 0.013 1.089 18.068 59.684 194.953 4742.552 21586.800 
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I report the descriptive statistics for the individual coverage sample in Table 3.7. 
Prospectors have significant differences (p<0.01) at the mean and median from Defenders 
for individual coverage, while Defenders have slightly larger mean and greater standard 
deviation than Prospectors. For individual analyst coverage, there are also significant 
differences in mean and median values between Prospectors and Defenders. Prospectors 
and Defenders show significant differences at mean and median in all independent and 
control variables except for BROKERSIZE. This seems to suggest there are no difference 
in coverage by brokerage houses with high and low investment banking (IB) incentives 
between Prospectors and Defenders. For industry strategic orientation, 
INDIV_COVERAGE exhibits similar patterns as for the firm strategy scores. However, 
the means and medians of general experiences for Defender-oriented industries are 
greater than those for Prospector-oriented industries and the differences are statistically 
significant (p<0.01). The distributions of the control variables in the individual coverage 
sample are consistent with those in the aggregate coverage sample. I also provide the 
descriptive statistics by firm and industry strategy indicators in Appendix 3.1. 
3.5.2. Correlation Matrix 
The Pearson correlation matrix for variables included hypothesis tests is presented in 
Table 3.8 for the aggregate coverage sample and Appendix 3.2 for the individual coverage 
sample. In Table 3.8 of the aggregate coverage sample, the STRATEGY score is 
significantly correlated with general coverage. However, Prospector and Defender 
indicators are significantly correlated with all coverage variables. All control variables 
are significantly correlated with general coverage, while BTM is not significantly 
correlated with the expert coverage variables implying all analysts cares about growth 
prospects in their coverage decision. The strategy-related variables (both firm and 
industry level) are significantly associated with several control variables, but with no 
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bivariate correlation exceeds 30%. Consistent with expectations, CFVOL and LOSS are 
positively associated while ROA is negatively correlated with Prospector-related 
dummies; while the correlations are the opposite for Defender-related dummies. 
EXT_FINANC is positively correlated with Prospector indicator while negatively 
correlated with Defender indicator which indicates Prospectors are associated with 
greater investment banking incentives. No such difference is observed for industry 
strategic indicators. There seems to be no differences in associations between the strategic 
indicators and trading incentives (VOLUME). Finally, there are no bivariate correlations 
exceeding 50% among control variables.  
Appendix 3.2 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for the individual coverage sample. 
Both the firm and industry-level strategy scores are negatively correlated with individual 
coverage (INDIV_COVERAGE) which seems to be inconsistent with findings in the 
aggregate coverage sample. Consistent with expectations, experienced analysts 
(EXPERIENCE) and larger brokerage house (BROKERSIZE) are positively correlated 
with individual analyst coverage. All the control variables are significantly correlated 
with INDIV_COVERAGE. Comparable to the aggregate coverage sample, no 
independent variables and control variables exhibit bivariate correlations exceeds 50% 
which suggests there is no serious multicollinearity problem exist in all the models for 
testing the hypotheses.
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Table 3.8 Correlation Matrix for the Aggregate Coverage Sample 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 AGG_COVERAGE 1                  
2 STRATEGY -0.001 1                 
3 PROS_F -0.008 0.585 1                
4 DEF_F -0.003 -0.474 -0.075 1               
5 IND_STRATEGY -0.057 0.032 0.007 -0.024 1              
6 PROS_I -0.023 0.009 -0.009 -0.001 0.636 1             
7 DEF_I 0.046 -0.012 0.001 0.028 -0.465 -0.093 1            
8 MEAN_EXPERIENCE 0.032 -0.005 -0.008 0 -0.038 -0.023 0.025 1           
9 MEAN_BROKERSIZE 0.009 -0.001 0.008 0.003 -0.008 0 0.034 0.043 1          
10 CFVOL -0.049 0.294 0.281 -0.065 0.168 0.087 -0.078 -0.038 0.014 1         
11 lnASSET 0.091 -0.163 -0.163 0.014 -0.212 -0.107 0.11 0.043 0.019 -0.547 1        
12 LOSS -0.035 0.256 0.241 -0.043 0.117 0.065 -0.056 -0.005 0.026 0.345 -0.303 1       
13 ROA 0.027 -0.252 -0.262 0.047 -0.098 -0.059 0.037 0.012 -0.027 -0.363 0.273 -0.529 1      
14 BTM -0.008 -0.033 -0.014 0.03 -0.01 -0.018 -0.009 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.033 0.034 0.001 1     
15 LEVERAGE 0.02 -0.137 -0.049 0.087 -0.123 -0.029 0.101 0.009 0.003 -0.057 0.227 0.074 -0.201 -0.118 1    
16 FREE_CASH 0.034 -0.226 -0.25 0.035 -0.007 0.014 0.016 0.021 -0.009 -0.386 0.339 -0.454 0.653 -0.017 -0.177 1   
17 EXT_FINANC -0.017 0.201 0.235 -0.025 0.039 0.023 -0.023 -0.011 0.013 0.319 -0.23 0.29 -0.556 -0.015 0.148 -0.677 1  
18 VOLUME 0.046 0.022 -0.019 -0.035 -0.006 -0.001 -0.021 0.013 0.014 -0.079 0.401 -0.047 0.044 -0.03 0.031 0.094 -0.034 1 
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3.6. Results Analysis 
This section presents the empirical results for each hypothesis. Subsection 1 provides 
detailed analysis of the results for tests involving firm-level strategic choices.  Subsection 
2 presents the results for tests of industry-level strategic orientation and finally I perform 
some robustness tests. 
3.6.1. Results for Firm Strategic Choices 
3.6.1.1. Tests of Firm Strategic Choice and Analyst Coverage 
I employ both the aggregate coverage sample and individual coverage sample to test my 
hypotheses relating to the association between firm strategy and analyst coverage (H1Fp, 
H1Fd). Collectively, these hypotheses predict that Prospectors will attract greater coverage 
than all other strategy types, and that Defenders will attract lower coverage than ‘other 
firms’.  Table 3.9 presents the results of all tests of Hypotheses 1F. 
Table 3.9 Regression Results for H1F for Firms’ Strategic Choices 
 Negative Binominal Regressions Logistic Regressions 
  (1) (2)   (3) 
VARIABLES AGG_ 
COVERAGE 
AGG_ 
COVERAGE 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE    
    
STRATEGY 0.0327*** 
 
0.0411***   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)  
PROS_F 
 
0.1670***   0.2848***   
(0.000) 
 (0.000) 
DEF_F 
 
-0.1969***   -0.1396***   
(0.000) 
 (0.000) 
EXPERIENCE 
  
0.0237*** 0.0237*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE 
  
0.1169*** 0.1168***    
(0.000) (0.000) 
CFVOL 0.0972*** 0.1086*** 0.0092*** 0.0186*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
lnASSET 0.3290*** 0.3290*** 0.3009*** 0.3015*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -0.0391** -0.0175 -0.0730*** -0.0528*** 
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(-) (0.025) (0.318) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.0061 -0.0357 0.3651*** 0.3143*** 
(+) (0.881) (0.372) (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM -0.0195* -0.0232** -0.0047*** -0.0051*** 
(-) (0.053) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE -0.3884*** -0.4485*** -0.1654*** -0.2505*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FREE_CASH 0.2929*** 0.3004*** 0.4081*** 0.4140*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXT_FINANC 0.1835*** 0.1958*** 0.4159*** 0.4210*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VOLUME 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.0381 0.6224*** -5.8512*** -5.0382*** 
 (0.746) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
Observations 27,232 27,232 16,818,622 16,818,622 
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.114 0.0807 0.0796 
F test 5693 5493 235832 232534 
ROC stats   0.7402 0.7380 
Difference in Coefficients of Pros and Def:   
Chi-squared =77.95       P-value<0.001                    Chi-squared =40.08       P-value<0.001 
Two-tailed robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AGG_COVERAGE 
= the number of analysts following the firm within the 90-day window leading up to the earnings 
announcement, INDIV_COVERAGE = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if an analyst covers a 
firm during the year, and 0 otherwise, STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated 
using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] 
values indicate Prospector (other firms) [Defender] firms, respectively, PROS_F = an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F = an 
indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, 
CFVOL = the covered firm’s cash flow volatility, calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
standard deviation of the firm’s cash flows from operations over the past five years divided by 
total assets, lnASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets of the covered firm at the end of the 
year, ROA = the covered firm’s return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary (ib) 
items divided by total assets (at) at the end of the year, BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market 
ratio, calculated as total common equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market capitalisation 
(prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT, LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of total debt (lt) scaled by 
total assets (at), FREE_CASH = the covered firm’s cash from operations (oancf) minus average 
capital expenditures (capx) for the last five years, scaled by current assets (act), EXT_FINANC 
= an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the firm’s variable, and VOLUME = the covered firm’s 
annual trading volume (cshtrm) of firm’s stock in million. In regressions for individual analyst 
coverage: EXPERIENCE = the numbers of years since the analysts’ forecasts first appeared in 
I/B/E/S, and BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a given 
financial year. 
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The first two columns of Table 3.9 provide the results for tests of Hypothesis 1F estimated 
on the aggregate coverage sample. The Pseudo R2 for Model 1 estimated on the aggregate 
coverage sample is 0.114 (Column 2). For comparison with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) 
I present results using the discrete strategy scores (Column 1) as well as those using the 
indicators of strategic type (Column 2) .  
All control variables in Column 1 and 2 exhibit a consistent sign with the prediction and 
most are significantly associated with AGG_COVERAGE, except for LOSS and ROA. 
This is consistent with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017)’s model using the discrete strategy 
scores in the regression. The control for investment banking incentive (EXT_FINANC) 
and trading incentives (VOLUME) are positively associated with analyst coverage 
indicating analyst incentives might have an impact on analysts’ choice to cover a firm. 
For tests of H1Fp, the coefficient on PROS_F is positive and significant (β=0.167, p<0.001) 
indicating that Prospectors receive greater analyst coverage than ‘other firms’. This result 
is further supported by the positive and significant coefficient on STRATEGY in Column 
1 (β = 0.0327, p < 0.001).  These results are consistent with Barth et al. (2001)’s argument 
that the value-adding benefits from covering firms with high ex ante information 
asymmetry dominates the increased task complexity effect. However, it is difficult to 
differentiate whether the positive association is derived from 1) the value-adding effect 
from ex ante information asymmetry or 2) the reduced task complexity effect from high 
voluntary disclosures.  
For tests of H1Fd, the coefficient on DEF_F in Column 2, Table 3.9 is negative and 
significant (β = -0.1969, p < 0.001) suggesting that Defenders receives lower analyst 
following than firms that pursue ‘other strategies’. This result indicates that the 
relationship between Defenders and analyst coverage is driven by the effects of either or 
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both: 1) the reduced value-adding benefits of low inherent information asymmetry, and/or 
2) the increased task complexity effect of low voluntary disclosures.  
The test of the difference in coefficients for PROS_F and DEF_F (tabulated) suggest that 
the positive coefficients on PROS_F are significantly different from the negative 
coefficients on DEF_F (p < 0.001), indicating that Prospectors receives more analyst 
coverage than Defenders.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.9 present the results from estimation using the individual 
coverage sample, of the probability that an individual analyst will cover the firm 
(INDIV_COVERAGE). The Pseudo-R2s for the model using the ordinal strategy score 
and that using indicator variables are both 0.08. The areas under the ROC statistics curve 
for the regressions are 74.02% and 73.80% respectively, indicating reasonable fit. All 
control variables in Model 2 are significantly associated with the COVERAGE variables 
and consistent with the predicted direction.  
Consistent with the results from the aggregate coverage sample, both the coefficient on 
STRATEGY in Column 3 (β = 0.0411, p<0.001) and the coefficient on PROS_F in 
Column 4 (β = 0.2848, p<0.001) are positive and significant, while the coefficient on 
DEF_F is significantly negative (β= -0.1396, p<0.001). These results indicate that 
Prospectors receive greater analyst coverage while Defenders receive lower analyst 
coverage than firms following ‘other strategies’. The test of difference in coefficients on 
PROS_F and DEF_F once more shows the positive association for PROS_F are 
significantly different from the negative association for DEF_F (p < 0.001).   
Collectively, the results indicating that Prospectors receive greater coverage is consistent 
with either or both a demand effect driven by high ex ante information asymmetry or a 
supply effect arising from superior discretionary disclosures. The findings that Defenders 
attract lower coverage than ‘other firms’ could be explained by either lower demand due 
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to lower ex ante information asymmetry or a greater supply cost arising from Defenders’ 
weaker discretionary disclosures.  
To further disentangle the strategic impacts of ex ante information asymmetry from the 
strategic effects of voluntary disclosure, I use analyst expertise to differentiate the 
situations in which one of the impacts dominates the ultimate impacts of firm’s strategic 
choices.  
3.6.1.2. Tests of the Moderating Effect of Analyst Expertise on the Association 
between Firm Strategy and Analyst Coverage 
Hypotheses 2FPe and 2FDe predict that the strategic impacts of ex ante information 
asymmetry and discretionary disclosure on the analyst coverage decision are moderated 
by analyst expertise, which is proxies by analysts’ general experience. Experienced 
analysts are less likely to be affected by high task complexity because of their greater 
ability to obtain, understand and analyse information developed over time (e.g. Clement 
1999). Recall from the results for tests of H1F, that the relationship between firms’ 
strategic choices and analysts’ coverage could be explained by either: 1) a demand effect 
arising from the level of ex ante information asymmetry, or 2) a supply effect associated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure. Within each of these effects task complexity plays 
competing roles. Prospectors are expected to be associated with higher task complexity 
arising from ex ante information asymmetry, but lower task complexity resulting from 
superior disclosure. If experienced analysts are found to be abnormally likely to follow 
Prospectors, this would suggest that the demand effect of task complexity dominates the 
disclosure effect. If experienced analyst are found to be abnormally likely to follow 
Defenders, this would suggest that higher task complexity arising from these firms 
weaker disclosure dominates the effect of lower complexity associated with ex ante 
information asymmetry.   
  
94 
 
Table 3.10 Regression Results for H2FPe and H2FDe for Firms’ Strategic Choices 
 OLS Regression  Logistic Regression 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES MEAN_EXPERIENCE VARIABLES INDIV_COVERAGE   
  
PROS_F -0.2879** PROS_F 0.3993*** 
(-) (0.035)  (0.000) 
DEF_F 0.3219* DEF_F -0.2686*** 
(+) (0.070)  (0.000) 
  PROS_F* 
EXPERIENCE -0.0114*** 
  (-) (0.000) 
  DEF_F* 
EXPERIENCE 0.0117*** 
  (+) (0.000) 
COVERAGE 0.0331*** EXPERIENCE 0.0237*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
MEAN_ 
BROKERSIZE -0.0055*** BROKERSIZE 0.1169***  
(0.000)  (0.000) 
CFVOL -0.5342*** CFVOL 0.0184*** 
(+) (0.000) (+) (0.000) 
lnASSET 0.2236*** lnASSET 0.3014*** 
(+) (0.000) (+) (0.000) 
LOSS 0.0904 LOSS -0.0520*** 
(-) (0.357) (-) (0.000) 
ROA -0.2200 ROA 0.3170*** 
(+) (0.302) (+) (0.000) 
BTM 0.0086 BTM -0.0051*** 
(-) (0.525) (-) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.9833*** LEVERAGE -0.2491*** 
(-) (0.000) (-) (0.000) 
FREE_CASH 0.1475 FREE_CASH 0.4152*** 
(+) (0.375) (+) (0.000) 
EXT_FINANC -0.2090 EXT_FINANC 0.4210*** 
(+) (0.423) (+) (0.000) 
VOLUME -0.0000 VOLUME 0.0000*** 
(+) (0.573) (+) (0.000) 
Constant 2.0729*** Constant -5.0391*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
  
  
Year fixed effects Yes Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes 
  
  
Observations 27,232 Observations 16,818,622 
R-squared 0.156 Pseudo R-squared 0.0797 
  
 
F test 232835 
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  ROC stat 0.7382 
Two-tailed clustered robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE = the average years of forecasting experience recorded in I/B/E/S of all 
analysts who follows a firm during the financial year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’, 
INDIV_COVERAGE = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if an analyst covers a firm during the 
year, and 0 otherwise, STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model 
of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate 
Prospector (other firms) [Defender] firms, respectively, PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 
1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F = an indicator variable, 
equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, COVERAGE = the 
AGG_COVERAGE variable in Model 1 for testing H1 which is the number of analysts following 
the firm counted during the 90 days before the earnings announcement, MEAN_BROKERSIZE 
= the average number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a given year in the ‘aggregate 
coverage sample’, CFVOL = the covered firm’s cash flow volatility, calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s cash flows from operations over the past five 
years divided by total assets, lnASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets of the covered firm 
at the end of the year, ROA=the covered firm’s return on assets, calculated as income before 
extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) at the end of the year, BTM = the covered 
firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total common equity outstanding (ceq) divided by 
market capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT, LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of 
total debt (lt) scaled by total assets (at), FREE_CASH = the covered firm’s cash from operations 
(oancf) minus average capital expenditures (capx) for the last five years, scaled by current assets 
(act), EXT_FINANC = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the firm’s variable FREE_CASH for 
the covered firm is less than -0.5, and 0 otherwise, and VOLUME = the covered firm’s annual 
trading volume (cshtrm) of firm’s stock in million. In regressions for individual analyst coverage: 
EXPERIENCE = the numbers of years since the analysts’ forecasts first appeared in I/B/E/S, and 
BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a given financial year. 
 
Table 3.10 presents the results of tests of the moderating effect of analyst expertise on the 
association between strategy and analyst coverage, for the aggregate coverage sample 
(Column 1) and the individual coverage sample (Column 2).  
Tests using the aggregate coverage sample regress MEAN_EXPERIENCE (the average 
number of years of general experience of the analysts following the firm) against strategy 
types, after controlling for the raw level of coverage, and are estimated using OLS. The 
R2 for this model is 0.156. As expected, analysts’ general experience is positively 
associated with aggregate coverage. MEAN_BROKERSIZE is negatively associated 
with analysts’ general experience suggesting that small brokerage houses have more 
experienced analysts on average than large brokerage houses.  
For the tests of hypotheses H2FPe and H2FDe and their alternate forms, it can be seen that 
the coefficient for PROS_F is negative and significant (β = -0.2879, p = 0.035), while 
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that for DEF_F is positive and significant (β = 0.3219, p = 0.070), suggesting lower expert 
coverage for Prospectors and greater expert coverage for Defenders, relative to ‘other 
firms’.  
Results for tests using the individual coverage sample are reported in Column 2 of Table 
3.10. The areas under the ROC statistics curve for the regression is 73.82% indicating 
reasonable fit. In these models the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable 
indicating that an individual analyst chose to cover the firm in that year 
(INDIV_COVERAGE). The test variables in this case are the interactions between 
strategic dummies and analysts’ general experience (PROS_F*EXPRIENCE and 
DEF_F*EXPERIENCE). The coefficient on DEF_F*EXPERIENCE is positive and 
significant (β = 0.0117, p < 0.001) while the coefficient on PROS_F*EXPRIENCE is 
negative and significant (β = -0.0114, p < 0.001). Like the aggregate sample regressions, 
these results indicate that the experienced analysts are more (less) likely to cover 
Defenders (Prospectors) than are junior analysts.21  
The results for both sets of tests provide evidence that task complexity plays a significant 
role in determining analyst coverage, and that the path through which it does so is 
dominated by the impacts of discretionary disclosure on complexity. For Defenders, the 
significant positive coefficient is consistent with expert analysts’ superior ability to deal 
with complexity arising from the Defenders’ weaker disclosure. Further this suggests that, 
for Defenders, the greater complexity arising from poor disclosure plays a significant role 
in explaining coverage decision, and dominates any impacts on complexity of the lower 
ex ante information asymmetry. For Prospectors’ the lower degree of expert coverage is 
consistent with these firms’ high level of discretionary disclosure reducing complexity, 
                                                 
21 To assist the interpretation of the interaction terms in this model, I performed additional analysis by re-
estimating the regressions on subsamples defined by the quintiles values of the probability of coverage 
(estimated from the full sample regression). The interactions remain significant with the predicted signs in 
all sub-samples.  
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and that this effect dominates any effects of high complexity associated with ex ante 
information asymmetry. 
3.6.2. Results for Tests of Industry Strategic Orientation and Analyst 
Coverage, and the Moderating Role of Analyst Expertise 
This section present the results for tests of the association between industry strategic 
orientation and analyst coverage. Only the aggregate coverage sample is used here, 
because the construction of the individual coverage sample makes the coverage decision 
endogenous to industry identity (analysts must cover firms in the industry in order to 
appear in the sample). I report all regression results in Table 3.11.  
Table 3.11 Regression Results for Industry Strategic Orientation 
Regressions on the Aggregate Analyst Coverage Sample 
 
Negative Binominal 
Regression  OLS Regression 
  (1) (2)   (1) 
VARIABLES 
AGG_ 
COVERAGE 
AGG_ 
COVERAGE VARIABLES 
MEAN_ 
EXPERIENCE 
          
PROS_I  0.1294*** PROS_I -0.0872 
  (0.000)  (0.559) 
DEF_I  -0.1137*** DEF_I 0.5595*** 
  (0.000) (+) (0.000) 
IND_STRATEGY 0.0154***    
 (0.000)    
   COVERAGE 0.0329*** 
    (0.000) 
   
MEAN_ 
BROKERSIZE -0.0057*** 
    (0.000) 
log_CFVOL 0.1129*** 0.1149*** log_CFVOL -0.5419*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
LnASSET 0.3340*** 0.3338*** LnASSET 0.2152*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
LOSS -0.0142 -0.0133 LOSS 0.0851 
(-) (0.418) (0.446)  (0.384) 
w_ROA -0.0547 -0.0591 w_ROA -0.1851 
(+) (0.152) (0.119)  (0.384) 
adj_BTM -0.0248** -0.0256** adj_BTM 0.0096 
(-) (0.031) (0.029)  (0.501) 
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LEVERAGE -0.4555*** -0.4674*** LEVERAGE 0.9771*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
FREE_CASH 0.2764*** 0.2749*** FREE_CASH 0.1826 
(+) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.275) 
EXT_FINANC 0.2067*** 0.1987*** EXT_FINANC -0.2109 
(+) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.418) 
VOLUME 0.0001*** 0.0001*** VOLUME -0.0000 
(+) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.791) 
Constant 0.3631*** 0.6431*** Constant 2.0333*** 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes 
     
Observations 27,232 27,232 Observations 27,232 
Pseudo R-squared 0.113 0.113 R-squared 0.156 
F test 5356 5379     
Difference in Coefficients of Pros and Def:   
Chi-squared =45.8       P-value<0.001   
Two-tailed clustered robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
AGG_COVERAGE= the number of analysts following the firm within the 90-day window 
leading up to the earnings announcement, MEAN_EXPERIENCE = the average years of 
forecasting experience recorded in I/B/E/S of all analysts who follows a firm during the financial 
year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’, IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level discrete strategy 
score, estimated using a method derived from Bentley et al. (2013). The score values ranging 
from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector strategy-oriented (other 
strategy-oriented) [Defender strategy-oriented] industries, respectively,  PROS_I = an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_I 
= an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 
otherwise, COVERAGE = the AGG_COVERAGE variable in Model 1 for testing H1 which is 
the number of analysts following the firm counted during the 90 days before the earnings 
announcement, MEAN_BROKERSIZE = the average number of analysts employed by a 
brokerage house in a given year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’, CFVOL = the covered firm’s 
cash flow volatility, calculated as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s 
cash flows from operations over the past five years divided by total assets, lnASSET = the natural 
logarithm of total assets of the covered firm at the end of the year, ROA=the covered firm’s return 
on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) at the 
end of the year, BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total common 
equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT, 
LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of total debt (lt) scaled by total assets (at), FREE_CASH 
= the covered firm’s cash from operations (oancf) minus average capital expenditures (capx) for 
the last five years, scaled by current assets (act), EXT_FINANC = an indicator variable, equal to 
1 if the firm’s variable FREE_CASH for the covered firm is less than -0.5, and 0 otherwise, and 
VOLUME = the covered firm’s annual trading volume (cshtrm) of firm’s stock in million. In 
regressions for individual analyst coverage: EXPERIENCE = the numbers of years since the 
analysts’ forecasts first appeared in I/B/E/S, and BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts 
employed by a brokerage house in a given financial year. 
Column 1 and 2 of Table 3.11 presents the results for tests of Hypothesis 1I estimated on 
the aggregate coverage sample. The Pseudo R2 of each model is 0.113, which is similar 
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to the equivalent regressions on the firm-level sample. Like the firm-level results 
presented above and in Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), the coefficient for the ordinal 
measure STRATEGY (Column 1) is positive and significant. In Column 2, the coefficient 
for the test variable PROS_I is positive and significant (β = 0.1294, p < 0.001) indicating 
that firms in Prospector-oriented industries receive greater analyst coverage than the 
industries with ‘other strategic orientations’, consistent with the prediction for H1Ip. 
Conversely, the coefficient on DEF_I is negative and significant (β = -0.1137, p < 0.001) 
suggesting that members of Defender-oriented industries receive lower analyst 
followings than industries with ‘other strategic orientations’, consistent with the 
prediction for H1Id. The test of the difference in coefficients on PROS_I and DEF_I 
(tabulated) is significant (p < 0.001), which suggest Prospector-oriented industries receive 
greater analyst coverage than Defender-oriented industries. 
Collectively, these findings are consistent with the association between firm-level 
strategy and coverage, which indicates that industry strategic orientation, as expected, has 
an complementary impact on top of firms’ strategy types, and together affect the analyst 
coverage decision.  
Like the results for tests of firm-level strategy, the findings for Prospector-oriented 
industries may reflect: 1) the demand associated with greater ex ante information 
asymmetry and / or 2) the reduced task complexity effect from more frequent 
discretionary disclosures. Similarly, the lower coverage for Defender-oriented industries 
is consistent with: 1) reduced investor demand due to low inherent information 
asymmetry, and/or 2) increased task complexity arising from infrequent voluntary 
disclosures.  
To further investigate the likely sources of difference in aggregate coverage, in Column 
3 of Table 3.11, I estimate regressions of MEAN_EXPERINCE against industry strategic 
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orientation, in a similar manner to the firm strategy level tests tabulated in Table 10. The 
results with respect to Defenders are broadly similar to the equivalent firm strategy tests. 
The coefficient for DEF_I is positive and significant (β = 0.5595, p < 0.001), implying 
that Defender-oriented industries receive abnormally large coverage from experienced 
analysts. Once more, this is consistent with expert analysts being better able to deal with 
the high task complexity arising from Defenders lower incidence of voluntary disclosures 
and this dominates any negative effect associated with lower complexity arising from 
lower ex ante information asymmetry.  
However, unlike the results for tests using firm-level strategy, there is no significant 
negative association between MEAN_EXPERIENCE and Prospector-oriented industries; 
the coefficient for PROS_I is insignificant (β = -0.0872, p = 0.559), suggesting that when 
assessed at the industry strategic orientation level, complexity effects associated with 
Prospector-like attributes disclosure frequency are weaker.22  
3.6.3. Robustness Test 
3.6.3.1.Additional Control 
As suggested by descriptive in Panel D, Table 3.4, there seems to be an association 
between the Prospector strategy and firm life cycle as Prospectors are more frequently 
observed in the introduction stage, but less frequently observed in the mature stage of a 
given firm. Therefore, I employ the dummy measure of indicators of firm life cycle stages 
from Dickinson (2011) as an additional control for all the regressions. However, the tenor 
of my results is unaffected by the addition of the life cycle indicators. All the test variables 
are still significant.  
                                                 
22 To control for any potential reversed causality between corporate strategy and analyst characteristics, I 
performed analysis by regressing change in STRATEGY against lag change in MEAN_EXPERIENCE for 
a single or multiple periods. The untabulated results show no evidence that a change in analyst experience 
affects firms’ strategic choices.  
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3.6.3. Additional Analysis 
3.6.3.1. Testing the Mediating Role of Voluntary Disclosure 
Results reported earlier suggest that, on average, Prospectors receive greater analyst 
coverage than both ‘other firms’ and Defenders. Tests also showed that for a given level 
of coverage, the cohort of analysts following Prospectors was less expert than that 
following ‘other firms’, which suggested that Prospectors likely superior disclosure 
quality played a significant role in determining coverage. Conversely, Defenders received 
more expert coverage within the cohort of analysts following these firms, which I 
interpreted as signalling the greater difficult in following firms with poor disclosure 
quality.  To test the potential mediating effect of disclosure more directly, I collect data 
for two proxies for disclosure quality (frequency of earnings guidance and financial 
statement readability) and use structural equation modelling to determine whether either 
of these proxies mediate the positive association between firms’ strategic choices and 
analyst coverage. I also the potential mediating role of reporting quality more broadly, 
proxied by accruals quality.  
For brevity I use the ordinal STRATEGY score in these models, but similar inferences 
are drawn if I use the two indicator variables (PROS_F and DEF_F). I use the aggregate 
analyst coverage sample and regress COVERAGE (the aggregate analyst coverage) on 
STRATEGY and controls, including proxies for voluntary disclosures as potential 
mediating variables, and also estimate regression representing the indirect path from 
STRATEGY to each disclosure proxy to COVERAGE.  
Table 3.12 presents the summarised results of the mediation tests using each of the three 
proxies for disclosure or reporting quality. The first disclosure proxy is MGD_FREQ 
which captures the frequency of earnings guidance provided by managers during the 
reporting period (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017), as recorded in the I/B/E/S Guidance file.   
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Table 3.12 Mediation Analysis for Discretionary Disclosure on the Relationship 
between STRATEGY and Analyst Coverage 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
  
Effect of STRATEGY on 
COVERAGE 
Effect 
coefficient p-value 
Effect 
percentage 
Direct effect 0.1411 (0.000) 90.97% 
Indirect effect 0.0140 (0.000) 9.03% 
Total effect 0.1551 (0.000) 100% 
Effect of STRATEGY on 
COVERAGE 
Effect 
coefficient p-value 
Effect 
percentage 
Direct effect 0.1742 (0.000) 98.59% 
Indirect effect 0.0024 (0.083) 1.41% 
Total effect 0.1767 (0.000) 100% 
STRATEGY 
MGMT_FREQ 
COVERAGE 
0.0426*** 
(0.000) 
0.3292*** 
(0.000) 
0.1411*** 
(0.000) 
STRATEGY 
BogIndex 
COVERAGE 
0.3237*** 
(0.000) 
0.0076* 
(0.082) 
0.1742*** 
(0.000) 
  
103 
 
Panel C 
 
 
 
 
 
Effect of STRATEGY on 
COVERAGE 
Effect 
coefficient p-value 
Effect 
percentage 
Direct effect 0.1628 (0.000) 99.99% 
Indirect effect -0.0001 (0.394) 0.01% 
Total effect 0.1626 (0.000) 100% 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. COVERAGE= the number 
of analysts following the firm within the 90-day window leading up to the earnings announcement, 
STRATEGY= a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). 
Values range from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) 
[Defender] firms, respectively, MGMT_FREQ= the total number of annual earnings guidance 
issued by the firm for the fiscal year, BogIndex= a proprietary measure of readability created by 
Editor Software's plain English software, StyleWriter. The formula is based on several plain 
English factors such as sentence length, passive voice, weak verbs, overused words, complex 
words, and jargon. Higher values of the index imply lower readability, AQ= a firms’ accruals 
quality estimated using the modified Dechow and Dichev model, CFVOL= the covered firm’s 
cash flow volatility, calculated as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s 
cash flows from operations over the past five years divided by total assets, lnASSET = the natural 
logarithm of total assets of the covered firm at the end of the year, ROA = the covered firm’s 
return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) 
at the end of the year, BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total common 
equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT, 
LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of total debt (lt) scaled by total assets (at), FREE_CASH 
= the covered firm’s cash from operations (oancf) minus average capital expenditures (capx) for 
the last five years, scaled by current assets (act), EXT_FINANC = an indicator variable, equal to 
1 if the firm’s variable, and VOLUME = the covered firm’s annual trading volume (cshtrm) of 
firm’s stock in million. 
 
I provide the descriptive statistics for the disclosure proxies and Equation used to estimate 
AQ in Appendix 3.3.  The results for tests of the mediating role of MGD_FREQ are 
summarised in Panel A: STRATEGY is a positive determinant of MGD_FREQ (β = 
0.0426, p<0.001) and MGD_FREQ is a positive determinant of analyst coverage (β = 
STRATEGY 
AQ 
COVERAGE 
0.0004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3029 
(0.380) 
0.1628*** 
(0.000) 
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0.3292, p<0.001). The indirect effect of STRATEGY on COVERAGE via MGD_FREQ 
is positive and significant 0.014 (p < 0.001), explaining 9.03% of the total effects of 
strategy on coverage. The direct effect of STRATEGY on analyst coverage (β = 0.1411, 
p < 0.001) explains 90.97% of the total effects of strategy on coverage. These results 
suggest that voluntary disclosure partially mediates the association between firms’ 
strategic choice and analyst coverage, and this effect is from the quantitative aspect of 
voluntary disclosure. While MGD_FREQ explains less than 10% of the total effect size, 
it should be remembered that management earnings guidance represents just a small 
proportion of the set of voluntary disclosures that a firm may make, and may also be 
measured with error.  
My second disclosure proxy measures financial reporting readability, and is measured by 
the ‘Bog Index’. The Bog Index is composite measure of the qualitative attributes of 10-
K reports (e.g. active voice, fewer hidden verbs, etc.) and has been employed in prior 
research (e.g. Bonsall IV et al. 2017). A higher value of the index imply lower readability. 
Data for the Bog Index was obtained from Brain Miller’s website.  
Panel B, Table 3.12 reports the results of mediation tests using the Bog Index: 
STRATEGY is a positive determinant of BogIndex (β = 0.3237, p < 0.001) and BogIndex 
is a weak positive determinant of analyst coverage (β = 0.0076, p = 0.082). The indirect 
effect (0.0024) is significant at 10% significance, but explains just 1.41% percent of the 
total effect of STRATEGY on COVERAGE. These results indicate that while the 
readability of 10-K reports partially mediates the association between firms’ strategic 
choice and analyst coverage, the mediating effect is far less significant than for the 
disclosure quantity proxy.  
Finally, in Panel C of Table 3.12, I consider whether financial reporting quality 
considered more broadly, and which may be correlated with disclosure quality, mediates 
the association between STRATEGY and COVERAGE. To this end I employ accruals 
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quality (AQ) calculated using the modified Dechow and Dichev model (McNichols 2002).  
AQ is an inverse measure of accruals quality, which captures the mapping of total current 
accruals into operating cash flow after controlling changes in revenues and PPE. The 
mediation tests for AQ suggest that: STRATEGY is a positive determinant of AQ (β = 
0.0004, p < 0.001), but AQ is not a determinant of analyst coverage (β = -0.3029, p = 
0.380). Consequently, there is no indirect effect STRATEGY on COVERAGE through 
its association with AQ. The direct effect of STRATEGY on analyst coverage remains 
significant (β = 0.1628, p < 0.001). These results suggest that the precision of firms’ 
accrual estimates do not mediate the association between firms’ strategic choices and 
analyst coverage.  
In summary, these results provide some evidence to support the existence of mediating 
effects of disclosure, both in terms of frequency and financial reporting readability. 
Therefore, Prospectors who issue more frequent earnings guidance or provide less 
readable discussion in the 10-Ks attract greater analyst coverage. However, the direct 
effects of STRATEGY on analyst coverage are still significant remain significant after 
accounting for both the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosure.  These results 
indicate that there are other factors affecting the association between corporate strategy 
and analyst coverage, which may include, but are not limited to information asymmetry 
effects. In the next section I examine and alternate potential link between corporate 
strategy and analyst coverage, in the form of incentives to encourage investment banking 
business.    
3.6.3.2. Corporate Strategy, Investment Banking Incentives and Analyst Coverage 
The literature recognises the presence of investment banking (IB) incentives affecting 
analysts, which reflect the financial benefits received by the analysts’ employer from 
encouraging covered firms to direct investment banking contracts in 
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their employer’s favour (e.g. Dugar and Nathan 1995, Hunton and McEwen 1997, Lin 
and McNichols 1998, Michaely and Womack 1999, Dechow et al. 2000, Hong 
and Kubik 2003 and Kolasinski and Kothari 2008). The strategy-related factors argued to 
be systematically associated with ex ante information asymmetry and disclosure policy 
are also potential indicators of analysts’ investment banking incentives. Prospectors, for 
instance, are constantly seeking new market opportunities to protect their reputation as an 
innovator. One mode of expansion is through purchasing previously developed 
expertise through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This creates investment banking 
opportunities for many analysts’ employers, as firms engaging in such transactions often 
frequently engage investment banks to advise on the structure and pricing of the proposed 
acquisition. Additionally, Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) argue that Prospectors are 
abnormally likely to require external financing to fund their innovation as projects 
involving large R&D expenditures may take a long time to obtain returns. Therefore, 
Prospectors may also be more likely to issue additional equity or debt securities, which 
may create investment banking opportunities in the form of underwriting contracts. 
Consequently, analysts are likely to have stronger investment banking incentives to cover 
Prospectors relative to ‘other firms’ and Defenders. 
To test the impact of IB incentives on the association between strategy and analyst 
coverage, I regress firms’ strategy choices on analyst coverage, and include alternate 
indicators of greater IB-related incentives for coverage, and their interaction with the 
strategy measures. In my first test, I follow earlier literature, and use the finalisation of 
the Global Analyst Research Settlement (the ‘Global Settlement’) in 2003, as a proxy for 
a change in investment banking-related incentive facing analysts (Kadan et al. 2009, 
Clarke et al. 2011 and Wu et al. 2015). The Global Settlement is an agreement between 
the twelve top-tier investment banks, the New York Attorney General and the SEC, which 
inter alia significantly restricted interactions between the investment banking and 
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research departments of investment banks, and thus arguably reduced investment banking 
related incentives for coverage.  Thus, in my first tests I include a dichotomous variable 
(GS) equal to 1 to indicate observations occurring after the Global Settlement, and 0 
otherwise. The effect from investment banking incentives should be reduced in the post-
Global Settlement period.  
My second proxy for IB incentives is the mean size of the brokerage houses whose 
analysts follow a particular firm. Large brokerage houses are more likely to provide 
investment banking services, and on average about half of the annual investment banking 
revenues derived from the equity market and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (The 
Economist 2016). Therefore, analysts employed by large brokerage houses are likely to 
be associate with stronger IB incentives to cover Prospectors than analysts from small 
brokerage houses. To test the impact of size of each brokerage houses, I use the log of the 
number of analysts employed by the brokerage house and who issued forecast during a 
given year. MEAN_BROKERSIZE is the mean of broker size across all the analysts 
covering a firm in a given year. Using the aggregate coverage sample, I regress 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE against the interactions between firm strategy dummies and the 
GS dummy, and control for general coverage and the average analyst general experience.  
For all tests, the vector of control variables employed earlier is maintained, with the 
exception of the variables FREE_CASH and EXT_FINANC, which  are excluded as they 
are directly associated with investment banking incentives and may distort the 
interpretation of coefficients. I would expect MEAN_BROKERSIZE to be increasing in 
the presence of IB-related incentives. 
Table 3.13 presents the results for tests of the impacts of IB incentives on the association 
between firms’ strategic choices and analyst coverage with different test variables and 
sample specifications. Column 1 provides the results for regressions of COVERAGE 
against strategy types, and interactions with indicators of the post-Global settlement 
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observations. Because the Prospector strategy has the most obvious implications for the 
likelihood of the firm requiring investment banking services in the future, and investment 
banking incentives are expected to moderate after the Global settlement, the main effect 
for PROS_F and its interaction with GS are the focus on this test. One would expect to 
observe a positive coefficient for the main effect for PROS_F, and for the interaction term 
PROS_F*GS to be negative if the impact of the Prospector strategy on COVERAGE is 
significantly affected by IB incentives. The main effect for PROS_F is, indeed, positive 
and significant (β=0.0567, p = 0.059), indicating that Prospectors enjoyed greater 
coverage than ‘other firms’ in the pre-reform period. While the positive coefficient for 
the main effect is consistent with an investment banking explanation, the coefficient on 
PROS_F*GS is also positive and significant (β=0.1501, p < 0.001), indicating that 
coverage of these firms increased following the Global Settlement, and providing no 
support for an investment banking explanation of the association between strategy and 
COVERAGE. 
Table 3.13 Regression Results for the Impact of IB Incentive on STRATEGY and 
Analyst Coverage estimated on the Pooled Sample 
  
NBR OLS Regression 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES AGG_COVERAGE MEAN_BROKERSIZE 
    
PROS_F 0.0567* 6.5168*** 
 (0.059) (0.000) 
DEF_F -0.1724*** 1.6441 
 (0.000) (0.316) 
GS 0.0484*** -0.4695 
 (0.000) (0.420) 
PROS_F*GS 0.1501*** -5.8526*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEF_F*GS -0.0313 -2.9459 
 (0.386) (0.127) 
COVERAGE  -0.9069*** 
  (0.000) 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE  -0.0747 
  (0.206) 
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Controls Included Included 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
   
Observations 27,232 27,232 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.102 0.277 
 F test 19832  
Two-tailed robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AGG_COVERAGE= 
the number of analysts following the firm within the 90-day window leading up to the earnings 
announcement, MEAN_BROKERSIZE= the average number of analysts employed by a 
brokerage house in a given year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’, STRATEGY= a firm’s 
discrete strategy score estimated using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 
to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) [Defender] firms, 
respectively, PROS_F= an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 
and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F= an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is 
between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, COVERAGE= the AGG_COVERAGE variable in Model 1 
for testing H1 which is the number of analysts following the firm counted during the 90 days 
before the earnings announcement,  MEAN_EXPERIENCE =the average years of forecasting 
experience recorded in I/B/E/S of all analysts who follows a firm during the financial year in the 
‘aggregate coverage sample’. I include all control variables in these regressions.    
   
Column 2, Table 3.13 reports the results of the tests of whether the size of brokerage 
houses employing analysts covering Prospectors changed following the Global 
Settlement. In this regression the dependent variable is MEAN_BROKERSIZE, and the 
level of COVERAGE is included as a control variable. The coefficient for the main effect 
of PROS_F is positive and significant (β=6.5168, p < 0.001), indicating that, relative to 
‘other firms’ Prospectors were typically followed by analysts from larger brokers before 
the Global Settlement. To the extent that larger brokers are more likely to offer investment 
banking services, this result is consistent with an investment banking explanation for 
Prospector coverage in the pre-reform period. Further, the coefficient on PROS_F*GS is 
negative and significant (β= -5.8526, p<0.01) indicating a significant shift in the 
composition of the analysts covering Prospectors in the post-GS period. Again, this 
significant reduction in the average broker size following the reforms is consistent with 
an investment banking explanation. However, given the finding that the aggregate 
coverage of Prospectors increased following the Global Settlement, this results for 
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changes in average broker size should be interpreted with caution. In Appendix 3.4, I 
report similar tests to those discussed above, but in which I estimate regressions within 
pre-GS and post-GS subsamples, then test the differences in coefficients across equations. 
This generates similar inferences to the discussion above, and for brevity is not discussed 
again here.  
In summary, I report evidence that Prospectors received greater coverage in the pre-GS 
period, and that coverage was, on average, provided by larger brokers. However, while I 
find evidence that the average size of brokers covering Prospectors declined following 
the Global Settlement, the aggregate coverage received by Prospectors actually increased. 
The evidence of an investment banking explanation for the association between strategy 
and coverage is thus at best mixed.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This study examines how corporate strategy affects the analyst coverage decision through 
its impacts from ex ante information asymmetry, voluntary disclosure and analyst 
incentives for investment banking transactions at both firm and industry level. For the 
firm’s strategic choices, I find that Prospectors are likely to receive greater analyst 
coverage, and that this may arise from: 1) greater value-adding effects due to high ex ante 
information asymmetry and / or 2) the reduced task complexity induced by more frequent 
discretionary disclosures. Further tests examining the extent of ‘expert coverage’ 
provided support for the contention that reduced task complexity associated with 
discretionary disclosure plays a significant role in the decision to cover Prospectors, and 
outweighs any negative effects on coverage caused by the extra difficulty faced by 
analysts covering firms with greater inherent uncertainty.  
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Defenders, on the other hand, receive lower coverage due to either or both: 1) the low 
value-adding effects from following firms with low ex ante information asymmetry and 
2) high task complexity resulting from low discretionary disclosure. Defenders 
abnormally high coverage by expert analysts suggest that the high task complexity 
associated with weaker disclosure dominates any coverage-inducing effects of lower 
complexity arising from relative stability of Defenders’ business model. I also perform 
additional tests to provide evidence that voluntary disclosure partially mediates the 
association between firms’ strategy choices and analyst coverage. However, there are 
other factors affecting this association because the direct effects of firms’ strategy choices 
on analyst coverage are still significant after control for voluntary disclosures. I also show 
that the overall strategic orientation of an industry is associated with similar effects on 
analyst coverage to those reported when firm strategy is measured ‘within-industry’.  
The results from additional tests of the impact of investment banking (IB) incentives 
suggests that the average size of the brokerage houses (a proxy for the likely provision of 
investment banking services by the analysts’ employer) following Prospectors declines 
after the Global Settlement, which is consistent with an investment banking incentives 
partially explaining Prospector’s greater coverage. However, the overall level of analyst 
coverage for Prospectors increases after the GS, which is inconsistent with an investment 
banking explanation.   
My study develops a comprehensive theoretical framework on how corporate strategy, 
which is important input information to analysts’ valuation process, affects analysts’ 
decision to cover a firm or industry. Future research on analyst behaviour can use or adapt 
this framework to explain analysts’ coverage decision before examining the strategic 
impacts on the properties of analyst reports. It also contributes to the analyst literature by 
considering both the unintentional (firm-related) and intentional (analyst-related) factors 
derived from corporate strategy and finds in what situations that one or some of the effects 
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drive the ultimate impacts of corporate strategy. The results from my study provide 
insights to the concurrent debate on the influence of analysts in their role as information 
intermediaries where analysts in general cover firms for reasons that are positive to the 
capital markets (value-adding and task complexity). However, analysts employed by 
large brokerage houses might be also cover firms for investment banking opportunities. 
Finally, the findings from my study might of interest to investors to understand the 
existence of investment banking incentives when using reports provided by analysts 
employed by large brokerage houses.  
My study is subject to the limitation of the potential endogenity in the decision process 
of strategic choice and analyst coverage (i.e. firms may change their corporate strategy to 
induce coverage of certain type of analysts). Even though Miles and Snow’s (2003) 
strategic typology suggests that firms choose their corporate strategy at the very early 
stage of firm’s life and these strategies tend to be constant over time, I cannot fully control 
for this reversed causality empirically. 
In Study Two, I investigate how industry-level strategy may interact with firm-level 
strategy and have a combined impact on analyst decision to cover a firm as well analyst 
forecast accuracy.  
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Appendix 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Prospectors and Defenders in the Individual Coverage Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A Prospectors (N=1,328,782) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
INDIV_COVERAGE 0.013 0.115 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
STRATEGY 25.314 1.308 24 24 24 25 26 29 30 
IND_STRATEGY 18.806 3.981 6 10 16 18 22 27 27 
PROS_I 0.120 0.325 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.056 0.229 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 8.594 7.446 0 0 2 7 14 28 33 
BROKERSIZE 60.396 68.710 1 1 14 34 86 323 397 
CFVOL -2.062 1.044 -5.942 -4.409 -2.793 -2.012 -1.384 0.564 3.613 
lnASSET 5.024 1.643 0.662 1.723 3.888 4.873 5.979 9.602 11.861 
LOSS 0.698 0.459 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA -0.277 0.528 -4.207 -2.696 -0.386 -0.118 0.020 0.288 0.297 
BTM 0.777 1.522 -46.673 -1.418 0.291 0.578 1.143 4.293 37.971 
LEVERAGE 0.389 0.323 0.022 0.041 0.178 0.316 0.519 1.595 4.597 
FREE_CASH -0.258 0.569 -5.778 -2.665 -0.407 -0.112 0.078 0.438 1.383 
EXT_FINANC 0.205 0.404 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 250.048 733.819 0.320 3.026 29.273 75.133 202.155 2851.712 21003.130 
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Panel B Defenders (N=1,047,082) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
INDIV_COVERAGE 0.016 0.125 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
STRATEGY 11.041 1.150 6 8 10 11 12 12 12 
IND_STRATEGY 18.344 4.153 6 9 15 18 22 27 27 
PROS_I 0.129 0.335 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.079 0.270 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 8.789 7.621 0 0 2 7 14 29 33 
BROKERSIZE 59.351 66.280 1 1 14 34 86 314 397 
CFVOL -3.117 0.722 -6.117 -4.948 -3.560 -3.110 -2.657 -1.502 -0.296 
lnASSET 6.223 1.871 1.280 2.604 4.805 6.069 7.390 11.487 12.757 
LOSS 0.237 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA 0.029 0.126 -5.227 -0.501 0.004 0.048 0.084 0.262 0.297 
BTM 1.215 6.321 -197.307 -2.660 0.577 1.045 1.631 5.809 332.166 
LEVERAGE 0.523 0.254 0.036 0.074 0.337 0.511 0.673 1.250 2.457 
FREE_CASH 0.089 0.293 -5.026 -0.968 0.004 0.100 0.204 0.688 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.023 0.151 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 173.706 705.648 0.160 0.709 8.369 29.753 98.731 2292.283 13092.300 
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Appendix 3.2 Correlation Matrix for the Individual Coverage Sample 
 
 
  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE 1                  
2 STRATEGY -0.001 1                 
3 PROS_F -0.008 0.585 1                
4 DEF_F -0.003 -0.474 -0.075 1               
5 IND_STRATEGY -0.057 0.032 0.007 -0.024 1              
6 PROS_I -0.023 0.009 -0.009 -0.001 0.636 1             
7 DEF_I 0.046 -0.012 0.001 0.028 -0.465 -0.093 1            
8 EXPERIENCE 0.032 -0.005 -0.008 0 -0.038 -0.023 0.025 1           
9 BROKERISZE 0.009 -0.001 0.008 0.003 -0.008 0 0.034 0.043 1          
10 CFVOL -0.049 0.294 0.281 -0.065 0.168 0.087 -0.078 -0.038 0.014 1         
11 lnASSET 0.091 -0.163 -0.163 0.014 -0.212 -0.107 0.11 0.043 0.019 -0.547 1        
12 LOSS -0.035 0.256 0.241 -0.043 0.117 0.065 -0.056 -0.005 0.026 0.345 -0.303 1       
13 ROA 0.027 -0.252 -0.262 0.047 -0.098 -0.059 0.037 0.012 -0.027 -0.363 0.273 -0.529 1      
14 BTM -0.008 -0.033 -0.014 0.03 -0.01 -0.018 -0.009 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.033 0.034 0.001 1     
15 LEVERAGE 0.02 -0.137 -0.049 0.087 -0.123 -0.029 0.101 0.009 0.003 -0.057 0.227 0.074 -0.201 -0.118 1    
16 FREE_CASH 0.034 -0.226 -0.25 0.035 -0.007 0.014 0.016 0.021 -0.009 -0.386 0.339 -0.454 0.653 -0.017 -0.177 1   
17 EXT_FINANC -0.017 0.201 0.235 -0.025 0.039 0.023 -0.023 -0.011 0.013 0.319 -0.23 0.29 -0.556 -0.015 0.148 -0.677 1  
18 VOLUME 0.046 0.022 -0.019 -0.035 -0.006 -0.001 -0.021 0.013 0.014 -0.079 0.401 -0.047 0.044 -0.03 0.031 0.094 -0.034 1 
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Appendix 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Disclosure Proxies in the Aggregate Coverage Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A Full Sample (N=27,322) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
COVERAGE 6.776 6.599 1 1 2 4 9 29 55 
STRATEGY 17.738 3.736 6 10 15 18 20 27 30 
PROS_F 0.073 0.260 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_F 0.072 0.258 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
MGMT_FREQ 1.455 2.715 0 0 0 0 2 11 43 
BogIndex 84.489 7.395 49 66 80 85 89 101 139 
AQ 0.058 0.090 0.002 0.007 0.026 0.043 0.072 0.248 9.582 
CFVOL -3.062 0.841 -7.371 -4.957 -3.617 -3.092 -2.545 -0.850 1.572 
lnASSET 6.588 1.928 -0.112 2.737 5.200 6.433 7.820 11.568 12.906 
LOSS 0.255 0.436 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ROA 0.006 0.220 -5.227 -0.829 -0.002 0.048 0.088 0.259 0.297 
BTM 0.839 2.730 -197.307 -1.758 0.440 0.767 1.244 4.233 27.426 
LEVERAGE 0.466 0.253 0.016 0.067 0.282 0.452 0.611 1.153 5.048 
FREE_CASH 0.072 0.321 -6.490 -1.033 -0.011 0.100 0.208 0.718 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.034 0.180 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 332.351 1034.14 0.022 1.296 24.368 74.673 232.819 4437.998 21586.800 
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Panel B Prospectors (N=1,984) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
COVERAGE 5.974 5.877 1 1 2 4 8 27 39 
STRATEGY 25.283 1.297 24 24 24 25 26 29 30 
MGMT_FREQ 0.939 2.383 0 0 0 0 0 10 30 
BogIndex 88.133 6.828 59 73 84 88 92 104 110 
AQ 0.080 0.115 0.004 0.008 0.030 0.054 0.096 0.375 2.573 
CFVOL -2.320 1.079 -5.942 -4.638 -3.086 -2.285 -1.567 0.243 1.572 
lnASSET 5.551 1.825 -0.112 2.044 4.292 5.308 6.674 10.430 11.861 
LOSS 0.603 0.489 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
ROA -0.197 0.464 -5.227 -2.015 -0.286 -0.056 0.050 0.257 0.297 
BTM 0.693 1.593 -46.673 -1.520 0.298 0.553 1.049 3.823 11.858 
LEVERAGE 0.422 0.331 0.022 0.043 0.194 0.365 0.563 1.595 4.597 
FREE_CASH -0.175 0.552 -6.490 -2.400 -0.324 -0.036 0.122 0.583 1.383 
EXT_FINANC 0.162 0.368 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 282.700 785.83 0.319 3.026 34.867 88.789 252.961 2939.929 21003.130 
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Panel C Defenders (N=1,959) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
COVERAGE 5.385 5.374 1 1 2 3 7 23 34 
STRATEGY 11.001 1.227 6 7 10 11 12 12 12 
MGMT_FREQ 1.108 2.293 0 0 0 0 1 10 24 
BogIndex 82.631 7.367 49 64 78 83 87 100 127 
AQ 0.049 0.039 0.004 0.007 0.024 0.038 0.063 0.201 0.415 
CFVOL -3.257 0.705 -6.117 -5.022 -3.713 -3.237 -2.793 -1.645 -0.971 
lnASSET 6.707 1.830 1.468 2.979 5.405 6.675 7.837 11.795 12.757 
LOSS 0.211 0.408 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA 0.035 0.101 -1.064 -0.365 0.008 0.047 0.078 0.269 0.297 
BTM 0.927 4.951 -197.307 -3.982 0.548 0.970 1.527 5.670 19.217 
LEVERAGE 0.554 0.239 0.036 0.102 0.392 0.541 0.693 1.255 2.457 
FREE_CASH 0.096 0.342 -4.764 -0.930 -0.002 0.094 0.210 1.094 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.024 0.153 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 217.796 695.96 0.167 0.786 12.736 41.764 139.100 2947.707 13092.300 
  
119 
 
Panel D Measurement of AQ 
 
TCAt = β0 + β1CFOt-1+ β2CFOt + β3 CFOt+1 + β4△REVt+ β5PPEt + εt 
 
Where:     
TCAt = total current accruals of a firm in year t, estimated as: △CAt -△CLt -△Casht 
+△STDEBTt. 
△CAt = change in current assets (COMPUSTAT: act) between year t-1 and t. 
△CLt = change in current liabilities (lct) between year t-1 and t. 
△Casht = change in cash (che) between year t-1 and t. 
△STDEBTt = change in devt in current liabilities (dlc) between year t-1 and t. 
CFOt = NIBEt - TAt = cash flow from operations in year t. 
NIBEt = net income before extraordinary items (ib) at year t. 
TAt = △CAt -△CLt -△Casht +△STDEBTt - DEPNt = total accruals at year t. 
DEPNt = depreciation and amortisation expense (dp) at year t. 
△REVt = change in revenues (sale) between year t-1 and t. 
PPEt = gross value of property, plant and equipment at year t.  
   
I estimate the annual across-sectional regression of the above equation for each two-digit SIC 
industry to generate the firm-year specific residuals ε. Thus, my AQ measure is the standard deviation 
of the firm’s residuals from year t-4 through year t.  
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Appendix 3.4 Regression Results for the Impact of IB Incentive on STRATEGY and Analyst Coverage estimated on the Pre-Post GS 
Subsamples 
 NBR OLS Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AGG_COVERAGE MEAN_BROKERSIZE_yrfe 
VARIABLES Pre GS Post GS Pre GS Post GS 
      
PROS_F -0.0030 0.2346*** 5.4611*** 2.6879*** 
(-)  (0.924) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
DEF_F -0.1773*** -0.1863*** 0.4707 -1.6789* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.750) (0.098) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 10,245 16,987 10,245 16,987 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.113 0.0960 0.220 0.340 
F test 7982 12226   
     
Test of Differences in Coefficients for Pre and Post GS Prospectors:   
 For AGG_COVERAGE regressions: For MEAN_BROKERSIZE regressions: 
chi^2 37.60   2.82  
p-value <0.01      0.093   
Two-tailed robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AGG_COVERAGE = the number of analysts following the firm within the 90-day window 
leading up to the earnings announcement, MEAN_BROKERSIZE_yrfe = the average number of analysts employed by a brokerage house calculated by each year in 
the ‘aggregate coverage sample’, PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, and DEF_F = an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. I include all control variables in these regressions. 
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Chapter 4 Study 2: Does Industry Strategic 
Orientation Affect the Association between Firm 
Strategy and Analyst Behaviour? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Study One considered the separate roles of firm-level strategy and industry strategic 
orientation in explaining the analyst coverage decision, and found that both firms and 
industries following a Prospector (innovation-oriented)  strategy receive greater coverage 
than firms and industries following a Defender (efficiency-oriented) strategy. However, 
theory suggests that the success of firm-level strategies is conditioned by industry 
attributes, including the relative importance of innovation and cost-minimisation, and this 
may imply that the impact of firm-level strategy on analyst behavior may also be affected 
by the industry-level strategic orientation. Being an extreme cost-minimizer in and 
industry in which innovation is key to success, for instance, may have different impacts 
on analyst behavior than for extreme cost-minimizers in a defensive industry. Study Two 
is an exploratory study that investigates whether industry strategic orientation impacts the 
associations between firm-level strategy and the properties of analyst forecasts (the 
coverage decision and forecast accuracy). Because Study Two is a direct extension of 
Study One, discussion of the theory that is common to both papers is constrained here.  
Understanding the association between strategy and analyst behavior is important, 
because analysts are crucial financial intermediaries that mitigates the inherit information 
asymmetry between firms and external investors and improve the efficiency of capital 
markets (Hugon and Muslu 2010). In preparing their reports, analysts gather and analyse 
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information from a variety of sources, some of which are specific to the covered firm, but 
others include industry and economy-level data, and information from competitor firms. 
From this information, analysts and are expected to develop expertise in identifying the 
factors that drive the profits and stock returns of their covered firms (Boni 2005), and it 
appears logical that the conformity of a firm’s strategy with that of its peers may impact 
the usefulness of information derived from those peers, and a firm’s chance of survival 
(which may influence analyst coverage). To this end, I apply the Miles and Snow (1978; 
2003) strategic typology at both the firm level (which compares members of an industry 
to their industry peers) and the industry level (which compares the traits of all firms in a 
particular industry to all firms in other industries), and examine the impact on analyst 
behavior of the interaction between these measures. To attempt to disentangle alternate 
explanations for any observed differences in coverage or accuracy associated with the 
speculations above, I explore the extent to which analyst expertise moderates these 
relations.  
Of greatest interest is the behaviour of firms and analysts in cases where the industry 
strategic orientation is at either extreme of the strategy continuum. From one perspective, 
firms identified as lying in the middle of the strategy continuum in any industry could be 
considered as having the greatest ‘alignment’ with industry strategic orientation. 
However, it is also possible that for industries which there are strong Prospector or 
Defender traits, that firms whose individual strategies are biased in the same (opposite) 
direction attract different levels of coverage or accuracy than Prospector firms or 
Defender firms in industries that lie in the middle of the strategy continuum.  Defender 
firms in a Prospector industry may face abnormal challenges to their survival if innovation 
is abnormally important. I describe such firms as ‘misaligned firms’. On the other hand, 
firms with an extreme strategy who are members of the industry that has the same extreme 
tendency are described as ‘Extreme Prospectors’ and ‘Extreme Defenders’.  
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My results show that in Prospector-oriented industries, the misaligned firms (Defenders) 
receive abnormally low coverage relative to ‘other firms’ (Analyzers and Reactors) in 
that industry, and relative to Defenders in industries with other strategic orientations, 
while Extreme Prospectors also receive lower coverage than ‘other firms’ in that industry. 
However, the low coverage for Defenders (the misaligned firms) is decreasing in analyst 
expertise, consistent with a task complexity explanation, but this is not the case for 
Extreme Prospectors in Prospector-oriented industries. I also show that the misaligned 
firms (Prospectors) in Defender-oriented industries receive significantly lower coverage 
than all other firms in that industry.  Unexpectedly, I further find that analysts cover more 
Extreme Defenders in Defender-oriented industries than all other firm in that industry. 
However, neither of the above association in Defender-oriented industries is moderated 
by analyst expertise which indicates a profitability, rather than task complexity, 
explanation.  
My tests of forecast accuracy show that some misaligned firms (Prospectors) in Defender-
oriented industries are associated with lower forecast accuracy than ‘other firms’ in that 
industry and this association is not moderated by analyst expertise, together suggesting 
that industry strategic misalignment may have a profitability-related impact on forecast 
accuracy that is beyond analysts’ expectation. My results also show that the expert 
analysts make more accurate forecasts for Extreme Prospectors and Extreme Defenders 
than ‘naïve’ analysts. This seems to suggest expert analysts are better able to deal with 
less relevant information, supporting the task complexity explanation. Finally, I also find 
that Prospectors are, on average, associated with greater forecast accuracy than Defenders, 
consistent with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). However, I find no consistent evidence that 
analyst expertise moderate the association between firm strategy and accuracy, which 
may indicate there are other explanation of this observed association rather than the 
disclosure explanation argued by Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). 
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My study makes several contributions to the literature and practice. First, I provide 
insights on how the industry strategic orientation (Prospector-oriented or Defender-
oriented) can condition the association between firm-level strategy and analysts’ decision 
to cover a firm. Second, the results from the accuracy tests imply that industry strategic 
misalignment is likely to increase unexpected errors in analyst forecasts because of the 
profitability-related effect. Further, my findings imply that there are other potential 
explanation of the observed association between firm strategy and forecast accuracy that 
are not explained by firms’ disclosure behaviour which is likely to be moderated by 
analyst expertise. Thus, in Study Three, I examine of such alternate explanation, the 
potential association between strategy and cost stickiness, and their joint association with 
forecasting efficiency. Finally, this study provides further evidence on how corporate 
strategy, an important information valued by investors, affects analyst behaviour. Thus, 
understand the impact of how corporate strategy affects the properties of analyst reports 
helps investors when they use analysts’ earnings forecasts to assist their investment 
decisions. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: I develop hypotheses related to the 
impact of industry strategic orientation on firm strategy in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 
introduce the models and measurement of variables used to test the proposed hypotheses. 
Then, I describe the sample selection process in Section 4.4 following with the descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix in Section 4.5. The results from testing all the hypotheses 
are presented in Section 4.6. Finally, I conclude this study in Section 4.7.
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4.2. Hypothesis Development 
In this section, I develop hypotheses examining whether industry strategic orientation 
moderates the impact of firm strategy on analyst behaviour. I begin by briefly reviewing 
key literature regarding the main constructs employed in this paper. I then develop 
hypotheses regarding the analyst coverage decision to cover the firm, and the extent to 
which any observed association is moderated by analyst expertise. Finally, I develop 
similar hypotheses regarding analyst forecast accuracy.  
4.2.1. Key Literature Regarding Analyst Coverage, Accuracy and 
Corporate Strategy 
Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) identify three potentially efficient strategic types by 
reference to points on a strategy continuum (Prospector, Analyzer and Defender) and a 
fourth inefficient type (Reactor). Like the other papers in my dissertation, this study 
focuses on the behavior of firms and industries exhibiting the extreme points on the 
strategy spectrum: those following an innovation-oriented approach denoted ‘Prospectors’ 
and those adopting an efficiency-oriented strategy denoted ‘Defenders’. Prospectors are 
constantly engaged in innovation and responding to their environment, invest more 
heavily in human capital and R&D and tend have decentralised organisational structures. 
Defenders have focused and stable product ranges, pursue cost-efficient technology and 
use highly specialised and formalised organisational structures. Analyzers attempt to 
selectively apply aspects of both Prospector and Defender strategies, while Reactors are 
inefficient firms unable or unwilling to adopt one of the other strategies. Analyzers and 
Reactors form the reference group against which the behavior of analysts following 
Prospectors and / or Defenders is compared.  
Management literature defines strategy as a unifying theme that gives coherence and 
direction to the actions and decisions of an individual or an organisation (Grant 2016). In 
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an organisational context, business strategy is an organisational process that attempts to 
set the basic long-term objectives of a firm and determine the course of actions and 
resources (at entrepreneurial level, engineering level and administrative level) required to 
achieve these objectives (Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). Therefore, the choice of corporate 
strategy happens at the very early stage of a firm’s existence and is unlikely to change 
significantly over time (Snow and Hambrick 1980, Hambrick 1983). However, the 
management literature also recognise that the impacts of corporate strategy go beyond the 
firm level strategies and include the impacts from industry strategic factors as well (e.g. 
Porter 1980, Carroll et al.1992 and Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Therefore, the choice of 
corporate strategy within an organisation is conditional on these industry strategic 
characteristics that determine the probability of success in a particular industry (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993). I define the sum of these industry strategic factors as the ‘strategic 
orientation’ of an industry. In this study, I explore the interrelationship between firm level 
strategic choices and industry strategic orientation and in turn, examine whether a 
deviation of the firm strategy from the industry strategic orientation affects the analyst 
coverage decision and forecast accuracy. 
Prior literature suggests that the difficulty of analysts’ forecasting challenge is affected 
by the level of inherent information asymmetry (Barron et al. 2002, Zhang 2006), firm’s 
disclosure environment (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 2000, Byard and Shaw 2003, Byard et 
al. 2011 and Bentley-Goode et al. 2017) and analyst’s individual expertise (e.g. Mikhail 
et al. 1997, Clement 1999 and Jacob et al. 1999). Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) applies 
Miles and Snow’s (1978; 2003) strategic typology and suggest that firms’ choice of 
strategy will have systematic effects on both the level of inherent information asymmetry 
and disclosure choices. Firms pursuing an innovation-oriented strategy (Prospectors) 
typically have greater investments in intangible assets, and more volatile operations, 
which may lead to both higher demand for analyst forecasts, but lower forecast accuracy.  
 127 
 
Study One of this dissertation also notes the potential for inherent information asymmetry 
to reduce coverage due to the greater task complexity implied. At the same time, these 
innovative firms make more frequent discretionary disclosures, due to pressure to obtain 
external financing to fund their growth, and the need to market a constantly evolving 
product line, and this reduces task complexity facing analysts. Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) 
find the demand effects of high information asymmetry and the supply effect of superior 
disclosure by innovative firms dominate the impact of strategy on analyst coverage and 
accuracy.  
4.2.2. Industry Strategic Misalignment and the Analyst Coverage 
Decision 
Study One reported evidence that firm and industry-level strategic orientation are each 
associated with variation in analyst coverage, but considered the firm and industry-level 
measures as alternate and independent measures of behaviour. However, prior 
management literature suggests that industry and firm strategic orientation are jointly 
determined, and thus the impact of firm strategy on analyst coverage may be conditional 
on industry strategic orientation. Recall that Amit and Schoemaker (1993) identify key 
‘Strategic Industry Factors’ that constrain mangers’ strategic choices if their firm is to be 
successful within a particular industry. Not all firms will, however, be perfectly aligned 
with the key success factors, because the market is subject to imperfections, such as moral 
hazard (Akerlof 1970), asset specialisation (Klein et al. 1978) and sunk costs (Caves et 
al. 1984), leading to asymmetric distributions of resources and capabilities across firms, 
and this affects the profitability of some firms in the industry more than others. Therefore, 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) suggest that the overlap between firm’s strategic choices 
and the industry strategic factors are a crucial determinant of the profitability of the firms 
in that industry. This implies that the consistency between firm’s strategic choices and 
industry strategic orientation may affect analysts’ coverage decision, because analysts are 
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reticent to cover firms that they believe cannot succeed (Hong et al. 2000 and Dechow 
and Ge 2006).  For example, in a Prospector-oriented industry (e.g. computer equipment 
industry; SIC code: 35), firms adopting a Defender strategy may miss opportunities for 
future growth due to their narrower focus. Similar arguments can be applied to a 
Prospector in a Defender-oriented industry (grocery retailers; SIC code 51-59). I describe 
cases such as that of a Defender firm in a Prospector-oriented industry as exhibiting 
‘industry strategic misalignment’. Thus, to the extent that individual firms in an industry 
that has an extreme strategic orientation adopt a strategy at the opposite extreme of the 
strategy continuum, strategic misalignment may suggest that future profitability will be 
poor and thus induce lower analyst coverage (thereafter ‘Profitability effect’). 
Where an industry exhibits an extreme strategic orientation, the impact on coverage of 
particular firms adopting an extreme firm-level strategy of the same nature as the industry 
orientation (e.g. a Prospector firm in an industry with a Prospector orientation, denoted 
‘Extreme Prospectors’) is less clear. While such cases may signal a closer alignment with 
key strategic industry factors, and thus greater profitability, literature also suggests that 
analysts face higher task complexity if they choose to follow firms with strategies distinct 
from their peers, regardless of whether this unique strategy is more aggressive or 
defensive than the industry trend, and that this may affect the coverage decision and 
forecast properties (Litov et al. 2012). In essence, Litov et al. (2012) argue that uniqueness 
of strategy may enhance profitability but at the same time increase task complexity, 
because the usefulness of information spill-overs from following other firms in the 
industry is limited.  
For simplicity, and because there are potentially competing effects of industry strategic 
orientation on the association between coverage and firm strategy, I state a single 
hypothesis in the null form: 
 129 
 
H1: Industry Strategic Orientation has no effect on the association between firm-level 
strategy and analyst coverage. 
4.2.3. Industry Strategic Misalignment, Analyst Expertise and the 
Analyst Coverage Decision 
To bring further evidence to bear on the likely causes of any observed dependence 
between industry and firm-level strategy and analyst following, I employ analyst 
expertise as a proxy for differences in ability to deal with complexity. A long literature 
has long documented that individual analyst attributes like experience, employer size and 
portfolio complexity are associated with analyst’s knowledge acquisition and skills in 
processing complex information, and in turn, affect forecast accuracy and bias (Clement 
1999, Jacob et al. 1999, Clement and Tse 2003, 2005, Clement et al. 2007, Drake and 
Myers 2011, Kim et al. 2011 and Keskek et al. 2013). Boni and Womack (2006) suggest 
that analyst’s ability to acquire and analyse industry-wide information improves their 
ability to process firm-level information. Because more expert analysts are better able to 
deal with the greater complexity associated with following firms subject to strategic 
misalignment, one would expect that any observed negative association between 
misalignment and coverage would be decreasing in analyst expertise. Similarly, for 
Extreme Prospectors (Prospector firms in an industry with Prospector strategic orientation) 
or Extreme Defenders (Defender firms in an industry with Defender orientation), if there 
is an increase in complexity due to their uniqueness, its effect on coverage should also be 
moderated by expertise.  
In Prospector-oriented industries, there are reasons to expect that misaligned firms will 
suffer greater losses of coverage than Extreme Prospectors. Because the Prospector 
strategy is associated with superior disclosure (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017), the aggregate 
amount of information in industries with Prospector orientation is likely to be relatively 
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high, and thus the value of spillovers forgone when covering Defenders in these industries 
is likely to be greater.  
In sum, to the extent that combination of industry and firm-level strategy does affect 
analyst coverage, analyst expertise should reduce the magnitude of this effect. H2, stated 
in null form is thus: 
H2: Industry Strategic Orientation has no effect on the extent to which analyst expertise 
moderates the association between firm-level strategy and the analyst coverage decision. 
4.2.4. Industry Strategic Misalignment and Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
The previous sections identified both profitability and task complexity effects that may 
arise due to the combination of firm and industry-level strategic tendencies, each of which 
may impact the analyst coverage decision. Both the profitability and task complexity 
effects may also have similar impacts on analyst forecast accuracy, as discussed below.  
Greater task complexity arising for industry strategic misalignment may impact forecast 
accuracy for the same reasons that it potentially affects coverage; the value of intra-
industry information spillover is expected to be lower for these firms and this makes the 
forecasting task more difficult. Merkley et al. (2017) present evidence regarding the 
importance of information spillovers to forecasting performance, showing that analysts 
within an industry that has recently experienced a significant reduction in overall 
coverage exhibit abnormally low forecast accuracy.  
Further, if as predicted, firms with misaligned strategies exhibit weaker performance 
(Amit and Schoemaker 1993), this may result in less accurate analyst forecasts. This is 
because analyst forecast accuracy is known to be lower for firms with poor performance, 
which may reflect more volatile operations (Barron et al. 2002) and/or a lower chance 
that managers will be motivated to manipulate earnings to ‘meet or just beat’ consensus 
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forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002) and a higher chance of taking an ‘earnings bath’ (Abarbanell 
and Lehavy 2003). However, because my empirical models include several controls for 
current profitability, my tests should be more sensitive to task complexity effects.  
Thus, to the extent the combination of industry and firm-level strategy increase 
complexity, one would expect lower forecast accuracy to be observed. Therefore, H3 
stated in null form is as below:  
H3: Industry Strategic Orientation has no effect on the association between firm-level 
strategy and analyst forecast accuracy. 
4.2.5. Industry Strategic Misalignment, Analyst Expertise and Analyst 
Forecasts 
Once more, I use variation in analyst expertise to shed further light on whether task 
complexity effects arising from the reduced value of information spillovers explains any 
observed association between the combination of industry and firm-level strategy impacts 
analyst forecast accuracy. As per Section 4.2.3, there is evidence that several indicators 
of analyst expertise are associated with greater forecast accuracy, for example, analyst 
general experience (Clement 1999, Clement and Tse 2005 and Kim et al. 2011), firm-
specific experience (Mikhail et al. 1997 and Clement 1999), brokerage size (Clement 
1999, Jacob et al. 1999); and lower forecast bias (Drake and Myers 2011). Therefore, if 
greater task complexity resulting from lower information spillovers explains the 
abnormally low coverage associated with misaligned firms or for Extreme Prospectors or 
Extreme Defenders, this effect should be decreasing in analyst expertise.  
Therefore, H4, stated in null form is: 
H4: Industry Strategic Orientation has no effect on the extent to which analyst expertise 
moderates the association between firm-level strategy and forecast accuracy.   
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4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Models for Testing Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 examines whether the combination of firm-level strategy and industry 
strategic orientation is associated with analyst coverage. To test H1, I augment Model 1 
from Study One, adding indicators for industry strategic orientation and their interaction 
with firm strategic orientation. The resulting Model 1 is estimated on the ‘aggregate 
coverage sample’ using a Negative Binominal Regression, whereas Model 2 is estimated 
on the ‘individual coverage sample’ using Logistic Regressions. All regressions include 
year and industry fixed effects, and standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm 
using the method of Petersen (2009). For brevity, year and industry subscripts have been 
omitted: 
AGG_ 
COVERAGE 
= β0 + β1PROS_F + β2DEF_F + β3 PROS_I + 
β4DEF_I + β5PROS_F * PROS_I + β6 DEF_F* 
PROS_I +  β7PROS_F *DEF_I + β8DEF_F 
*DEF_I + ΣβiCONTROLS+ ε 
Model 1 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE 
= β0 + β1PROS_F + β2DEF_F + β3 PROS_I + 
β4DEF_I + β5PROS_F * PROS_I + β6 DEF_F* 
PROS_I +  β7PROS_F *DEF_I + β8DEF_F 
*DEF_I + ΣβiCONTROLS (including 
EXPERIENCE and BROKERSIZE) + ε 
Model 2 
    
Where:     
AGG_ 
COVERAGE 
= the number of analysts following the firm within the 90-day 
window leading up to the earnings announcement. 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE 
= an indicator variable, equal to 1 if an analyst covers a firm 
during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model of 
Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 to 30 where high 
(middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) 
[Defender] firms, respectively. 
PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is 
between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise. 
DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is 
between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. 
IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level discrete strategy score, estimated using a 
method derived from Bentley et al. (2013), as described in 
Section 4.3.1.1.  
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PROS_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise.  
DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY 
score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. 
PROS_F*PROS_I = the interaction between PROS_F and PROS_I, indicating 
that firm is of Prospector type, and is a member of a 
Prospector-oriented industry. 
DEF_F * PROS_I = the interaction between DEF_F and PROS_I, indicating that 
firm is of Defender type, and is a member of a Prospector-
oriented industry. 
PROS_F * DEF_I = the interaction between PROS_F and DEF_I, indicating that 
firm is of Prospector type, and is a member of a Defender-
oriented industry. 
DEF_F * DEF_I = the interaction between DEF_F and DEF_I, indicating that 
firm is of Defender type, and is a member of a Defender-
oriented industry. 
Controls:   
CFVOL = the covered firm’s cash flow volatility, calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s cash 
flows from operations over the past five years divided by 
total assets. 
lnASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets of the covered firm at 
the end of the year. 
LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if prior year income before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT: ib) is negative for the 
covered firm, and 0 otherwise.  
ROA = the covered firm’s return on assets, calculated as income 
before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) at 
the end of the year. 
BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total 
common equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market 
capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT. 
LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of total debt (lt) scaled by total assets 
(at). 
FREE_CASH = the covered firm’s cash from operations (oancf) minus 
average capital expenditures (capx) for the last five years, 
scaled by current assets (act). 
EXT_FINANC = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the firm’s variable 
FREE_CASH for the covered firm is less than -0.5, and 0 
otherwise. 
VOLUME = the covered firm’s annual trading volume (cshtrm) of firm’s 
stock in million. 
Individual Analyst Attributes:  
EXPERIENCE = the numbers of years since the analysts’ forecasts first 
appeared in I/B/E/S 
BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a 
given financial year. 
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The null form of H1 would be rejected if the coefficients for PROS_F*DEF_I and   
DEF_F*PROS_I (indicators of misalignment), and PROS_F*PROS_I (Extreme 
Prospectors) and / or DEF_F*DEF_I (Extreme Defenders) are significantly different from 
zero. The interpretation of significant coefficients is case-specific and will be discussed 
in the results section. The intercept β0, captures mean effects for firms pursuing ‘other 
strategies (Analyzer and Reactor) in an industry with similar strategic orientation. The 
coefficients β1 and β2 capture the incremental effect for Prospector and Defender firms in 
an industry with Analyzer or Reactor orientation. β3 captures the impact of firms 
following “other strategies” in a Prospector-oriented industry, while β4 captures a similar 
effect for firms in a Defender-oriented industry.  
4.3.1.1. Measurement of Variables 
The dependent and control variables are identical to those used to test Hypotheses 1F and 
1I in Study One. In Model 1, AGG_COVERAGE is the number of analysts covering a 
firm during the window commencing 90 days before the earnings announcement and 
extending to the earnings announcement date; while in Model 2, INDIV_COVERAGE is 
a binary variable indicating whether or not an individual analyst covers a particular firm 
in a given year, on the condition that the analyst covers at least one other firm in the same 
industry-year. For brevity, the following discussion is restricted to the independent and 
test variables that are specific to this study, and which were not described in Study One.  
Firms’ Strategy Types and Industry Strategic Orientation 
Following the same procedures discussed in Study One, I construct the discrete firm 
(industry) strategy score (STRATEGY and IND_STRATEGY) using the method derived 
from Bentley et al. (2013). The three strategy types are categorised described based on 
the strategic typology described in Miles and Snow (1978, 2003), as: scores ranging from 
24 to 30 inclusive – Prospectors (Prospector-oriented industry); scores ranging from 13 
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and 23 inclusive – other firms (industry with other strategic orientation); and scores 
ranging from 6 to 12 – Defenders (Defender-oriented industry). Therefore, my two 
dichotomous test variables measuring strategic types are defined as follows:  PROS_F is 
a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the discrete STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 
otherwise 0; and DEF_F is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the discrete STRATEGY score 
is between 6 and 12, otherwise 0.  Two dichotomous variables measuring firms’ strategy 
type (industry strategic orientation) are defined as follows:  PROS_F (PROS_I) is an 
indicator variable, equal to 1 if the discrete STRATEGY (IND_STRATEGY) score is 
between 24 and 30, and otherwise 0; and (DEF_F) DEF_I is an indicator variable, equal 
to 1 if the discrete STRATEGY (IND_STRATEGY) score is between 6 and 12, otherwise 
0. 
Industry Strategic Misalignment, Extreme Prospectors and Extreme Defenders 
The variables of greatest interest in this exploratory study are the interaction terms 
between firm-level and industry-level strategic orientation. I use the term ‘industry 
strategic misalignment’ to describe cases where a firm is a member of an industry with 
an extreme strategic orientation (i.e. Prospector or Defender), but the firm adopts the 
opposite strategy. Thus, Defender firms within a Prospector-type industry, and Prospector 
firms within a Defender-type industry are described as exhibiting ‘industry strategic 
misalignment’. The incremental effect on coverage of firms adopting these strategies is 
captured by the coefficients for DEF_F * PROS_I and PROS_F * DEF_I.  On the other 
hand, firms who are a member of an industry with an extreme strategic orientation, and 
who, at the firm-level are identified as adopting the same extreme strategy are denote 
‘Extreme Prospectors’ or ‘Extreme Defenders’. The incremental effect on coverage of 
firms adopting these strategies is captured by the coefficients for PROS_F * PROS_I and 
DEF_F * DEF_I.   
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4.3.2. Models for Testing Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 examines whether analyst expertise moderates any effect of industry 
strategic orientation on the association between firm strategy and analyst coverage. This 
hypothesis is tested using Models 3 and 4 below. Model 3 is an OLS regression of the 
mean experience of analysts covering a firm on indicators of industry strategic orientation, 
firm-level strategy and interactions thereof, and controls. Once more the variables of 
greatest interest are the interaction terms between firm and industry-level strategies.   
Model 4 estimates logistic regressions of the incidence of individual analysts’ choice to 
cover a particular firm against indicators of firm strategy and that analyst expertise and 
their interaction, within two sub-samples representing Prospector-oriented industries and 
Defender-oriented industries. The variables of interest are the interaction terms between 
indicators of firm strategy and analyst expertise. Models 3 and 4 are specified as below: 
MEAN_ 
EXPERIENCE 
= β0 + β1PROS_F + β2DEF_F + β3 PROS_I + β4DEF_I 
+ β5PROS_F * PROS_I + β6 DEF_F* PROS_I +  
β7PROS_F *DEF_I + β8DEF_F *DEF_I + 
β9COVERAGE + β10MEAN_BROKERSIZE + Σ
βiCONTROLS+ ε 
Model 
3 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE 
= β0 + β1PROS_F + β2DEF_F + β3EXPERIENCE +  
β4PROS_F**EXPERIENCE + 
β5DEF_F**EXPERIENCE + ΣβiCONTROLS23 + ε 
Model 
4 
Where:    
MEAN_ 
EXPERIENCE 
= the average years of forecasting experience recorded in I/B/E/S 
of all analysts who follows a firm during the financial year in 
the ‘aggregate coverage sample’. 
And all other variables are measure as described below Models 1 and 2.  
Model 4 is estimated on Prospector-oriented industry and Defender-oriented industry 
subsamples. 
 
                                                 
23 Model 2 for testing Hypothesis 4F includes BROKERSIZE as a control variable. 
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4.3.3. Models for Testing Hypothesis 3 
Hypotheses 3 examines whether industry strategic orientation affects the association 
between firm-level strategy and analyst forecast accuracy.  This is tested by regressing 
the accuracy of individual analyst forecasts against the interactions between firm and 
industry strategy indicators and controls, and thus the data is of analyst-firm-year 
dimensions (as per Drake and Myers 2011). Once more, all models include year and 
industry fixed effects, and standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm as per the 
method of Petersen (2009).  The dependent variable and controls are winsorised or 
transformed where appropriate. Model 5 is specified as below: 
ACCURACY = β0 + β1PROS_F + β2DEF_F + β3 PROS_I + 
β4DEF_I + β5PROS_F * PROS_I + β6 DEF_F* 
PROS_I +  β7PROS_F *DEF_I + β8DEF_F 
*DEF_I + β9FOLLOW + β10BROKERSIZE + 
β11DISPERSON + β12DAYS + β13LOSS + β13 
ROA + β14BTM + β15EVOL + β16 MV_CRSP + 
β17 ZSCORE + ε  
Model 5 
    
Where:    
ACCURACY = the negative of the absolute value of analyst forecast error 
(actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by stock price at the end 
of the reporting period, for each analysts in I/B/E/S Detail 
History File covering the firm within the 90-day window 
leading up to the annual earnings announcement,  multiplied 
by 100. 
STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model of 
Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 to 30 where high 
(middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) 
[Defender] firms, respectively. 
PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is 
between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise. 
DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is 
between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. 
IND_STRATEG
Y 
= a industry-level discrete strategy score, estimated using a 
method derived from Bentley et al. (2013). First, within each 
industry-year, I calculate the weighted-average values for 
each of the six strategy components using firms’ total assets 
as weights.  Then, I rank each industry mean within the year 
and use the rankings to calculate the industry strategy score 
the same manner as the firm ones. The score values ranging 
from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate 
Prospector strategy-oriented (other strategy-oriented) 
[Defender strategy-oriented] industries, respectively. 
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PROS_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise.  
DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY 
score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. 
PROS_F*PROS_
I 
= the interaction between PROS_F and PROS_I, indicating that 
firm is of Prospector type, and is a member of a Prospector-
oriented industry. 
DEF_F * PROS_I = the interaction between DEF_F and PROS_I, indicating that 
firm is of Defender type, and is a member of a Prospector-
oriented industry. 
PROS_F * DEF_I = the interaction between PROS_F and DEF_I, indicating that 
firm is of Prospector type, and is a member of a Defender-
oriented industry. 
DEF_F * DEF_I = the interaction between DEF_F and DEF_I, indicating that 
firm is of Defender type, and is a member of a Defender-
oriented industry. 
Controls:   
BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a 
given financial year. 
FOLLOW = the number of analysts covering a firm during the current 
financial year. 
DISPERSON = the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts, deflated 
by stock price at end of the financial year. 
DAYS = the natural logarithm of the number of days elapsing between 
the dates on which a forecast is issued and firms’ annual 
earnings announcement date. 
LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if prior year income before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT: ib) is negative for the 
covered firm, and 0 otherwise. 
ROA = the covered firm’s return on assets, calculated as income 
before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) at 
the end of the year. 
BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total 
common equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market 
capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT. 
EVOL = the five-year standard deviation of the firms’ income before 
extraordinary items (ib). 
MV_CRSP = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end 
of the financial year using data from CRSP. 
ZSCORE = the values estimated using the Zmijewski (1984)’s financial 
distress model constrained between the values of -5 to 5.  
ZSCORE = -4.336 – 4.513*ROA + 5.679*leverage – 
0.004*liquidity (Zmijewski 1984). 
 
The null form Hypothesis 3 would be rejected if any of the coefficients representing the 
effect on accuracy of misaligned firms (PROS_F*DEF_I, DEF_F*PROS_I). Extreme 
Prospectors (PROS_F*PROS_I) or Extreme Defenders (DEF_F*DEF_I) are significantly 
different from zero. The intercept β0, and coefficients β1 and β2 capture the impacts of 
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firms that employ other strategies, Prospector strategy or Defender strategy in an industry 
with a strategic orientation of Analyzer or Reactor. β3 captures the impact of firms 
following “other strategies” in a Prospector-oriented industry on analyst forecast 
accuracy. β4 captures the impact of firms employing “other strategies” in a Defender-
oriented industry on analyst forecast accuracy. 
The measurements of key variables is discussed below. 
4.3.3.1. Dependent Variables 
Following Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), I study analysts ‘end-of-period’ forecasts. Thus, 
ACCURACY is defined as the negative of the absolute value of analyst forecast error 
(actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by stock price at the end of the reporting period, for 
each analyst covering the firm within the 90-day window leading up to the annual 
earnings announcement. I also multiply the calculated forecast errors by 100 to help with 
interpretation of regression coefficients, as per Equation (1).24 
ACCURACY = 
− abs(
 Actual EPS − Forecast EPS̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
Price
 )x 100 
(5) 
 
4.3.3.2. Control Variables 
The vector of control variables differs from that used in models of analyst coverage and 
is based on those employed by Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) in their models of forecast 
accuracy. These controls are described below.  
FOLLOW 
Analyst following captures the supply effect of analyst coverage, as greater analyst 
following of a firm improves firms’ information environment, and increase the 
                                                 
24 Untabulated results using the firm-year consensus forecast accuracy generate similar conclusion to those 
using analyst-firm-year measure. I use the analyst-firm-year measure here for consistency with tests of H4, 
where analyst specific expertise measures are used. 
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competition among analysts in providing more value-relevant information to the market 
place, increasing expected forecast accuracy. Analyst following (FOLLOW) is measured 
by the number of analysts covering a firm during the current financial year (e.g. Lys and 
Sohn 1990). I expect a positive relationship between FOLLOW and analyst forecast 
accuracy. 
BROKERSIZE 
The size of a brokerage house (BROKERSIZE) is measured by the number of analysts 
employed by a brokerage house who provide forecasts to I/B/E/S in a given financial year. 
I use this variable as a proxy for analyst expertise, as prior literature (e.g. Clement 1999) 
suggests that large brokerage houses are likely to have better resources to help analyst 
forecasting efficiency. In tests of H3, BROKERSIZE acts as a control variable. In tests 
of H4, BROKERSIZE forms the basis of one of the interaction terms used to test the 
hypothesis. 
DISPERSON 
Prior literature suggests forecast dispersion captures the boarder information environment 
within the analyst community. Because individual analysts may have different level of 
access to private information about firms’ future earnings, this will be reflected in the 
forecasts they issue (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996, Barron et al. 1998, Zhang 2006). I 
measure DISPERSION as the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts, deflated 
by the end of year stock price. A negative coefficient for DISPERSON is expected as 
firms’ greater information uncertainty leads to greater forecasting task difficulty, and in 
turn reduces analyst forecast accuracy. 
DAYS 
I control for analyst forecast horizon (DAYS) using the natural logarithm of the number 
of days elapsing between the dates on which a forecast is issued and firms’ annual 
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earnings announcement date (Wu and Wilson 2015). Analyst forecast horizon affects the 
amount of information available at the time of forecast. A negative coefficient estimate 
is expected for DAYS as the forecast accuracy should increases as it approaches earnings 
announcement date. 
LOSS 
Consistent with the model for analyst coverage, I control for loss-reporting firms because 
loss-making affects the distribution of expected earnings (Das et al. 1998, Gu and Wu 
2003), and may also be associated with manager’s incentives to engage in significant 
income-decreasing earnings management (i.e. to take an ‘earnings bath’). The variable 
LOSS equals one if the firm’s income before extraordinary items was negative in the prior 
year, and zero otherwise. A positive relationship between the absolute forecast errors and 
LOSS is expected, as loss firms are associated with greater earning surprise than firms 
that report profits.  
ROA 
I control for the impact of firm performance on forecast accuracy using ROA, as prior 
literature suggests that firms’ performance affects the level of voluntary disclosure (e.g. 
Verrecchia 1983 and Eng and Mak 2003). Firms with greater disclosure will reduce the 
forecasting task difficulty associated with covered firm and in turn, increase forecast 
accuracy. Return on asset (ROA) is calculated as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total asset is employed as per Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). I expect a positive 
sign for ROA as firms with higher profits should be associated with greater forecast 
accuracy. 
BTM 
Prior studies suggest that the firm’s growth opportunities affect the expected earnings 
growth and in turn, affect the distribution of analyst forecast errors (e.g. La Porta 1996 
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and Doukas et al. 2002). Consistent with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), I use the book-to-
market ratio (BTM) as a proxy for firm growth opportunities, rather than direct growth 
measures because the latter are included in the estimation of my strategy scores. The 
variable BTM equals to the firm’s total common equity outstanding divided by market 
capitalisation from CRSP. The coefficient of BTM is expected to be negative as analysts 
are more likely to be associated with lower forecast accuracy due to greater outcome 
uncertainty (Siegel et al. 2011). 
EVOL 
I employ earnings volatility as a proxy for firms’ operating risks. Earnings volatility 
reflects the riskiness of firms’ underlying operation from both cash flows and accruals, 
which are likely to affect the distribution of future earnings, and in turn, analyst forecast 
errors (Lipe 1990, Graham et al. 2005 and Dichev and Tang 2009).  I measure earnings 
volatility (EVOL) using the five-year standard deviation of the firms’ actual earnings (e.g. 
Lang and Lundhom 1996). I expect a negative association between EVOL and analyst 
forecast accuracy. 
MV_CRSP 
I control for the size of the covered firms using the natural logarithm of the market value 
of equity at the end of the financial year using data from CRSP (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. 2012). 
Prior literature suggests that larger firms are associated with greater disclosure, which 
increases the information availability that analysts needed to forecast earnings (Atiase 
1985 and Collins et al. 1987). However, another stream of literature indicates that firm 
size reflects greater financial reporting complexity, which may increase analysts’ task 
complexity that is associated with forecasting firms’ earnings, and in turn reduce forecast 
accuracy (Payne 2008, Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Therefore, I do not have a predicted sign 
for MV_CRSP. 
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ZSCORE 
Consistent with prior research, I employ Zmijewski (1984)’s ZSCORE as the proxy for 
financial distress because analysts’ forecast accuracy are associated with firms’ level of 
financial distress (Lang and Lundholm 1996, Payne 2008). ZSCORE is a financial 
distress ratio measures firm performance, leverage and liquidity. ZSCORE = -4.336 – 
4.513*ROA + 5.679*leverage – 0.004*liquidity (Zmijewski 1984). The variable 
ZSCORE equals to the values estimated using the above model constrained between the 
values of -5 to 5. A negative coefficient estimate is expected for ZSCORE as financial 
distress reduces forecast accuracy. 
All the controls discussed above are general controls that apply to all the following 
hypothesis testings. I will use a vector of controls (ΣCONTROLS) to present the nine 
variables that applies to all models.  
4.3.4. Models for Testing Hypotheses 4 
Hypothesis 4 examines the extent to which analyst expertise moderates any association 
between the combination of industry and firm-level strategy and forecast accuracy. To 
the extent that task complexity effects are responsible for observed difference in forecast 
accuracy, these should be decreasing in analyst expertise. In Model 6, I regress forecast 
accuracy against the three-way interactions between firm strategy types, industry strategy 
indicators and analyst expertise and the same vector of controls as in Model 6. 
ACCURACY = β0 + β1DEXP + β2PROS_F + β3PROS_F*DEXP 
+ β4DEF_F + β5 DEF_F*DEXP + β6 PROS_I + 
β7PROS_I* DEXP + β8PROS_F*PROS_I + 
β9PROS_F*PROS_I*DEXP + β10DEF_F 
*PROS_I +  β11DEF_F*PROS_I*DEXP + 
β12DEF_I + β13 DEF_I*DEXP +  β14 PROS_F 
*DEF_I  + β15PROS_F*DEF_I*DEXP +  
β16DEF_F*DEF_I  + β17DEF_F *DEF_I*DEXP + 
ΣβiCONTROLS + ε 
Model 6 
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Where:    
DEXP = the indicator variable that equals to 1 if the analyst is an expert 
analyst, and otherwise 0 for ‘naïve’ analysts. I employ three 
proxies to identify expert analysts: analyst firm-specific 
experience (DFIRM_EXP), general experience 
(DEXPERIENCE) and the number of analysts employed by a 
brokerage house (DBROKERSIZE). 
PROS_F* DEXP = the interaction between PROS_F and DEXP, indicating that 
firm is of Prospector type, is a member of an industry with 
other strategic orientation and is followed by an expert 
analyst. 
DEF_F* DEXP = the interaction between DEF_F and DEXP, indicating that 
firm is of Defender type, is a member of an industry with other 
strategic orientation and is followed by an expert analyst. 
PROS_I* DEXP = the interaction between PROS_I and DEXP, indicating that 
firm is of Analyzer or Reactor type, is a member of a 
Prospector-oriented industry and is followed by an expert 
analyst. 
DEF_I* DEXP = the interaction between PROS_I and DEXP, indicating that 
firm is of Analyzer or Reactor type, is a member of a 
Defender-oriented industry and is followed by an expert 
analyst. 
PROS_F*PROS_I
* DEXP 
= the three-way interaction between PROS_F, PROS_I and 
DEXP, indicating that firm is of Prospector type, is a member 
of a Prospector-oriented industry and is followed by an expert 
analyst. 
DEF_F*PROS_I* 
DEXP 
= the three-way interaction between DEF_F, PROS_I and 
DEXP, indicating that firm is of Defender type, is a member 
of a Prospector-oriented industry and is followed by an expert 
analyst. 
PROS_F*DEF_I* 
DEXP 
= the three-way interaction between PROS_F, DEF_I and 
DEXP, indicating that firm is of Prospector type, is a member 
of a Defender-oriented industry and is followed by an expert 
analyst. 
DEF_F*DEF_I* 
DEXP 
= the three-way interaction between PROS_F, DEF_I and 
DEXP, indicating that firm is of Defender type, is a member 
of a Defender-oriented industry and is followed by an expert 
analyst. 
Proxies for Analyst Expertise (DEXP): 
DFIRM_EXP = the dichotomous variable that equal to 1 if the analyst covers 
the firm for more than 2 years, and otherwise 0 for analysts 
covering the firm for equal or less than 2 years. 
DEXPERIENCE = the dichotomous variable that equal to 1 if the analyst exists 
in I/B/E/S more than 10 years, and otherwise 0 for existence 
of analysts that are equal or less than 10 years.  
DBROKERSIZE = the dichotomous variable that equal to 1 if a brokerage house 
employs more than 55 analysts, and otherwise 0 for brokerage 
houses that employ equal or less than 55 analysts. 
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The null form H4 would be rejected if any of the three-way interactions between firm 
strategy, industry strategic orientation and analyst expertise are significantly different 
from zero. However, the results will be most informative if any of the two-way 
interactions between firm and industry strategy are negative, and the corresponding three-
way interaction with expertise is negative and significant.  For example, if 
DEF_F*PROS_I is negative and significant, and DEF_F*PROS_I* DEXP is positive and 
significant this would be consistent with ‘naïve’ analysts forecast accuracy being 
impaired by the greater task complexity of firms in this group, and ‘expert’ analysts 
suffering less severely from this complexity.  
4.3.4.1. Measures of Analyst Expertise Used in Forecast Accuracy Models 
To identify expert analysts, I employ three proxies: analyst firm-specific experience, 
general experience, and the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house. I employ 
the mean value of the three proxies as thresholds to calculate the dichotomous variables 
of analyst expertise used for all testings. To simplify the interpretation of interaction terms, 
I employ an indicator variable that equals 1 if the analyst’s measure of a specific proxy is 
above the mean value of that proxy, and describe such analysts as ‘experts’. Analysts 
whose expertise is below the mean are scored 0, and described as for ‘naïve’ analysts.25 
The alternate proxies are described below:   
Firm-specific Experience 
Firm-specific experience refers to the period over which an analyst has issued forecasts 
for a specific firm and is argued to increase analysts’ understanding of idiosyncrasies of 
covered firms’ characteristics (i.e. financial performance and reporting practices) and 
have better access to managers’ information that improves forecast accuracy (Mikhail et 
al. 1997, Clement 1999 and Keskek et al. 2013).  Therefore, I expect analysts with longer 
                                                 
25 Using continuous measures of the expertise proxies does not change the tenor of results reported.  
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firm-specific experience to be less affected by the high task complexity, and in turn, are 
associated with higher analyst forecast accuracy than ‘naïve’ analysts.  
General Experience 
Genral experience of analyst is measured by the number years that an analyst exists in the 
I/B/E/S Forecast Detail History File (Clement 1999, Clement and Tse 2003, 2005, Kim 
et al. 2011, Drake and Myers 2011 and Casey 2012). Prior literature suggests that analysts 
who are more experienced in this profession possess better ability and takes less effort to 
perform their forecasting duties (Clement 1999 and Drake and Myers 2011). Therefore, 
these analysts are more likely to provide more accurate forecasts for misaligned firms 
than ‘naïve’ analyst because of their better ability to handle higher task complexity.  
Brokersize 
The size of a brokerage house affect analyst forecast accuracy through the firms’ ability 
to provide better job support, including administrative assistance, training opportunities, 
superior datasets, evaluation procedures and techniques to analyse data (Clement 1999, 
Drake and Myers 2011). Large brokerage houses are likely to have good relationship with 
the covered firms over time and possess a greater amount of relevant information about a 
firm (Clement 1999, Jacob et al. 1999). Therefore, I expect analysts working for these 
larger brokerage houses to have superior skills and better supports to deal with the task 
complexity associated with forecasting earnings for the misaligned firms and are 
associated with greater forecast accuracy than ‘naïve’ analysts.  
 
4.4. Data Collection and Sample Selection 
This section describes the sources of data used in this study and the sample selection 
process. All analyst data is obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(hereafter ‘I/B/E/S’), while financial reporting and stock price data are obtained from 
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Compustat and CRSP. The regression models for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
estimated on a firm-year sample that represents the number of analysts following a firm 
in a given year, and an analyst-firm-year sample that represents the probability of an 
analyst to cover a firm. For testing of Hypotheses 3 and 4, I estimate all regressions on a 
sample of annual earnings forecast produced by individual analysts in a given year. The 
samples used for testing Hypotheses 2 and 4 are subject to minor variation because of the 
inclusion of analyst expertise data. I describe the samples for analyst coverage tests 
briefly, as they are to identical to the sample used in Study One, and then derivation of 
the analyst forecast accuracy sample.  
4.4.1. Samples Used in Tests of Analyst Coverage 
Table 4.1 presents describes the sample selection criteria for tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
The aggregate coverage sample consists of U.S firms in the Compustat Annual 
Fundamental file that are drawn from years between 1980 and 2015. The final sample for 
the aggregate analyst coverage is 27,232 firm-year observations for 4,088 firms; while 
the final sample available for ‘the individual analyst coverage’ is 16,818,622 observations. 
To test Hypothesis 2, I employ two sub-samples drawn from the larger individual 
coverage sample, restricted to Prospector-oriented industries and Defender-oriented 
industries only. There are 2,189,894 observations in the Prospector-oriented industry sub-
sample and 923,004 observations in the Defender-oriented industry sub-sample. Using 
the two-digit historical SIC industry classification, there are 8 industries that are 
categorised as Prospector-oriented industry at some time within the sample period, 
whereas 34 industries are classified as Defender-oriented industries at some time during 
the same period. 
  
 148 
 
Table 4.1 Sample Selection for Hypotheses 1 & 2  
 
Panel A: Aggregate Analyst Coverage Sample 
Descriptions Observations 
Final Sample for the aggregate analyst coverage (firm-years) – as 
Per Study 1 
27,232 
Panel B Individual Analyst Coverage Sample 
Final Sample for the individual analyst coverage (analyst-firm-
years) – as Per Study 1 16,818,622 
Sub-samples of Prospector-oriented and Defender-oriented 
Industries: 
Sub-sample of observations for analysts covering Prospector-oriented 
Industries 2,189,894 
Sub-sample of observations for analysts covering Defender-oriented 
Industries 923,004 
4.4.2. The Sample for Tests of Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
The sample used in tests of analyst forecast accuracy consist of forecasts made for U.S 
firms in the I/B/E/S Forecast Detail History File from 1992 to 2015. Panel A of Table 4.2 
present the sample derivation from the data in I/B/E/S. I employ an analyst-firm-year 
sample because the use of individual analyst forecasts is most commonly used when 
incorporating measures of expertise (e.g. Drake and Myer 2011).  I exclude forecasts 
which are no longer active at the earnings announcement date, by reference to the I/B/E/S 
Detail History - Stopped Estimates file. Forecast errors are based on the most recent 
forecast issued by an analyst in the 90 days leading up to the announcement of annual 
earnings. 26 I use the stock price recorded in the I/B/E/S Pricing file to scale forecast errors. 
After applying the above criteria there are 510,188 analyst-firm-year forecasts available. 
Panel B of Table 4.2 describes available sample in Compustat. Consistent with the sample 
selection for coverage tests, the total observations of STRATEGY composite measure 
available is 60,177 firm-years from 1992 to 2015. After matching these to the available 
                                                 
26 Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) calculate forecast errors using the consensus forecasts provided by I/B/E/S 
Summary file. While the summary file is updated on a monthly basis, constituent forecasts could be as old 
as 135 days.  
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sample of analyst forecasts the sample is reduced to 206,066 forecasts. Finally, after 
considering missing data for controls, the final sample used for testing Hypotheses 3 and 
4 is 185,274 analyst-firm-year observations.  
Table 4.2 Sample Selection for Hypotheses 3 & 4 
The Analyst Forecast Sample 
Panel A: Sample Selection from I/B/E/S   
Description   Observations  
I/B/E/S annual forecasts data for individual analysts from year 1992 
to 2015 3,670,291 
Less: Forecasts that are stopped (410,490) 
Less: Forecasts that are not made within the 90 days before earnings 
announcement (2,471,017) 
Less: Forecasts are not most recent (269,109) 
Less: Missing stock price deflators (9,487) 
Final Sample of Number of Forecasts in I/B/E/S 510,188 
  
Panel B Sample Selection from COMPUSTAT   
Total Observations for STRATEGY composite score dataset 
(1992-2015) 60,177 
  
  
Panel C: Matching of Data from COMPUSTAT to I/B/E/S 
Number of observations from I/B/E/S  (per Panel A) 
               
510,188  
Less: Firms with no STRATEGY score (304,122) 
  
Total Observations of analyst forecasts with STRATEGY 
composite scores 206,066 
  
Less: Controls for firm fundamentals (20,792) 
  
Final Sample for Individual Forecasts (analyst-firm-years) 185,274 
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4.5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This section presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of this study. I 
present the Pearson correlation matrix for the individual analyst forecast sample only as 
the correlations for both analyst coverage samples are identical to those discussed in 
Study One. 
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
4.5.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Analyst Coverage Samples 
Table 4.3 provides the descriptive statistics for the aggregate coverage sample used for 
testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. Panel A reports statistics for the pooled sample, which is 
consistent with the distributions reported in Study One. Therefore, I concentrate my 
discussions on the descriptive of the sub-samples according to the combination of firm 
and industry level strategic orientation, as presented in Panels B to E of Table 4.3. I also 
present mean and median comparison tables for aggregate coverage conditional on firm 
and industry strategy in Table 4.4. The samples within the Prospector and Defender-
oriented industries are modest. Within Prospector-oriented industries there are 1,877 
observations, including 129 Extreme Prospectors and 114 misaligned firms (DEF_F = 1). 
The average and median analyst coverage for misaligned firms are significantly lower 
than coverage for Extreme Prospectors. There are no differences in mean coverage for 
Prospectors and ‘other firms’ within a Prospector-oriented industry, while the Defenders 
(misaligned firms) receive lower coverage than ‘other firms’. Panel B of Table 4.4 
presents the mean and median comparison in Defender-oriented industries where there 
are 279 misaligned firms and 391 Extreme Defenders among 3,687 firms.   For Defender-
oriented industries, the average analyst coverage for misaligned firms are no different 
from coverage for aligned firms, while the differences in median coverage between 
misaligned and aligned is still significant at 5% level. However, there is no difference in  
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Aggregate Coverage Sample 
Panel A Pooled Sample (N=27,232)        
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 6.776 6.599 1 1 2 4 9 29 55 
STRATEGY 17.738 3.736 6 10 15 18 20 27 30 
PROS_F 0.073 0.260 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_F 0.072 0.258 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
IND_STRATEGY 17.027 4.077 6 8 14 17 19 27 28 
PROS_I 0.069 0.253 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.135 0.342 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 10.155 4.817 0 0 7 10 13 24 33 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 59.355 42.519 1.000 3.000 29.500 52.400 79.667 224.500 396.000 
CFVOL -3.062 0.841 -7.371 -4.957 -3.617 -3.092 -2.545 -0.850 1.572 
lnASSET 6.588 1.928 -0.112 2.737 5.200 6.433 7.820 11.568 12.906 
LOSS 0.255 0.436 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ROA 0.006 0.220 -5.227 -0.829 -0.002 0.048 0.088 0.259 0.297 
BTM 0.839 2.730 -197.307 -1.758 0.440 0.767 1.244 4.233 27.426 
LEVERAGE 0.466 0.253 0.016 0.067 0.282 0.452 0.611 1.153 5.048 
FREE_CASH 0.072 0.321 -6.490 -1.033 -0.011 0.100 0.208 0.718 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.034 0.180 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 332.351 1034.142 0.022 1.296 24.368 74.673 232.819 4437.998 21586.800 
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Panel B Extreme Firms in Prospector-oriented Industries (PROS_F==1 & PROS_I==1) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 7.209 7.741 1 1 2 4 11 30 35 
STRATEGY 25.264 1.378 24 24 24 25 26 29 30 
IND_STRATEGY 25.302 1.309 24 24 24 25 27 27 27 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 8.159 4.738 0 0 5 7.66667 11.1429 21 28 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 49.364 30.257 2.000 2.000 23.500 48.750 64.333 137.750 140.250 
CFVOL -1.949 1.137 -4.957 -4.313 -2.780 -2.014 -1.240 0.754 1.304 
lnASSET 5.478 1.581 -0.112 1.667 4.509 5.239 6.526 9.130 9.862 
LOSS 0.744 0.438 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
ROA -0.451 0.962 -5.227 -4.925 -0.378 -0.141 0.000 0.243 0.297 
BTM 0.849 1.411 -2.618 -1.927 0.182 0.600 1.175 6.616 11.858 
LEVERAGE 0.366 0.358 0.038 0.039 0.155 0.282 0.507 1.263 3.366 
FREE_CASH -0.269 0.691 -5.353 -2.801 -0.328 -0.053 0.096 0.353 0.392 
EXT_FINANC 0.178 0.384 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 350.169 585.274 0.319 1.420 42.495 116.372 341.293 2731.051 3628.072 
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Panel C Misaligned Firms in Prospector-oriented Industries  (DEF_F==1 & PROS_I==1) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 4.526 4.605 1 1 2 3 7 22 27 
STRATEGY 10.798 1.213 8 8 10 11 12 12 12 
IND_STRATEGY 24.877 1.138 24 24 24 24 25 27 28 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 10.426 5.568 1 1 5.5 10.8036 13.5 26 28 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 56.054 46.297 1.000 2.000 22.750 44.833 75.333 246.500 249.000 
CFVOL -2.944 0.775 -5.451 -5.160 -3.291 -2.954 -2.448 -1.450 -0.971 
lnASSET 5.876 2.081 2.390 2.584 4.304 5.432 7.187 11.389 11.699 
LOSS 0.316 0.467 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ROA 0.032 0.124 -0.421 -0.417 -0.018 0.045 0.105 0.231 0.297 
BTM 1.044 1.627 -4.536 -2.577 0.257 0.698 1.316 5.809 8.737 
LEVERAGE 0.484 0.267 0.036 0.101 0.286 0.433 0.663 1.440 1.454 
FREE_CASH 0.082 0.324 -1.183 -1.040 -0.049 0.138 0.290 0.688 0.811 
EXT_FINANC 0.061 0.241 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 246.683 713.081 0.167 0.351 7.575 42.036 112.284 2125.319 6448.002 
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Panel D Extreme Firms in Defender-oriented Industries (PROS_F==1 & DEF_I==1) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 6.538 5.583 1 1 2 5 9 22 34 
STRATEGY 25.129 1.193 24 24 24 25 26 28 29 
IND_STRATEGY 10.455 1.549 6 7 9 11 12 12 12 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 10.603 4.470 0 0.666667 7.4 10.8 13.8571 21 29 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 66.321 41.963 1.000 2.000 32.000 63.750 94.667 201.000 208.333 
CFVOL -3.107 0.985 -5.450 -5.032 -3.772 -3.204 -2.586 -0.507 0.316 
lnASSET 7.026 1.942 2.234 2.602 5.601 7.115 8.380 11.151 11.372 
LOSS 0.280 0.450 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ROA -0.017 0.206 -1.454 -0.868 -0.026 0.049 0.076 0.225 0.297 
BTM 0.445 3.446 -46.673 -15.550 0.350 0.563 0.898 5.640 8.453 
LEVERAGE 0.489 0.218 0.060 0.070 0.350 0.500 0.617 1.049 2.076 
FREE_CASH 0.043 0.332 -1.970 -1.355 -0.016 0.117 0.198 0.547 0.631 
EXT_FINANC 0.061 0.240 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 261.461 437.676 0.448 0.911 41.184 106.966 268.100 2851.712 2957.246 
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Panel E Misaligned Firms in Defender-oriented Industries (DEF_F==1 & DEF_I==1) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
AGG_COVERAGE 6.325 5.764 1 1 2 4 9 23 34 
STRATEGY 10.834 1.353 6 7 10 11 12 12 12 
IND_STRATEGY 10.069 1.736 6 6 9 10 12 12 12 
MEAN_EXPERIENCE 10.552 4.496 0 0 7.66667 10.8 13.3333 22 29 
MEAN_BROKERSIZE 78.293 50.697 5.000 5.500 40.000 74.300 102.143 285.000 312.000 
CFVOL -3.347 0.716 -6.117 -5.093 -3.767 -3.375 -2.866 -1.645 -0.972 
lnASSET 7.579 1.614 2.933 4.007 6.485 7.423 8.553 12.360 12.757 
LOSS 0.246 0.431 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA 0.026 0.093 -0.545 -0.455 0.001 0.031 0.067 0.223 0.297 
BTM 0.733 3.008 -32.344 -18.043 0.546 0.880 1.434 6.311 9.556 
LEVERAGE 0.609 0.213 0.108 0.132 0.477 0.607 0.720 1.396 1.622 
FREE_CASH 0.075 0.317 -1.437 -1.173 -0.030 0.080 0.223 1.034 1.442 
EXT_FINANC 0.036 0.186 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 274.733 725.003 0.176 0.508 20.043 60.795 183.135 3746.083 7228.080 
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Table 4.4 Mean and Median Values of Aggregated Analyst Coverage for Misaligned Firms, Extreme Firms & Other Firms 
In Prospector-oriented Industries 
 Extreme Firm Misaligned Firm  Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Analyzer & Reactor PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean 7.2093 4.5263 6.8629 2.6830*** 0.3464 -2.3366*** 
Median 4 3 4 1** 0 -1*** 
N 129 114 1,634 1877   
       
In Defender-oriented Industries 
 Misaligned Firm Extreme Firm  Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Analyzer & Reactor PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean 6.5376 6.3248 7.0573 0.2128 -0.5197 -0.7325** 
Median 5 4 5 1** 0 -1*** 
N 279 391 3,017 3687   
       
In Industries with Other Strategic Orientation (Analyzer & Reactor) 
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Analyzer & Reactor PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean 5.7735 5.1995 6.9542 0.5740*** -1.1807*** -1.7547*** 
Median 4 3 5 1*** -1*** -2*** 
N 1,576 1,454 18,638 21,668     
      Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 157 
 
average coverage for Prospectors (misaligned firms) and ‘other firms’ within the 
Defender-oriented industries, which collectively seem to suggest the misaligned firms 
receives similar level of analyst coverages as all other firms in the same industry.  
In Panel B and C of Table 4.3, the average general experience (MEAN_EXPERIENCE) 
of analysts following misaligned firms are greater than the aligned firms in Prospector-
oriented industries, but not for analysts in Defender-oriented industries (Panel D and E, 
Table 4.3). However, analysts from large brokerage houses are consistently more likely 
to cover misaligned firms than aligned firms in both Prospector-oriented and Defender-
oriented industries. All control variables are behave consistent as the descriptive in Study 
One.  
I also provide the basic descriptive statistic of the individual analyst forecast sample in 
Appendix 4.1.  
4.5.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Analyst Forecast Sample 
Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the individual forecast sample used for 
testing Hypotheses 3 and 4 from the pooled sample. The statistics for the STRATEGY 
measures and control variables are comparable to Bentley-Goode et al. (2017). I use 
different proxies for some of the control variables (e.g. firm size and earnings volatility) 
as Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), because these proxies are more commonly used in analyst 
literature (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996). All control variables behave as expected. I also 
provide the descriptive statistics of the signed forecast errors (FE) to assist with 
interpretation. 
I further present the descriptive statistics of the sub-samples for misaligned firms and 
extreme firms in Prospector-oriented and Defender-oriented industries in Appendix 4.2 
and the mean and median comparisons between misaligned firms and all other firms in 
Table 4.6.  I start by looking at Prospector-oriented industries in Panel A and B, Appendix 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics for Individual Analyst Forecast Sample 
Full Sample ( N=185,274) 
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
ACCURACY -0.747 10.276 -2366.025 -9.357 -0.362 -0.127 -0.044 0.000 0.000 
FE -0.191 10.301 -2115.239 -6.850 -0.050 0.041 0.180 3.419 2366.025 
STRATEGY 17.865 3.523 6 10 15 18 20 26 30 
IND_STRATEGY 16.849 4.079 6 8 14 17 19 27 28 
PROS_F 0.063 0.243 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_F 0.057 0.232 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
PROS_I 0.068 0.253 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.142 0.349 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
FIRM_EXP 3.731 4.392 0 0 1 2 5 20 32 
DFIRM_EXP 0.472 0.499 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 10.849 7.867 0 0 4 9 16 30 33 
DEXPRIENCE 0.496 0.500 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
BROKERSIZE 66.904 64.567 1 1 20 45 98 291 396 
DBROKERIZE 0.429 0.495 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
FOLLOW 13.542 8.573 1 1 7 12 19 37 55 
DISPERSON 0.003 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.036 7.859 
DAY 24.260 27.208 -89 -38 3 16 41 88 89 
LOSS 0.184 0.388 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA 0.036 0.188 -5.227 -0.587 0.019 0.060 0.100 0.260 0.297 
BTM 0.713 2.090 -197.307 -1.006 0.381 0.655 1.042 3.413 27.426 
EVOL 0.373 1.518 0.005 0.008 0.037 0.075 0.172 6.412 18.419 
MV_CRSP 14.933 1.868 7.473 10.798 13.619 14.890 16.219 19.166 20.260 
ZSCORE -1.680 1.701 -5.000 -4.512 -2.805 -1.821 -0.903 5.000 5.000 
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Table 4.6 Mean and Median Values of Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Bias for Misaligned Firms, Extreme Firms & Other Firms     
    Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Prospector-oriented Industries 
  Extreme Firm Misaligned Firm  Differences   
  PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Analyzer & Reactor PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Accuracy Mean -3.7191 -1.8581 -1.0531 -1.8610 -2.6660*** -0.8050 
 Median -0.1309 -0.1894 -0.1050 0.0585*** -0.0259*** -0.0844*** 
Bias Mean -2.5843 0.0540 0.0325 -2.6382 -0.2.6168*** 0.0215 
 Median 0.0186 9.7608 0.0551 -9.7422*** -0.0365*** 9.7057 
 N 925 491 11,266 12,682   
In Defender-oriented Industries 
  Misaligned Firm Extreme Firm  Differences   
  PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Analyzer & Reactor PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Accuracy Mean -0.6706 -1.8095 -0.8544 1.1390*** 0.1838 -0.9551*** 
 Median -0.1344 -0.2701 -0.1534 0.1357*** 0.0190** -0.1168*** 
Bias Mean -0.3218 -0.8421 -0.2793 0.5203 -0.0425 -0.5629*** 
 Median 0.0144 0.0084 0.0328 0.0060 -0.0184*** -0.0244** 
 N 1,867 2,473 21,936 26,276   
In Industries with Other Strategic Orientation (Analyzer & Reactor) 
     Differences   
  PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Analyzer & Reactor PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Accuracy Mean -0.8254 -0.7874 -0.6494 -0.0380 -0.1760** -0.1381 
 Median -0.1703 -0.1678 -0.1199 -0.0025 -0.0504*** -0.0479*** 
Bias Mean -0.0701 -0.2546 -0.1654 0.1845** 0.0953 -0.0892 
 Median 0.0381 0.0328 0.0427 0.0053 -0.0046* -0.0099*** 
  N 8,864 7,617 129,835 146,316     
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4.2. There are only 925 firm-year observations in the sub-sample of Extreme Prospectors 
(Panel A), while 491 firm-year observations in the sub-sample of misaligned firms in 
Prospector-oriented industries (Panel B). The descriptive statistics suggest that, in 
Prospector-oriented industries, misaligned firms seem to be associated with higher 
forecast accuracy than aligned firms, opposite to prediction. However, in Table 4.6, the 
mean forecast accuracy are statistically indifferent between the Prospectors and 
Defenders in the Prospector-oriented industry. Further, misaligned firms seems to be 
associated with lower forecast dispersion compared to extreme firms further implying 
that misaligned firms might be associated with greater forecast accuracy (Panel A and B, 
Appendix 4.2). These results might be driven by the inherent differences in fundamentals 
between the misaligned firms and Extreme Prospectors in Prospector-oriented industries. 
It seems that misaligned firms are more likely to be firms with poor performance (e.g. 
loss-making, negative ROA and high earning volatility) compared to aligned firms in 
Prospector-oriented industries. 
Panel C and D, Appendix 4.2 present the descriptive for extreme and misaligned firms in 
Defender-oriented industries. The average forecast accuracy of misaligned firms are 
significantly lower than the forecast accuracy of Extreme Defenders, consistent with a 
task complexity explanation. Also, the forecast dispersion for misaligned firms are greater 
than the ones for Extreme Defenders, which further increases the likelihood of misaligned 
firms to be associated with lower forecast accuracy. Finally, the misaligned firms and 
Extreme Defenders average exhibit similar other characteristics except for growth 
potential (BTM) and level of financial distress (ZSCORE). This might be because that 
the misaligned firms in Defender-oriented industries follow a Prospector strategy which 
choose to pursue high growth and therefore, consistently requires more financing. This 
financing requirement is reflected in firms’ ZSCORE.  
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For testing Hypothesis 4, I employ three proxies for analyst expertise, firm-specific 
experience (DFIRM_EXP), general experience (DEXPERIENCE) and the size of the 
brokerage size (DBROKERSIZE). The mean and median comparisons for forecast 
accuracy between expert and naïve analysts are provided in Panel F. Both the mean and 
median values of forecast accuracy are significantly different between analysts with 
greater firm-specific and general experience and naïve analysts. This is consistent with 
prior literature where both the firm-specific experience (e.g. Clement et al. 2007) and 
general experience (e.g. Clement 1999) are associated with greater forecast accuracy. 
However, only the median values of forecast accuracy are significantly different between 
large and small brokerage houses. This suggests that the association between forecast 
accuracy and the size of brokerage house are weaker compared to firm-specific and 
general experiences. 
I also conduct univariate tests for comparing the mean and median values of forecast 
accuracy of the misaligned firms by analyst expertise for testing of Hypothesis 4. These 
untabulated results suggest that for Defenders in Prospector-oriented industry, the mean 
forecast accuracy for analysts with greater firm-specific experience are higher than those 
of the naïve analysts (p = 0.062), but not for general experience. This result seems to 
suggest that analysts’ firm-specific experience is the key expertise that affect analyst 
forecast accuracy of misaligned firms. For Defender-oriented industries, Prospectors are 
the firms with misaligned strategies. Unlike the case with Prospector-oriented industries, 
the difference in mean forecast accuracy between analysts with different level of general 
experience is significant for Prospectors in Defender-oriented industry (p=0.054). Also, 
the mean and median values of the forecast accuracy are indifferent between high and 
low level of firm-specific experiences. This implies that general experience seems to 
increase the forecast accuracy of the misaligned firms in Defender-oriented industry. 
Finally, in terms of the size of the brokerage houses, the median values of forecast 
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accuracy for both misaligned firms in Prospector-oriented and Defender-oriented 
industries are significantly different between large and small brokerage houses. 
Collectively, these results seem to provide some, albeit inconsistent, evidence that task 
complexity arising from strategic misalignment is reduced by analyst expertise.  
4.5.2. Correlation Matrix 
I report only the Pearson correlation matrix for the individual analyst forecast sample in 
this section. The correlations for both analyst coverage samples are identical to those 
reported in Section 3.5.2 in Study One. 
The correlation matrix for the individual analyst sample is presented in Table 4.7. 
Forecast accuracy is negatively correlated with all strategy-related variables (including 
both firm-level and industry level) except for the STRATEGY variable. This suggest that 
both Prospectors and Defender strategies are associated with lower forecast accuracy. 
Most of the proxies for analyst expertise are positively correlated with forecast accuracy, 
except for the measures for size of brokerage houses. All control variables are 
significantly correlated with forecast accuracy with expected signs.  
The strategy-related variables (both firm-level and industry-level) are associated with 
most control variables, but no bivariate correlation exceeds 30%, suggesting that there is 
no serious multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 4.7 Correlation Matrix for the Individual Analyst Forecast Sample 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 ACCURACY 1
2 FE 0.386 1
3 STRATEGY -0.003 -0.003 1
4 IND_STRATEGY -0.004 0.003 0.068 1
5 PROS_F -0.007 -0.003 0.537 0.004 1
6 DEF_F -0.008 -0.006 -0.471 -0.074 -0.064 1
7 PROS_I -0.014 0 0.045 0.527 0.011 -0.021 1
8 DEF_I -0.007 -0.006 -0.019 -0.632 0.014 0.065 -0.11 1
9 FOLLOW 0.046 0.025 0.036 0.023 -0.039 -0.072 0.046 -0.024 1
10 FIRM_EXP 0.01 0.003 -0.118 -0.122 -0.082 0.041 -0.056 0.075 0.112 1
11 EXPERIENCE 0.014 0.005 -0.061 -0.058 -0.033 0.031 -0.022 0.023 0.052 0.453 1
12 BROKERSIZE 0.002 0.002 -0.042 -0.07 -0.018 0.017 -0.028 0.064 0.034 0.062 0.07 1
13 DISPERSON -0.263 0.12 -0.008 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.026 0.007 -0.025 0 -0.007 -0.002 1
14 DAY -0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.013 -0.001 0.002 -0.02 -0.009 -0.106 0.005 -0.015 -0.084 0 1
15 LOSS -0.089 -0.05 0.202 0.12 0.218 -0.014 0.074 -0.057 -0.143 -0.089 -0.05 -0.024 0.066 0.006 1
16 ROA 0.117 0.072 -0.184 -0.089 -0.224 0.012 -0.067 0.028 0.112 0.068 0.04 0.009 -0.076 0.006 -0.528 1
17 BTM 0.007 0.007 -0.021 0 -0.007 0.014 -0.011 -0.021 -0.042 -0.002 -0.005 -0.017 -0.004 0.014 0.052 -0.044 1
18 EVOL -0.047 -0.02 0.066 0.012 0.121 0.037 0.019 -0.003 -0.066 -0.029 -0.003 0.007 0.041 0.001 0.148 -0.182 -0.065 1
19 MV_CRSP 0.081 0.041 -0.062 -0.088 -0.087 -0.026 -0.016 0.068 0.666 0.23 0.126 0.138 -0.056 -0.066 -0.308 0.252 -0.091 -0.081 1
20 ZSCORE5 -0.081 -0.043 -0.094 -0.17 0.047 0.111 -0.054 0.157 -0.048 0.089 0.037 0.075 0.071 0.001 0.272 -0.427 -0.041 0.246 0.013 1
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4.6. Results Analysis 
I present the empirical results for each hypothesis in this section. Section 4.6.1 provides 
the results of the joint impact of firm and industry strategy on analyst coverage tests 
(Hypothesis 1). Section 4.6.2 reports the results of tests of the moderating role of analyst 
expertise as per Hypothesis 2.  I present regressions for tests relating to forecast accuracy 
(Hypothesis 3) in Section 4.6.3 and of the moderating effect of expertise on forecast 
accuracy in Section 4.6.4.   
4.6.1. Tests of Hypothesis 1 - Firm Strategy, Industry Strategic 
Orientation and Analyst Coverage 
Hypothesis 1 examines whether industry strategic orientation conditions the association 
between firm strategy and analyst coverage. Table 4.8 presents the results of all tests for 
Hypothesis 1. 
Table 4.8 Regression Results for H1 for Industry Strategic Misalignment and 
Analyst Coverage 
 NBR Logit 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES AGG_COVERAGE 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE 
    
PROS_F 0.2183*** 0.2732*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
DEF_F -0.2096*** -0.1685*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PROS_I 0.1558*** -0.3537*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PROS_F*PROS_I -0.0874 -0.1076*** 
 (0.249) (0.000) 
DEF_F*PROS_I -0.1583* -0.2727*** 
(-) (0.068) (0.000) 
DEF_I -0.1108*** 0.4789*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PROS_F*DEF_I -0.2101*** -0.0664*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.003) 
DEF_F*DEF_I 0.1043 0.2556*** 
 (0.139) (0.000) 
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EXPERIENCE  0.0233*** 
  (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE  0.1154*** 
  (0.000) 
CFVOL 0.1035*** 0.0247*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnASSET 0.3314*** 0.2988*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -0.0262 -0.0410*** 
(-) (0.132) (0.000) 
ROA -0.0160 0.2783*** 
(+) (0.686) (0.000) 
BTM -0.0228** -0.0051*** 
(-) (0.038) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE -0.4289*** -0.2914*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) 
FREE_CASH 0.2822*** 0.4602*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXT_FINANC 0.1858*** 0.4441*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) 
VOLUME 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.6004*** -5.0847*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 27,232 16,818,622 
Pseudo R-squared 0.115 0.0797 
F test 5642 232835 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AGG_COVERAGE = the 
number of analysts following the firm within the 90-day window leading up to the earnings 
announcement, INDIV_COVERAGE = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if an analyst covers a 
firm during the year, and 0 otherwise, STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated 
using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] 
values indicate Prospector (other firms) [Defender] firms, respectively, PROS_F = an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F = an 
indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise,  
IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level discrete strategy score, estimated using a method derived 
from Bentley et al. (2013), as described in Section 4.3.1.1,  PROS_I = an indicator variable, equal 
to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_I = an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, The 
other variables represent interaction between the main effects defined above, and the other 
variables represent interaction between the main effects defined above. CFVOL = the covered 
firm’s cash flow volatility, calculated as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the 
firm’s cash flows from operations over the past five years divided by total assets, lnASSET = the 
natural logarithm of total assets of the covered firm at the end of the year, ROA = the covered 
firm’s return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets 
(at) at the end of the year, BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total 
common equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT, 
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LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of total debt (lt) scaled by total assets (at), FREE_CASH 
= the covered firm’s cash from operations (oancf) minus average capital expenditures (capx) for 
the last five years, scaled by current assets (act), EXT_FINANC = an indicator variable, equal to 
1 if the firm’s variable, and VOLUME = the covered firm’s annual trading volume (cshtrm) of 
firm’s stock in million. In regressions for individual analyst coverage: EXPERIENCE = the 
numbers of years since the analysts’ forecasts first appeared in I/B/E/S, and BROKERSIZE = the 
number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a given financial year. 
 
The result for tests using the aggregate cover sample are reported in Column 1 of Table 
4.8, while those for the individual coverage sample appear in Column 2. The Pseudo R2 
statistics of 0.115 and 0.0797 are similar those generated by equivalent tests in Study One. 
The intercept captures the level of analyst coverage received by firms pursuing ‘other 
strategies’ in an industry with ‘other strategic orientations’. The main effect for POS_F 
and DEF_F measures the impacts of firm pursuing Prospectors and Defenders strategies 
in an industry with ‘other strategic orientation’. In each regression, the effect of strategic 
misalignment on coverage is measured by the coefficients for PROS_F*DEF_I and 
DEF_F*PROS_I. PROS_F*DEF_I measures the impacts on coverage of firms following 
a Prospector strategy in a Defender-oriented industry, while DEF_F*PROS_I captures 
the impact of firms following a Defender strategy in a Prospector-oriented industry.  
DEF_I and DEF_F*DEF_I reflects the effect on coverage for firms pursuing ‘other 
strategies’ in a Defender industry and Extreme Defenders respectively; and PROS_I and 
PROS_F*PROS_I measures the impacts of firms pursuing ‘other strategies’ in a 
Prospector-oriented industry and Extreme Prospectors.  
The main effects for PROS_F and DEF_F are consistent with the unconditional findings 
reported in Study One, and those of Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) who find that coverage 
is increasing in the level of the STRATEGY score; Prospectors are associated with 
significant positive coefficients and Defenders are associated with significant negative 
coefficients in tests of either sample. 
 167 
 
In tests using the aggregate coverage sample (Column 1), the coefficients indicating the 
effect on coverage of strategic misalignment are each negative and significant: 
DEF_F*PROS_I (β = -0.1583, p = 0.068) and PROS_F*DEF_I (β = -0.2101, p < 0.001) 
consistent with the contention that Defender firms Prospector-oriented industries and 
Prospector firms in Defender-oriented industries receive abnormally low coverage due to 
either or both task complexity or profitability effects. The equivalent coefficients in the 
tests using the individual analyst coverage sample are also negative and highly significant: 
(DEF_F*PROS_I: β = -0.273, p < 0.001; PROS_F*DEF_I: β = -0.664, p = 0.003). These 
results indicate that individual analysts are less likely to cover Defenders in a Prospector-
oriented industry than ‘other firms’ in the same industry, while the probability for 
individual analysts to cover a Prospector in a Defender-oriented industry is lower than 
covering a firm pursues ‘other strategies’.  
There is also some evidence that Extreme Prospectors and Extreme Defenders receive 
abnormal levels of coverage. While the coefficient for Extreme Prospectors 
(PROS_F*PROS_I) is insignificant in the aggregate coverage sample test, it is negative 
and strongly significant in the tests using the individual coverage sample (β = -0.108, 
p<0.001). The coefficient for Extreme Defenders (DEF_F*DEF_I) is positive and 
significant (β = 0.256, p<0.001) indicating that Defenders in a Defender-oriented industry 
receives greater analyst following than ‘other firms’ in the same industry. 
In the Defender-oriented industries, all tests of the differences in coefficients between 
misaligned firms and Extreme Prospectors cases are significant at p < 0.001 (untabulated), 
suggesting strategically misalignment has the greater negative impact on coverage. 
However, within Prospector-oriented industry, the test of difference in coefficients on 
DEF_F*PROS_I and PROS_F*PROS_I is only significant in the aggregate cover tests. 
Collectively, these imply that the impacts of strategic misaligned firms receive lower 
coverage, and that this may reflect either task complexity or profitability effects. There is 
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also (weaker) evidence that Extreme Prospectors receive abnormally low coverage and 
Extreme Defenders receive abnormally high coverage.  
4.6.2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 - Analyst Expertise and Industry Strategic 
Misalignment 
Hypothesis 2 considers whether analyst expertise moderates the effects on coverage of 
the combination of industry and firm-level strategy demonstrated in the previous section. 
Analyst expertise is argued proxy for the ability to deal with more complex forecasting 
tasks, and thus if the results in the previous section derive (at least in part) from greater 
complexity associated with the combination of industry and firm-level strategy, the effect 
on coverage should be decreasing in the expertise of analysts. For these tests, analyst 
general experience is the sole proxy for expertise, as firm-specific experience is 
endogenous to the coverage decision and brokerage size potentially reflects investment 
banking incentives for coverage.  I expect a positive relationship between analyst 
expertise and analysts’ likelihood to cover misaligned firms. I test H2 using both a 
measure of the mean experience of the cohort of the analysts following a firm, and the 
expertise of individual analysts. For tests based on individual analysts coverage decision, 
I estimate separate regressions on sub-samples of Prospector-oriented industries and 
Defender-oriented industries. Table 4.9 presents the results of tests of H2 using both 
methods. 
Column 1 of Table 4.9 presents the results estimated on the aggregate coverage sample. 
The dependent variables is MEAN_EXPERIENCE, representing the average general 
forecasting experience of all analysts following a firm. The R2 from this OLS regression 
is 0.157, similar to equivalent models in Study One. There is, however, no evidence in 
the reported coefficients that strategically misaligned firms, or Extreme Prospector or 
Defenders, receive abnormal levels of coverage from expert analysts. All coefficients on   
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Table 4.9 Regression Results for H2 for the Industry Strategic Misalignment 
Analyst, Analyst Expertise and Analyst Coverage 
 
Aggregate Converge 
Sample 
PROS Industry and DEF Industry  
Sub-samples 
 OLS  Logit 
  (1)   (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
MEAN_ 
EXPERIENCE VARIABLES 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE  
in PROS 
Industry 
INDIV_ 
COVERAGE 
in DEF 
Industry 
       
PROS_F -0.3503** PROS_F 0.0012 0.1419*** 
 (0.014)  (0.979) (0.000) 
DEF_F 0.4060** DEF_F -0.5198*** 0.0211 
 (0.042)  (0.000) (0.502) 
PROS_I -0.1001 
PROS_F* 
EXPERIENCE 0.0014 0.0001 
 (0.523) (+) (0.709) (0.976) 
PROS_F*PROS_I -0.4811 
DEF_F* 
EXPERIENCE 0.0183*** 0.0012 
 (0.243) (+) (0.000) (0.598) 
DEF_F*PROS_I 0.3371    
(-) (0.591)    
DEF_I 0.5951***    
 (0.000)    
PROS_F*DEF_I 0.3331    
(-) (0.404)    
DEF_F*DEF_I -0.5550    
 (0.179)    
COVERAGE 0.0350*** EXPERIENCE 0.0195*** 0.0246*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
MEAN -0.0056*** BROKERSIZE 0.0567*** 0.1298*** 
_BROKERSIZE (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CFVOL -0.5180*** CFVOL 0.0658*** -0.1045*** 
(+) (0.000) (+) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnASSET 0.2176*** lnASSET 0.4077*** 0.2529*** 
(+) (0.000) (+) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS 0.1055 LOSS 0.1698*** -0.0373* 
(-) (0.280) (-) (0.000) (0.069) 
ROA -0.2831 ROA -0.0432 0.5839*** 
(+) (0.179) (+) (0.144) (0.000) 
BTM 0.0086 BTM -0.2416*** -0.0139*** 
(-) (0.534) (-) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.9108*** LEVERAGE -1.0490*** 0.0895*** 
(-) (0.000) (-) (0.000) (0.002) 
FREE_CASH 0.1682 FREE_CASH 0.2845*** 0.5028*** 
(+) (0.312) (+) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXT_FINANC -0.1906 EXT_FINANC 0.0021 0.3616*** 
(+) (0.465) (+) (0.975) (0.000) 
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VOLUME -0.0000 VOLUME -0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(+) (0.720) (+) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.1003*** Constant -5.2051*** -5.3023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Year fixed effects 
Yes 
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed  
Effects Yes 
Industry fixed  
effects Yes Yes 
     
Observations 27,232 Observations 2,189,890 923,004 
Pseudo R-squared 0.157 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.0575 0.0821 
  F test 13462 26331 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEAN_EXPERIENCE = 
the average years of forecasting experience recorded in I/B/E/S of all analysts who follows a firm 
during the financial year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’, INDIV_COVERAGE = an indicator 
variable, equal to 1 if an analyst covers a firm during the year, and 0 otherwise, STRATEGY = a 
firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range 
from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) [Defender] firms, 
respectively, PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 
and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is 
between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise,  IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level discrete strategy score, 
estimated using a method derived from Bentley et al. (2013), as described in Section 4.3.1.1,  
PROS_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, 
and 0 otherwise, DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is 
between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, and the other variables represent interaction between the main 
effects defined above. COVERAGE = the AGG_COVERAGE variable in Model 1 for testing H1 
which is the number of analysts following the firm counted during the 90 days before the earnings 
announcement, MEAN_BROKERSIZE = the average number of analysts employed by a 
brokerage house in a given year in the ‘aggregate coverage sample’, CFVOL = the covered firm’s 
cash flow volatility, calculated as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s 
cash flows from operations over the past five years divided by total assets, lnASSET = the natural 
logarithm of total assets of the covered firm at the end of the year, ROA = the covered firm’s 
return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) 
at the end of the year, BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total common 
equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT, 
LEVERAGE = the covered firm’s ratio of total debt (lt) scaled by total assets (at), FREE_CASH 
= the covered firm’s cash from operations (oancf) minus average capital expenditures (capx) for 
the last five years, scaled by current assets (act), EXT_FINANC = an indicator variable, equal to 
1 if the firm’s variable FREE_CASH for the covered firm is less than -0.5, and 0 otherwise, and 
VOLUME = the covered firm’s annual trading volume (cshtrm) of firm’s stock in million. In 
regressions for individual analyst coverage: EXPERIENCE = the numbers of years since the 
analysts’ forecasts first appeared in I/B/E/S, and BROKERSIZE =the number of analysts 
employed by a brokerage house in a given financial year. 
 
interaction terms are insignificant in a two-tailed test. Considered alone, these results 
provide no direct support for a task complexity explanation for the findings in tests of H1, 
and suggest that the ‘profitability effect’ dominates that of complexity for cases of 
strategic misalignment. 
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The results for tests of the likelihood that expert and naïve analysts following a given firm, 
conditional on the analyst following at least one firm in the same industry, are reported 
in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.9.  Column 2 provides the results estimated within 
Prospector-oriented industries. The coefficient for DEF_F is negative and significant (β 
= -0.5198, p < 0.001), indicating that the least experienced analysts are significantly less 
likely to cover a Defender firm in a Prospector-oriented industry sub-sample. However, 
the interaction between Defender status and analyst experience (DEF_F*EXPERIENCE) 
is positive and significant (β = 0.018, p < 0.01), indicating that experienced analysts are 
more likely to cover these misaligned firms than are inexperienced analysts. This is 
consistent with a task complexity explanation for the lower coverage of Defender firms 
in Prospector-oriented industries. The coefficients for the equivalent main effect and 
interaction term for Extreme Prospectors are each insignificant, suggesting that within 
Prospector-oriented industries, Prospector firms and ‘other firms’ receive similar 
coverage. 
Column 3 provides the results estimated within Defender-oriented industries. The 
coefficient for PROS_F is positive and significant (β = 0.1419, p < 0.001), indicating that 
the least experienced analysts are significantly more likely to cover a Prospector firm in 
the Defender-oriented industry sub-sample. 27  However, the interaction between 
Prospector status and analyst experience (PROS_F*EXPERIENCE) is positive but 
insignificant (β = 0.0001, p = 0.976), indicating that experienced analysts are not more 
likely to cover these misaligned firms than are inexperienced analysts. This is consistent 
with a profitability explanation for the abnormally low coverage of Prospector firms in 
Defender-oriented industries reported in tests of H1, and not consistent with a task 
complexity explanation. Consistent with the Prospector-oriented industry sub-sample, the 
                                                 
27 This does not contradict the significant negative coefficient on PROS_F*DEF_I in Column 2 of Table 
4.8. That model used in tests of H1 measures effects that are incremental to the ‘normal’ effect on coverage 
of Prospector status. 
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coefficients for the equivalent main effect and interaction term for Extreme Defenders are 
each insignificant.   
In conclusion, the expertise tests provide some evidence to support that the ‘task 
complexity effect’ dominates that of profitability for cases of strategic misalignment in 
Prospector-oriented industries, while the ‘profitability effect’ or other un-modelled 
association that dominates that of complexity for the same cases in Defender-oriented 
industries. 
4.6.3. Tests of Hypotheses 3 - Industry Strategic Misalignment and 
Forecast Accuracy 
Hypotheses 3 examine the association between the combination of industry and firm-level 
strategy and analyst forecast accuracy, tests of which are reported in Table 4.10. To 
facilitate comparison with earlier research focusing only on firm strategy (Bentley-Goode 
et al. 2017), I report results of regression of regressions against firm level strategy 
measures (Column 1 and 3) and industry level strategy measures (Column 2 and 4) before 
reporting the results of the fully specified models (Column 5).    
All models have an adjusted R2 of approximately 22.3% which is higher than those 
reported in Bentley-Goode et al (2017), and may reflect the fact that my regressions are 
estimated on analyst-firm-year samples, rather than firm-year data. Results for 
regressions using the ordinal firm strategy measure (STRATEGY: β = 0.0186, p < 0.001) 
in Column 1 are consistent with the findings in Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), indicating 
that firms with more innovative (Prospector-like) strategies are associated with greater 
accuracy. The significant positive coefficient on PROS_F in Column 2 is also consistent 
with Bentley-Goode et al.’s findings, which those authors attribute to the more frequent 
discretionary disclosures of Prospectors.  
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Table 4.10 Regression Results for H3 for the Industry Strategic Misalignment 
Analyst, and Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY 
       
STRATEGY 0.0186***     
 (0.000)     
IND_STRATEGY   -0.0011   
   (0.720)   
PROS_F  0.2828***   0.3252*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
DEF_F  -0.0565   -0.0344 
  (0.158)   (0.411) 
PROS_I    -0.0042 0.0163 
    (0.924) (0.717) 
PROS_F*PROS_I     0.0194 
(-)     (0.905) 
DEF_F*PROS_I     -0.2779 
(-)     (0.134) 
1.DEF_I    -0.0475 -0.0341 
    (0.118) (0.285) 
PROS_F*DEF_I     -0.2464* 
(-)     (0.054) 
DEF_F*DEF_I     -0.0403 
(-)     (0.699) 
FOLLOW -0.0077*** -0.0069*** -0.0068*** -0.0069*** -0.0073*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISPERSON -2.1660 -2.1677 -2.1880 -2.1878 -2.1667 
(-) (0.192) (0.191) (0.190) (0.190) (0.191) 
DAY -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -0.6151*** -0.6148*** -0.5896*** -0.5916*** -0.6182*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.4253** 0.4264** 0.3559** 0.3615** 0.4419** 
(+) (0.015) (0.014) (0.034) (0.032) (0.011) 
BTM -0.0124** -0.0127** -0.0134** -0.0135** -0.0128** 
(-) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) 
EVOL -0.0420*** -0.0434*** -0.0398*** -0.0399*** -0.0439*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
MV_CRSP 0.1809*** 0.1792*** 0.1790*** 0.1792*** 0.1803*** 
(?) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ZSCORE -0.0885*** -0.0929*** -0.0976*** -0.0964*** -0.0916*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.4419*** -3.0989*** -3.0725*** -3.0814*** -3.1031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed  
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 185,274 185,274 185,274 185,274 185,274 
R-squared 0.223 0.223 0.221 0.221 0.224 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ACCURACY = the negative 
of the absolute value of analyst forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by stock price 
at the end of the reporting period, for all analysts in I/B/E/S Detail History File covering the firm 
within the 90-day window leading up to the annual earnings announcement, multiplied by 100, 
STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). 
Values range from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) 
[Defender] firms, respectively, PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the 
STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level 
discrete strategy score, estimated using a method derived from Bentley et al. (2013), as described 
in Section 4.3.1.1,  PROS_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is 
between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the 
IND_STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, The other variables represent 
interaction between the main effects defined above, and the other variables represent interaction 
between the main effects defined above. BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts employed by a 
brokerage house in a given financial year, FOLLOW = the number of analysts covering a firm 
during the current financial year, DISPERSON = the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, deflated by stock price at end of the financial year, DAYS = the natural logarithm of 
the number of days elapsing between the dates on which a forecast is issued and firms’ annual 
earnings announcement date, LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if prior year income before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT: ib) is negative for the covered firm, and 0 otherwise, ROA 
= the covered firm’s return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary (ib) items divided 
by total assets (at) at the end of the year, BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, 
calculated as total common equity outstanding (ceq) divided by market capitalisation (prc*shrout) 
in COMPUSTAT, EVOL = the five-year standard deviation of the firms’ income before 
extraordinary items (ib), MV_CRSP=the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the 
end of the financial year using data from CRSP, and ZSCORE = the values estimated using the 
Zmijewski (1984)’s financial distress model constrained between the values of -5 to 5.  ZSCORE 
= -4.336 – 4.513*ROA + 5.679*leverage – 0.004*liquidity (Zmijewski 1984). 
 
Column 3 and 4 of Table 4.10 presents the results for regressions on industry strategic 
orientation, expressed as an ordinal score (IND_STRATEGY) and dichotomous measures 
(PROS_I and DEF_I). The coefficient on PROS_I is negative but insignificant (β = -
0.0042, p = 0.924), while the coefficient on DEF_I is negative and marginally 
insignificant in a two-tailed test (β = -0.0475, p = 0.118). These results indicate that while 
there is no monotonic relation between industry strategic orientation and accuracy; and, 
at most, defensive industry strategic orientation may be weakly associated with lower 
forecast accuracy. Following the arguments enumerated in Study One, Defender-oriented 
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industries should generally be associated with lower information spillovers, because the 
firms in these industries are less likely to make discretionary disclosures. Thus, the lower 
forecast accuracy associated with Defender-oriented industry are likely to be drive by the 
high task complexity associated with low information spillovers.  
Test of Hypothesis 3 appear in Column 5 of Table 4.10.  The coefficients for variables 
indicating strategically misaligned firms, PROS_F*DEF_I (β = -0.2464, p = 0.054) is 
negative and significant, while DEF_F*PROS_I (β = -0.2779, p = 0.134) is negative and 
marginally insignificant. This indicates that Prospectors in Defender-oriented industries 
are associated with lower forecast accuracy compared to ‘other firms’ (Analyzers and 
Reactors) within the same industry. Coupled with the insignificant coefficients for firms 
pursuing other strategies in Defender-oriented industries, these findings generally suggest 
that misalignment increases the task complexity facing analysts where the value of 
information spillovers is abnormally low, and thus reduces forecast accuracy. However, 
because misaligned firms are likely to be associated with poor performance, the lower 
forecast accuracy may also be driven by 1) the increased volatility in forecasted earnings 
and/or 2) managers’ potential incentive to forsake ‘meeting or beating’ analyst forecasts 
and choose to ‘take a bath’ with this year’s earnings, and in turn, increase the errors in 
analyst forecast. Thus, I perform the expertise tests to disentangle the two impacts.  
The coefficients for Extreme Prospectors and Extreme Defenders, PROS_F*PROS_I (β 
= 0.0194, p = 0.905) and DEF_F*DEF_I (β = -0.0403, p = 0.699) are both statistically 
insignificant.  These results suggest that these firms are associated with similar level of 
forecast accuracy compared to ‘other firms’. This seems to reflect that extreme strategies 
on average, do not reduce the value of the intra-group information spillovers in 
forecasting firms’ earnings, and do not increase underlying uncertainty to an extent not 
explained by the control variables measuring firm fundamentals. 
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In additional analysis, I re-estimated Model 5 including separate regressions for firm and 
industry strategy indicators, replacing forecast accuracy with the signed forecast error 
(with negative values indicating cases where forecast earnings > actual earnings). These 
regressions are tabulated in Appendix 4.3. The coefficient on misaligned firms, 
PROS_F*DEF_I is negative and significant. This suggests the lower accuracy for 
Prospectors in a Defender industry arises from excessively optimistic forecasts, which 
may reflect a ‘profitability effect’ for misaligned firms, if analysts do not fully understand 
the implications for performance of strategic misalignment, or the different incentive for 
earnings management of poorly performing firms. All coefficients relating to the effect 
size for Extreme Prospectors / Defenders were insignificant indicating that extreme 
strategies do not create additional bias in analyst forecasts. 
4.6.4. Tests for Hypothesis 4 - Tests for Analyst Expertise, Industry 
Strategic Misalignment and Forecast Accuracy 
Hypotheses 4 uses variation in analyst expertise to attempt to identify whether the task 
complexity arising from the combination of industry and firm-level strategy explains the 
association with analyst forecast accuracy documented in the previous section. I employ 
three dichotomous proxies for analyst expertise, firm-specific experience 
(DUM_FIRM_EXP), general experience (DUM_EXP) and size of the brokerage house 
(DUM_BROKERSIZE), which I interact with variables indicating the various 
combinations of firm and industry-level strategy. I present the results for testing of 
Hypothesis 4 in Table 4.11.28 
 
                                                 
28 I also report the regression results for tests of accuracy against firm/industry level strategies in Appendix 
4.4. Basically, the results suggest that only analyst general experience increases the forecast accuracy for 
Defenders and Defender-oriented industries. This seems to be consistent with the information spillovers 
explanation. 
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Table 4.11 Analyst Expertise Tests for H4 the Impact of Industry Strategic 
Misalignment on Forecast Accuracy 
  Firm specific General Brokersize 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY 
        
DUM_EXP -0.0156* 0.0203** -0.0339*** 
 (0.077) (0.013) (0.000) 
PROS_F 0.3440*** 0.3148*** 0.3163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PROS_F*DEXP -0.0670 0.0250 0.0186 
(+) (0.197) (0.540) (0.618) 
DEF_F -0.0365 -0.0517 -0.0532 
 (0.444) (0.355) (0.266) 
DEF_F*DEXP 0.0043 0.0304 0.0441 
(+) (0.911) (0.503) (0.291) 
PROS_I 0.0419 -0.0040 0.0090 
 (0.372) (0.937) (0.840) 
PROS_I*DEXP -0.0610 0.0434 0.0159 
(+) (0.105) (0.249) (0.578) 
PROS_F*PROS_I -0.0416 -0.0592 0.0152 
 (0.817) (0.738) (0.918) 
PROS_F*PROS_I*DEXP 0.2440 0.1747* 0.0112 
(+) (0.243) (0.097) (0.926) 
DEF_F*PROS_I -0.2302 -0.3540 -0.3565 
 (0.163) (0.111) (0.118) 
DEF_F*PROS_I*DEXP -0.1000 0.1504 0.1672 
(+) (0.654) (0.445) (0.321) 
DEF_I -0.0641** -0.0381 -0.0363 
 (0.045) (0.312) (0.309) 
DEF_I*DEXP 0.0570** 0.0053 0.0052 
(+) (0.025) (0.830) (0.835) 
PROS_F*DEF_I -0.1875* -0.2860 -0.2648 
 (0.076) (0.105) (0.109) 
PROS_F*DEF_I*DEXP -0.0907 0.0745 0.0357 
(+) (0.458) (0.576) (0.765) 
DEF_F*DEF_I -0.0381 -0.1126 -0.0188 
 (0.740) (0.392) (0.850) 
DEF_F*DEF_I*DEXP -0.0041 0.1446* -0.0510 
(+) (0.958) (0.091) (0.585) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0003*** -0.0003***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
FIRM_EXP   -0.0018* 
   (0.057) 
FOLLOW -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0072*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISPERSON -2.1648 -2.1657 -2.1667 
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(-) (0.191) (0.190) (0.191) 
DAY -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -0.6188*** -0.6177*** -0.6181*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.4443** 0.4407** 0.4414** 
(+) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
BTM -0.0128** -0.0129** -0.0128** 
(-) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
EVOL -0.0440*** -0.0437*** -0.0441*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MV_CRSP 0.1810*** 0.1795*** 0.1806*** 
(?) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ZSCORE5 -0.0913*** -0.0919*** -0.0915*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.1044*** -3.0901*** -3.1052*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 185,274 185,274 185,274 
 R-squared 0.224 0.224 0.224 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ACCURACY = the negative 
of the absolute value of analyst forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by stock price 
at the end of the reporting period, for all analysts in I/B/E/S Detail History File covering the firm 
within the 90-day window leading up to the annual earnings announcement, multiplied by 100, 
STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). 
Values range from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) 
[Defender] firms, respectively, PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the 
STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level 
discrete strategy score, estimated using a method derived from Bentley et al. (2013), as described 
in Section 4.3.1.1,  PROS_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is 
between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the 
IND_STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, DEXP = the indicator variable 
that equals to 1 if the analyst is an expert analyst, and otherwise 0 for ‘naïve’ analysts. I employ 
three proxies to identify expert analysts: analyst firm-specific experience (DFIRM_EXP), general 
experience (DEXPERIENCE) and the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house 
(DBROKERSIZE), and the other variables represent interaction between the main effects defined 
above. Proxies for Analyst Expertise (DEXP): DFIRM_EXP = the dichotomous variable that 
equal to 1 if the analyst covers the firm for more than 2 years, and otherwise 0 for analysts 
covering the firm for equal or less than 2 years, DEXPERIENCE = the dichotomous variable that 
equal to 1 if the analyst exists in I/B/E/S more than 10 years, and otherwise 0 for existence of 
analysts that are equal or less than 10 years, and DBROKERSIZE = the dichotomous variable 
that equal to 1 if a brokerage house employs more than 55 analysts, and otherwise 0 for brokerage 
houses that employ equal or less than 55 analysts. The variable definitions of all controls are as 
per Section 4.3.3. 
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The adjusted R2s for all regressions are similar to those in tests of H3 (22.4%). While the 
various coefficients for effects involving firm-specific experience (Column 1), general 
experience (Column 2) and brokerage size (Column 3) are generally consistent, there is 
no evidence that greater expertise improves accuracy for misaligned firms. The 
coefficients for PROS_F*DEF_I*DEXP and DEF_F*PROS_I*DEXP are insignificant 
regardless of the expertise proxy employed. These results provide no support for a task 
complexity explanation for the lower accuracy attaching to misaligned firms. Thus, to the 
extent that the lower forecast accuracy associated with Prospector firms in Defender-
oriented industries is causal, this is are likely to be driven by the earnings management 
behaviour that expertise analysts are less likely to be able to predict rather than the pure 
volatility in forecasted earnings when firms’ performance is poor. Alternately, selection 
bias may cloud the results if expert analysts are more likely to take on challenging tasks 
(as per some results for tests of H2).  
In Column 2, the coefficients for interactions between Extremer Prospectors and 
Defenders status and general experience, PROS_F*PROS_I*DEXP (β = 0.1747, p = 
0.097) and DEF_F*DEF_I*DEXP (β = 0.1446, p = 0.091) are positive and significant, 
which indicates analyst general experience improves the forecast accuracy for firms 
following extreme strategies in an industry. This may reflect even though the average 
effect of extreme strategies is insignificant, adoption of these strategies does create some 
abnormal difficulty in forecasting earnings due to low information spillovers. Thus, 
expert analysts who are better in analysing and obtaining information, are less affected 
by this task complexity and make relatively accurate forecasts of these firms. However, 
the tests using firm-specific experience and brokerage size as an expertise proxy lend no 
such support. 
In conclusion, there is scant evidence to support a task complexity explanation for the 
lower forecast accuracy of misaligned firms. While unexpected profitability effects (i.e. 
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from earnings management) might explain the failure to detect the predicted association 
between accuracy, there remains the possibility that my proxies for expertise are very 
noisy, and/or selection bias may confound the impact of expertise on accuracy.  The fact 
that experienced analysts do appear to improve forecast accuracy of Extreme Prospectors 
and Extreme Defenders may point to the possibility that there are impacts of information 
spillovers surrounding these firms where experienced analysts are better in deal with these 
situations. Alternately, that there may be a systematic association between forecasts made 
for Prospector or Defender strategy that is beyond explanation by general firm 
fundamentals. 
4.6.5. Robustness Test 
4.6.5.1. Additional Control 
Consistent with Study 1, I perform robustness tests by adding the indicators of lifecycle 
stages measured by Dickinson (2011) to control for potential empirical association 
between corporate strategy and firm life cycle. The tenor of my results for Hypothesis 1 
to 3 is unaffected by the additional of the life cycle measure. However, for Hypothesis 4, 
the coefficients on the interactions between Extreme Prospector/Extreme Defender and 
analyst general experience become insignificant after controlling for firm life cycle. 
These coefficients were marginally significant before the inclusion of life cycle controls. 
Together, these results from the expertise tests for accuracy seem to suggest a potential 
omitted variable problem when examining the relationship between strategy and forecast 
accuracy. Therefore, I consider the impact of cost stickiness on this association in Study 
3. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
This study explores how industry strategic orientation affects the association between 
firm strategy and analyst behaviour (i.e. analyst coverage and forecast accuracy). For 
analyst coverage, I find that analysts are less likely to cover firms whose strategy is 
misaligned with the key strategic industry factors (SIFs). This is because misaligned firms 
are more likely to be associated with low profitability as they operate in segments that are 
not the most profitability segments of the industry (the ‘profitability effect’); and/or 
because these firms’ are associated with  high task complexity due to low information 
spillovers from industry-level strategic information  (the ‘task complexity effect’).  
Additionally, my analyst expertise tests on the individual coverage sample provide some 
evidence to suggest that the main driver of the strategic impacts in Prospector-oriented 
and Defender-oriented industries are different. The dominant impact of industry strategic 
misalignment in the Prospector-oriented industries is from the task complexity 
explanation, while the profitability explanation dominates the impact of misalignment in 
Defender-oriented industries. The impact of extreme strategies on analyst coverage are 
mixed. I find that Extreme Prospectors receive lower coverage than ‘other firms’ in 
Prospector-oriented industries, and unexpectedly, Extreme Defenders receive abnormal 
high coverage in Defender-oriented industries. However, neither of these impacts are 
moderated by analyst expertise which seems to suggest these impacts are related to firms’ 
profitability rather than task complexity associated with industry information spillovers. 
These results may indicate that there are other uncontrolled impact drives the impact of 
extreme strategies on analyst coverage. 
For analyst forecast accuracy, my results suggest that misaligned firms (Prospectors) are 
generally associated with lower forecast accuracy than ‘other firms’ in Defender-oriented 
industries, but no consistent results are observed in Prospector-oriented industries. Also, 
I show that the lower forecast accuracy of misaligned firms in Prospector-oriented 
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industries is not be affected by analyst expertise. These results suggest that the impact of 
industry strategic misalignment on forecast accuracy is driven by a profitability 
explanation, such as the unexpected low profitability from ‘taking a bath’ that even expert 
analysts are unable to predict.  Alternatively, there may be selection bias in analysts’ 
decision to cover these firms that is possibly explained by analyst self-interests. For 
example, being a Prospector in Defender-oriented industries send a strong signal of 
probability to require external financing, and in turn a high likelihood of involving in 
investment banking relationship with analysts’ employers. The results from my additional 
tests that show that these firms are associated with excess forecast optimism seem to 
support this proposition.  Overall, I find no evidence to suggest that extreme strategies, 
on average, affect analyst forecast accuracy. However, expert analysts appear to provide 
more accurate forecasts for both Extreme Prospectors and Extreme Defenders than ‘naïve’ 
analysts, suggesting that task complexity arising from the lower value of information 
spillovers has some impact on forecast accuracy.  
Finally, consistent with Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), I find that Prospectors are associated 
with higher forecast accuracy than Defenders. Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) attribute this 
results to Prospectors’ greater disclosure which, in turn, reduces analysts’ forecasting 
difficulty. If the disclosure explanation fully describes the association between firm 
strategy and forecast accuracy, this impact should be moderated by analyst expertise. 
However, the results from my expertise tests show little evidence that the difference in 
forecast accuracy between Prospectors and Defenders is moderated by analyst expertise. 
This might imply that there are other explanations for the observed association between 
firm strategy and forecast accuracy. Therefore, I examine one alternative explanation, the 
impact of firms’ cost behaviour on forecast accuracy, in additional tests of Study Three.  
My study is subject to the limitation of small sample size of my groups of interest, 
misaligned firms and firms following extreme strategies. There are only hundreds of 
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observations in these groups in a panel data and these firms form, on average, only 10% 
of the industry. Further, I do not directly capture firms’ future profitability in this study 
as observable expected profitability (proxied by analyst forecasts) are only available after 
analysts cover the firms.  
Because this study is highly exploratory, there are several avenues of future research. 
First, the results for the impact of extreme strategies on forecast accuracy are inconclusive. 
Future research may consider to examine what is the driver of the observed lower (higher) 
forecast accuracy associated with Extreme Prospectors (Extreme Defenders). Second, my 
study shows that industry strategic misalignment reduces analyst forecast accuracy and 
increases forecast optimism associated with Prospectors in Defender-oriented industry, 
and this impact is not from pure task complexity related to information spillovers. 
Although I have offered some potential explanations (i.e. earnings management), further 
studies may examine the potential explanations empirically including both effect from 
management behaviour and analyst self-interests. Further, future research can extend the 
investigation of the impact of strategic misalignment to other properties of analyst reports 
(i.e. recommendations) and investors’ expectation of firm performance. Finally, future 
studies may explore proxies of firms’ future profitability that are not associated with 
analyst forecasts and apply it into this stream of research. 
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Appendix 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Individual Coverage Sample 
 
Full Sample (N=16,818,622) 
Variable Mean Median SD Min 1% Q1 Q3 99% Max 
          
INDIV_COVERAGE 0.017 0 0.130 0 0 0 0 1 1 
STRATEGY 17.886 18 3.718 6 10 15 20 27 30 
PROS_F 0.079 0 0.270 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_F 0.062 0 0.242 0 0 0 0 1 1 
IND_STRATEGY 18.714 18 3.962 6 10 16 22 27 27 
PROS_I 0.130 0 0.337 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DEF_I 0.055 0 0.228 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 8.795 7 7.566 0 0 2 14 29 33 
BROKERSIZE 58.680 33 65.956 1 1 14 84 314 397 
CFVOL -2.896 -2.936 0.871 -7.371 -4.838 -3.473 -2.368 -0.660 3.613 
lnASSET 6.112 5.892 1.961 0.271 2.366 4.686 7.398 11.198 12.906 
LOSS 0.316 0.000 0.465 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA -0.023 0.041 0.284 -5.227 -1.140 -0.030 0.085 0.272 0.297 
BTM 0.905 0.792 2.682 -334.511 -1.441 0.442 1.297 4.172 332.166 
LEVERAGE 0.434 0.405 0.266 0.011 0.062 0.247 0.573 1.169 6.725 
FREE_CASH 0.042 0.087 0.351 -8.617 -1.256 -0.033 0.194 0.628 2.841 
EXT_FINANC 0.043 0 0.202 0 0 0 0 1 1 
VOLUME 321.845 59.684 1101.281 0.013 1.089 18.068 194.953 4742.552 21586.800 
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Appendix 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Individual Analyst Forecast Sample by Extreme and Misaligned Firms 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A Extreme Firms in Prospector-oriented Industries (PROS_F==1 & PROS_I==1) 
N=925          
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY -3.719 42.991 -880.620 -36.212 -0.524 -0.131 -0.027 0.000 0.000 
FE -2.584 43.074 -880.620 -34.819 -0.075 0.019 0.158 9.649 42.105 
STRATEGY 25.179 1.386 24 24 24 25 26 29 30 
IND_STRATEGY 25.319 1.341 24 24 24 25 27 27 27 
FIRM_EXP 1.178 1.461 0 0 0 1 2 6 11 
DFIRM_EXP 0.122 0.328 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 9.469 7.896 0 0 3 8 15 32 33 
DEXPRIENCE 0.451 0.498 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
BROKERSIZE 59.921 61.017 1 2 18 38 88 334 341 
DBROKERIZE 0.358 0.480 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
FOLLOW 15.819 9.373 1 1 8 14 25 35 35 
DISPERSON 0.009 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.074 1.332 
DAY 16.195 27.381 -86 -72 1 5 27 86 89 
LOSS 0.755 0.431 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
ROA -0.359 0.820 -5.227 -3.531 -0.219 -0.132 -0.005 0.176 0.297 
BTM 0.936 1.584 -1.927 -0.010 0.242 0.537 1.063 11.858 11.858 
EVOL 2.008 3.763 0.012 0.012 0.158 0.481 2.516 18.139 18.419 
MV_CRSP 14.220 1.630 9.410 10.024 13.185 14.310 15.415 17.063 18.551 
ZSCORE -1.305 2.503 -4.495 -4.201 -3.015 -2.202 -0.879 5.000 5.000 
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Panel B Misaligned Firms in Prospector-oriented Industries  (DEF_F==1 & PROS_I==1) 
N=491          
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY -1.858 9.642 -104.127 -43.038 -0.724 -0.189 -0.060 0.000 0.000 
FE -1.075 9.761 -104.127 -43.038 -0.061 0.054 0.244 6.306 6.627 
STRATEGY 10.774 1.235 8 8 10 11 12 12 12 
IND_STRATEGY 24.949 1.121 24 24 24 25 25 28 28 
FIRM_EXP 3.648 4.440 0 0 0 2 5 18 29 
DFIRM_EXP 0.452 0.498 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 11.189 8.391 0 0 4 10 17 31 33 
DEXPRIENCE 0.507 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
BROKERSIZE 69.772 67.695 1 1 19 47 98 334 341 
DBROKERIZE 0.464 0.499 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
FOLLOW 9.546 6.719 1 1 4 9 12 27 27 
DISPERSON 0.005 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.067 0.187 
DAY 22.505 28.463 -76 -57 1 9 38 89 89 
LOSS 0.291 0.455 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ROA 0.014 0.157 -0.421 -0.421 -0.018 0.052 0.092 0.297 0.297 
BTM 0.701 1.098 -1.132 -1.132 0.047 0.358 1.059 5.670 8.737 
EVOL 0.963 3.041 0.014 0.018 0.050 0.107 0.396 15.117 15.117 
MV_CRSP 14.688 2.331 8.943 10.102 12.994 14.447 15.743 19.155 19.155 
ZSCORE -1.065 2.021 -4.723 -4.723 -2.856 -1.056 -0.275 3.756 5.000 
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Panel C Extreme Firms in Defender-oriented Industries (PROS_F==1 & DEF_I==1) 
N=1,987          
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY -0.007 0.036 -0.833 -0.089 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
FE -0.003 0.037 -0.833 -0.087 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.019 0.203 
STRATEGY 24.997 1.199 24 24 24 26 25 28 29 
IND_STRATEGY 9.871 1.666 6 6 8 11 10 12 12 
FIRM_EXP 3.930 4.746 0 0 1 5 2 22 32 
DFIRM_EXP 0.471 0.499 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 11.276 8.384 0 0 4 10 18 32 33 
DEXPRIENCE 0.508 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
BROKERSIZE 74.716 68.972 1 1 22 54 113 291 396 
DBROKERIZE 0.488 0.500 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
BROKERIZE 11.809 7.035 1 1 6 17 10 34 34 
FOLLOW 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.016 0.302 
DISPERSON 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.016 
DAY 25.292 26.529 -89 -27 5 43 17 87 89 
LOSS 0.227 0.419 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA 0.029 0.131 -1.308 -0.430 0.010 0.097 0.055 0.234 0.297 
BTM 0.497 2.808 -46.673 -5.904 0.305 0.884 0.527 7.365 8.453 
EVOL 0.558 2.460 0.005 0.011 0.037 0.181 0.069 16.925 18.419 
MV_CRSP 15.242 1.827 9.243 11.117 14.109 16.694 15.062 18.796 18.796 
ZSCORE -1.332 1.287 -4.334 -3.923 -2.195 -0.561 -1.405 2.308 5.000 
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Panel D Misaligned Firms in Defender-oriented Industries (DEF_F==1 & DEF_I==1) 
N=2,473          
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY -0.018 0.165 -6.755 -0.251 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
FE -0.008 0.165 -6.755 -0.174 -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.078 0.635 
STRATEGY 10.947 1.168 6 7 10 11 12 12 12 
IND_STRATEGY 9.861 1.702 6 6 9 10 12 12 12 
FIRM_EXP 4.512 5.043 0 0 1 3 6 22 32 
DFIRM_EXP 0.547 0.498 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
EXPERIENCE 11.004 7.816 0 0 4 10 17 30 33 
DEXPRIENCE 0.516 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
BROKERSIZE 79.389 72.323 1 1 22 58 117 324 396 
DBROKERIZE 0.514 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
FOLLOW 11.809 7.060 1 1 6 11 17 34 34 
DISPERSON 0.010 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.132 0.951 
DAY 23.731 25.177 -84 -25 4 17 38 87 89 
LOSS 0.219 0.414 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA 0.035 0.080 -0.545 -0.234 0.006 0.031 0.074 0.297 0.297 
BTM 0.890 2.280 -32.344 -4.227 0.575 0.851 1.255 6.325 9.162 
EVOL 0.590 2.197 0.009 0.015 0.059 0.089 0.186 13.513 18.419 
MV_CRSP 14.960 1.968 8.657 10.909 13.701 14.681 16.183 19.793 19.907 
ZSCORE -0.776 1.425 -4.318 -3.230 -1.638 -0.912 -0.339 5.000 5.000 
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Appendix 4.3 Regression Results for the Industry Strategic Misalignment Analyst, 
and Analyst Forecast Bias 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FE 
       
STRATEGY 0.0093***     
 (0.000)     
IND_STRATEGY   0.0017   
   (0.475)   
PROS_F  0.1280***   0.1697*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
DEF_F  -0.0394   -0.0334 
  (0.247)   (0.328) 
PROS_I    0.0289 0.0354 
    (0.354) (0.260) 
PROS_F*PROS_I     0.0259 
     (0.848) 
DEF_F*PROS_I     -0.0840 
(?)     (0.591) 
DEF_I    -0.0460* -0.0302 
    (0.095) (0.285) 
PROS_F*DEF_I     -0.2392** 
(?)     (0.032) 
DEF_F*DEF_I     -0.0148 
     (0.865) 
FOLLOW -0.0024* -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021* -0.0024* 
(+) (0.063) (0.107) (0.110) (0.096) (0.066) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** 
(+) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) 
DISPERSON -0.4835 -0.4851 -0.4957 -0.4969 -0.4860 
(-) (0.492) (0.490) (0.483) (0.481) (0.487) 
DAY -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(-) (0.155) (0.154) (0.149) (0.150) (0.161) 
LOSS -0.3595*** -0.3583*** -0.3479*** -0.3492*** -0.3625*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.0084 -0.0100 -0.0391 -0.0360 0.0066 
(+) (0.929) (0.917) (0.669) (0.694) (0.945) 
BTM -0.0060 -0.0062 -0.0065 -0.0066 -0.0062 
(-) (0.165) (0.150) (0.130) (0.124) (0.144) 
EVOL -0.0110 -0.0115 -0.0100 -0.0101 -0.0121 
(-) (0.272) (0.256) (0.324) (0.318) (0.234) 
MV_CRSP 0.0484*** 0.0475*** 0.0477*** 0.0477*** 0.0484*** 
(?) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ZSCORE -0.0199*** -0.0221*** -0.0236*** -0.0230*** -0.0205*** 
(-) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Constant -1.0433*** -0.8703*** -0.8950*** -0.8589*** -0.8723*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 185,274 185,274 185,274 185,274 185,274 
R-squared 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE = the signed analyst 
forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by stock price at the end of the reporting period, 
for all analysts in I/B/E/S Detail History File covering the firm within the 90-day window leading 
up to the annual earnings announcement, multiplied by 100, STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete 
strategy score estimated using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values range from 6 to 30 
where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) [Defender] firms, respectively, 
PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 
otherwise, DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 
12, and 0 otherwise, IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level discrete strategy score, estimated using 
a method derived from Bentley et al. (2013), as described in Section 4.3.1.1,  PROS_I = an 
indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, 
DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 
0 otherwise, and the other variables represent interaction between the main effects defined above. 
BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house in a given financial year, 
FOLLOW = the number of analysts covering a firm during the current financial year, 
DISPERSON = the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts, deflated by stock price at 
end of the financial year, DAYS = the natural logarithm of the number of days elapsing between 
the dates on which a forecast is issued and firms’ annual earnings announcement date, LOSS = 
an indicator variable, equal to 1 if prior year income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT: 
ib) is negative for the covered firm, and 0 otherwise, ROA = the covered firm’s return on assets, 
calculated as income before extraordinary (ib) items divided by total assets (at) at the end of the 
year, BTM = the covered firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as total common equity 
outstanding (ceq) divided by market capitalisation (prc*shrout) in COMPUSTAT, EVOL = the 
five-year standard deviation of the firms’ income before extraordinary items (ib), MV_CRSP = 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the financial year using data from 
CRSP, and ZSCORE = the values estimated using the Zmijewski (1984)’s financial distress model 
constrained between the values of -5 to 5.  ZSCORE = -4.336 – 4.513*ROA + 5.679*leverage – 
0.004*liquidity (Zmijewski 1984). 
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Appendix 4.4 Analyst Expertise Tests for the Impacts of Firms' Strategy Type (Industry Strategic Orientation) on Forecast Accuracy 
  Firm specific General Brokersize Firm specific General Brokersize 
 Firms’ Strategy Types Industry Strategy Indicators 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY 
              
PROS_F(I) 0.3132*** 0.2657*** 0.2780*** 0.0219 0.2657*** -0.0128 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.639) (0.000) (0.768) 
PROS_F(I)*1.DEXP -0.0986* 0.0400 0.0076 -0.0661* 0.0400 0.0184 
(+) (0.065) (0.283) (0.824) (0.087) (0.283) (0.505) 
DEF_F -0.0611 -0.0970* -0.0741* -0.0763** -0.0970* -0.0505 
 (0.161) (0.056) (0.082) (0.013) (0.056) (0.124) 
DEF_F(I)*1.DEXP 0.0086 0.0742* 0.0390 0.0567** 0.0742* 0.0069 
(+) (0.796) (0.057) (0.294) (0.016) (0.057) (0.770) 
DUM_EXP -0.0122 0.0238*** -0.0322*** -0.0277*** 0.0238*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.144) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0003*** -0.0003***  -0.0003*** -0.0003***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
FIRM_EXP   -0.0020**   -0.0027*** 
   (0.037)   (0.005) 
FOLLOW -0.0070*** -0.0069*** -0.0069*** -0.0070*** -0.0069*** -0.0069*** 
(+) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
DISPERSON -2.1668 -2.1670 -2.1681 -2.1852 -2.1670 -2.1871 
(-) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.190) (0.191) (0.190) 
DAY -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -0.6153*** -0.6142*** -0.6149*** -0.5923*** -0.6142*** -0.5919*** 
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(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.4308** 0.4258** 0.4257** 0.3658** 0.4258** 0.3618** 
(+) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.014) (0.031) 
BTM -0.0127** -0.0128** -0.0126** -0.0135** -0.0128** -0.0134** 
(-) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) 
EVOL -0.0436*** -0.0433*** -0.0436*** -0.0402*** -0.0433*** -0.0401*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MV_CRSP 0.1798*** 0.1784*** 0.1797*** 0.1803*** 0.1784*** 0.1801*** 
(?) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ZSCORE5 -0.0925*** -0.0932*** -0.0928*** -0.0959*** -0.0932*** -0.0960*** 
(-) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.1002*** -3.0871*** -3.1037*** -3.0822*** -3.0871*** -3.0894*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 185,274 185,274 185,274 185,274 185,274 185,274 
R-squared 0.224 0.224 0.223 0.221 0.224 0.221 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ACCURACY = the negative of the absolute value of analyst forecast error (actual EPS – forecast 
EPS) deflated by stock price at the end of the reporting period, for all analysts in I/B/E/S Detail History File covering the firm within the 90-day window leading up 
to the annual earnings announcement, multiplied by 100, STRATEGY = a firm’s discrete strategy score estimated using the model of Bentley et al.  (2013). Values 
range from 6 to 30 where high (middle) [low] values indicate Prospector (other firms) [Defender] firms, respectively, PROS_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if 
the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_F = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, 
IND_STRATEGY = a industry-level discrete strategy score, estimated using a method derived from Bentley et al. (2013), as described in Section 4.3.1.1,  PROS_I = 
an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF_I = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the IND_STRATEGY 
score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, DEXP = the indicator variable that equals to 1 if the analyst is an expert analyst, and otherwise 0 for ‘naïve’ analysts. I 
employ three proxies to identify expert analysts: analyst firm-specific experience (DFIRM_EXP), general experience (DEXPERIENCE) and the number of analysts 
employed by a brokerage house (DBROKERSIZE) and the other variables represent interaction between the main effects defined above. The variable definitions of 
all controls are as per Section 4.3.3. Proxies for Analyst Expertise (DEXP): DFIRM_EXP = the dichotomous variable that equal to 1 if the analyst covers the firm for 
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more than 2 years, and otherwise 0 for analysts covering the firm for equal or less than 2 years, DEXPERIENCE = the dichotomous variable that equal to 1 if the 
analyst exists in I/B/E/S more than 10 years, and otherwise 0 for existence of analysts that are equal or less than 10 years, and DBROKERSIZE = the dichotomous 
variable that equal to 1 if a brokerage house employs more than 55 analysts, and otherwise 0 for brokerage houses that employ equal or less than 55 analysts. 
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Chapter 5 Study 3: Corporate Strategy, Cost 
Stickiness and Analyst Forecasts 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Study Three investigates the association between corporate strategy, firms’ asymmetric 
cost behaviour (i.e. the degree of ‘cost stickiness’) and the properties of analyst forecasts 
(i.e. accuracy and bias). Prior literature (Weiss 2010, Ciftci et al. 2016) has documented 
an association between firm’s sticky cost behavior and analyst forecast accuracy. Weiss 
(2010) shows that analyst forecast accuracy is decreasing in the degrees of cost stickiness, 
and attributes this to the greater variability of earnings as cost stickiness increases. Ciftci 
et al. (2016) investigate the relation between earnings and sales forecast errors to examine 
the extent to which analysts appear to understand the impact cost stickiness on the 
distribution of future earnings, and find evidence that analysts underestimate the 
variability and stickiness of firms’ expenses as the degree of cost stickiness increases. On 
the other hand, Ballas et al. (2017) find evidence of a causal association between firms’ 
strategic choices and the direction of firms’ asymmetric cost behaviour with respect to 
SG&A expenses, where Prospectors’ SG&A costs are observed to be sticky and those of 
Defenders are anti-sticky. Extending the literature, this study first investigates and discuss 
how corporate strategy affects firms’ asymmetric cost behavior in both direction and 
magnitude, and more importantly, examines whether and how analysts’ understanding of 
firms’ strategic choice  and its association with cost behavior impacts forecast bias and 
accuracy. 
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Cost stickiness (a form of asymmetric cost behaviour) occurs where costs adjust in a 
smaller proportion than sales change in periods of sales decrease than they do when sales 
increase in the short run (Banker and Byzalov 2014). Prior literature on cost stickiness 
provides two explanations for such cost behaviour. One stream of literature suggests that 
cost stickiness derives from short-term strategic decision by mangers to sacrifice short-
term profitability for greater expected long-term profitability (e.g. Anderson et al. 2003). 
Others suggest that the observed cost stickiness is determined by the long-term strategic 
decisions which circumscribe the cost structure (essentially the long-term fixed cost ratio) 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2014). Regardless of whether asymmetric cost behaviour is driven by 
short-term or long-term managerial decisions, sticky costs increase the variance of future 
earnings, which increases expected absolute forecast errors even if analysts have perfect 
understanding of the degree of asymmetric cost behaviour (Weiss 2010). While the 
stylised mathematical model in Ciftci et al. (2016) can be adapted to be demonstrate that 
superior understanding of asymmetric cost behaviour reduces expected absolute forecast 
errors, I show that such a conclusion depends on the assumed probability of future sales 
increases and decreases. Where the probability of sales increases and decreases are equal, 
cost stickiness has no effect of expected absolute forecast errors; whereas when the 
perceived probability of a sales decrease (increase) is greater than 50%, analysts who 
have a superior understanding of firms’ sticky cost behaviour will have lower (higher) 
expected absolute forecast errors. 
Because the theoretical relationship between cost stickiness, analysts’ understanding of 
cost stickiness and analysts’ absolute forecast errors is highly conditional, I focus my 
attention on analyst forecast bias (i.e. signed forecast errors). Applying the Ciftci et al. 
(2016) model, I show that cost stickiness is associated with excess forecast optimism, 
consistent, consistent with analysts  not recognising the disproportionate cost reduction 
when sales decrease; and that superior analyst understanding of cost stickiness reduces 
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this forecast optimism regardless of the perceived probability of sales increases and 
decreases. I examine these associations by applying Miles and Snow’s (1987) strategic 
typology identify firms focussed on innovation (‘Prospectors’), those with a stronger cost 
minimisation focus (‘Defenders’) and ‘other firms’, each of which may be associated with 
systematic differences in the degree of cost stickiness observe. For example, innovation-
oriented firms (Prospectors) may be abnormally reluctant to cut investment in marketing 
and R&D when sales fall, as short-term profitability is not their primary focus (Miles and 
Snow 2003, p. 56). If this prediction holds empirically, these firms will be more likely to 
exhibit sticky cost behaviour than are ‘other firms’. I collect empirical evidence on the 
cost behaviour of firms according to strategy type, and identify groupings of firms for 
which both theory and empirical evidence suggest an increased likelihood of sticky (anti-
sticky) cost behaviour, and then test whether the sensitivity of analyst forecast bias to 
observed cost stickiness is reduced for these firms.  
As predicted by my theoretical model, I find that forecast optimism is, on average, 
increasing in the degree of cost stickiness. Saliently, I also find evidence that, analyst 
forecast bias for firms for which cost stickiness is most predictable (Prospectors) are less 
sensitive to the incidence of cost stickiness than is the case for ‘other firms’, and that the 
opposite is true for firms for which cost stickiness is less likely to prevail (Defenders), 
and thus should be more of a shock to analysts. In my additional tests I examine similar 
associations between strategy, cost stickiness and analyst forecast accuracy (unsigned 
forecast errors) and show that, consistent with theory, these associations are less 
predictable than those relating to forecast bias (signed forecast errors).  
This study contributes to the literature and practice in several aspects. First, I provide 
insight on the extent to which variation in cost stickiness affects analyst forecast bias, and 
the firms-specific circumstances in which this is most likely to occur. Second, I provide 
evidence regarding whether and how analysts use strategic information to improve their 
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expectations of firms’ cost behaviour, and potentially improve our understanding of the 
“blackbox’ of analyst forecasting process (Bradshaw 2011). My study also have 
implications for less sophisticated investors, who are likely  have limited knowledge of 
business strategy and its association with analyst forecasting behaviour, and are more 
likely to follow analysts’ investment advice.  The findings from my study may improve 
their awareness of potential biases in analyst reports by identifying circumstances in 
which analysts’ are more (less) efficient in processing information regarding cost 
behaviour. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: I develop hypotheses related to 
corporate strategy, cost stickiness and analyst forecast bias in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 
introduce the models and measurement of variables used to test the proposed hypotheses. 
Then, I describe the sample selection process in Section 3.4 following with the descriptive 
statistics in Section 3.5. The results from testing all the hypotheses are presented in 
Section 3.6. Finally, I conclude this study in Section 3.7. 
 
5.2. Hypothesis Development 
In this section, I develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate 
strategy, firm’s cost behaviour and analyst forecast bias. I begin by reviewing and 
analysing the key literature investigating the association between cost stickiness and 
forecast accuracy. Then, I review the literature examining the sources of cost stickiness 
and explain why and how strategic information may be useful for predicting sticky cost 
behaviour. Finally, I use the stylised mathematical model in Ciftci et al. (2016) to 
demonstrate the association between cost stickiness, firms’ strategic choice and analyst 
forecast forecasting efficiency, and develop hypotheses regarding the moderating effect 
of strategy on the extent to which analysts efficiently deal with asymmetric cost behaviour. 
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5.2.1. Cost Stickiness and Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
The literature has documented an association between cost stickiness and analyst forecast 
accuracy. Weiss (2010) argues that sticky costs increase the firms’ ex-ante earnings 
variability. Compared to a firm that exhibits anti-sticky costs, a firm that exhibits cost 
stickiness experiences lower cost savings when sales decrease, and this reduces the firms’ 
expected earnings.  Assuming symmetric cost behaviour in cases of sales increases, and 
equal probabilities of sales increases and decreases, sticky costs induce a greater variance 
in future earnings, and thus a larger absolute forecast error if: a) analysts have some 
understanding of asymmetric cost behaviour, and b) analysts forecast the expected value 
of future earnings.  Figure 5.1 shows the diagram underpinning the theoretical model 
employed in Weiss (2010, p. 1445). This model compares two firms (a firm with sticky 
costs and a firm with anti-sticky costs) for which the level of current profits and 
conditions other than cost stickiness are similar. Sticky costs reduce the level of forecast 
earnings because the expected profit when sales decrease (YL) is lower for firms 
exhibiting sticky costs than those with anti-sticky costs (Forecast profit CF < Forecast 
profit BD).  Because the forecast earnings when sales decrease is lower, the range of 
possible outcomes of business operations for the sticky-cost firm should be greater than 
the ones for firms following the anti-sticky costs (Weiss 2010). This means that the 
earnings variability for firms with sticky costs is greater than that of firms’ exhibiting 
anti-sticky costs. Therefore, the distances between the forecasted earnings and actual 
earnings for sticky-cost firms (Line AB and DE) will be greater than the ones for anti-
sticky firms (Line AC and FG) suggesting that cost stickiness increases the absolute 
forecast errors both when sales increase and decrease (Weiss 2010). This implies that cost 
stickiness increases the variability of firms’ cost behaviour, which determines a large 
proportion of the firms’ expected earnings and in turn, reduce analyst forecast accuracy 
(Brown et al. 1987, Banker and Chen 2006).  
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Figure 5.1 Absolute Forecast Errors in the Presence of Sticky Costs and in the 
Presence of Anti-Sticky Costs (from Weiss 2010 – p. 1445) 
 
However, Weiss (2010) does not directly examine the extent to which analysts understand 
firms’ sticky cost behaviour; rather univariate tests of differences in forecast bias for firms 
with sticky and anti-sticky costs are presented as evidence that analysts have some 
understanding of the phenomenon. Ciftci et al. (2016) extends Weiss (2010) by 
investigating whether or not that analysts exhibit systematic errors in predicting the cost 
behaviour of firms associated with level of variable costs as well as the level of sticky 
costs. Their study uses the ratio of consensus (signed) earnings forecast errors (EFE) and 
sales forecast errors (SFE) to capture analysts’ understanding of firms’ cost behaviour. 
Ciftci et al. (2016) also condition this ratio on the level of variable costs and the degrees 
of cost stickiness, to examine the extent to which analysts understand cost behaviour.29 
Centrally, they argue that if analysts perfectly understand firms’ cost stickiness, then the 
ratio of earnings forecast errors to sales forecast errors should be equal for positive and 
                                                 
29 The theoretical model will be explained in detail in Section 1.4. 
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negative sales surprises of similar magnitude, regardless of the degrees of cost stickiness 
present. However, using a dichotomous transformation of the Weiss (2010) stickiness 
measure, Ciftci et al. (2016) find that the ratio of earning forecast errors to sale forecast 
errors when sales are unexpectedly low is significantly greater for firms with sticky costs, 
suggesting that analyst do not fully understand asymmetric cost behaviour. 
While Ciftci et al. (2016) provide evidence of a general association between cost 
stickiness manifested in current earnings and analyst forecast efficiency, there are a 
number of reasons why this may occur. A firm’s observed cost stickiness may, for 
instance, change over time and thus analysts relying on historically observed cost 
behaviour may be misled regarding future realised cost stickiness. Indeed, Banker et al. 
(2014) argue and show that the extent of asymmetry in firm’s current cost behaviour is 
conditioned by the sign of prior period sales changes. More importantly, they suggest that 
prior period sales decreases are a signals of future declines and may induce anti-sticky 
cost behaviour in the average firm, while prior period sales increase are argued to signal 
stronger future prospects and a greater likelihood that managers retain slack to capitalise 
future growth opportunities.  
To investigate the efficiency of analysts’ response to asymmetric cost behaviour more 
deeply, I use empirical proxies for firm strategy to identify firms for which the degrees 
of cost stickiness should be more easily predictable by analysts relying on historic 
publicly available information, and study the relative efficiency of analysts’ response to 
observed cost behaviour in these firms. In developing my hypotheses, I also incorporate 
the findings of Banker et al. (2014), and condition my tests on the direction of the change 
in prior period sales. 
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5.2.2. Firm’s Cost Behaviour and Cost Stickiness 
Cost stickiness reflects the asymmetric behaviour of the cost to sales ratio when sales 
increase and decrease (Anderson et al. 2003); costs are described as ‘sticky’ if the rate of 
change in costs when demand falls is smaller than the rate of change in sales when 
demand rises.  The management accounting literature proposes two broad explanations 
for sticky cost behaviour: the ‘cost structure’ hypothesis that refers to the firm’s cost 
behaviour associated with the short-run ratio of fixed-to-variable cost contingent on prior 
economic decisions (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2014); and the ‘management choice’ 
hypothesis which suggests that managers deliberately choose such sticky cost behaviour 
in the short-run based on their considerations of firms’ future performance (e.g. Anderson 
et al. 2003 and Cannon 2014). Below I explain the two main explanations of observed 
cost stickiness.30   
5.2.2.1. Cost Structure Hypothesis  
The cost structure hypothesis argues that observed cost stickiness is a product of the fixed-
to-variable cost ratio resulting from prior investment in assets that costly to liquidate and 
re-acquire and which thus entail a proportion of costs that are effectively sunk 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2014). In the short-run, when firm have a proportion of the fixed 
(uncontrollable) costs, the rate of increase (decrease) in sales relative to the rate of 
increase (decrease) in cost becomes smaller (larger) as the demand increase (decrease). 
This difference is increasing in the fixed to variable cost ratio, and is consistent with the 
observed sticky cost.  
                                                 
30 There are numerous other factors posited to be associated with cost stickiness, but which are less relevant 
to my hypothesis development. Cost stickiness has, for instance, been associate with agency costs, 
particularly those manifested in empire-building (e.g. Anderson et al. 2003, Chen et al. 2012, 2013) and 
accounting conservatism (Banker et al. 2016). 
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5.2.2.2. Management Choice Hypothesis 
The ‘management choice’ hypothesis has many specific variants, but each suggest that in 
cases of temporary decreases in demand, managers make short-term decisions to absorb 
higher current period costs to achieve superior future performance when demand 
increases (Anderson et al. 2003, Balakrishnan et al. 2004, Weiss 2010, Chen et al. 2012, 
Dierynck et al. 2012, Kama and Weiss 2013, Banker et al. 2013, 2014 and Cannon 2014).  
The central explanation of the management choice hypothesis for the observed sticky cost 
behaviour is managers’ choice to ‘retain idle resources’ to reduce the net costs of current 
and future capacity adjustments (Anderson et al. 2003). The ‘retaining idle resources’ 
argument refers to manager’s choice to maintaining unused resources when demand falls 
because the benefits of disposing these ‘fixed’ resources is low relative to the expected 
cost of replacing these resources in the future if demand grows (Anderson et al. 2003 and 
Banker et al. 2011).31   
I define costs associated with increasing/decreasing capacity as ‘capacity adjustment 
costs’. The net capacity adjustment cost comprises the benefits from selling the assets 
now and the costs of repurchasing these assets in future if sales increase. Managers may 
consciously choose to maintain excess capacity to minimise the net current and future 
capacity adjustment costs and this may lead to the decline in cost to be lower than the 
reduction in sales. Conversely, managers of firms at or near capacity may need to increase 
capacity if demand rises in these cases the corresponding increase in costs should be in 
similar proportion to that of the sales increase.  Therefore, the change in cost-to-sale ratio 
when sales decrease will be smaller than the change in cost-to-sale ratio when sales rises, 
resulting in ‘sticky cost behaviour’.  
                                                 
31 Cannon (2014) identifies temporary price reductions as an alternative response to temporary falls in 
demand, which avoids the development of excess capacity, but his strategy also imposes short-term cost on 
the firm. Therefore, the change in cost-to-sale ratio when sales decrease is still lower than the ones when 
sales increase, consistent with sticky cost behaviour. 
 203 
 
However, Banker et al. (2014) refine the theoretical expectations of sticky cost behaviour 
by considering the moderating effect of prior period sales. They argue that managers’ 
decision to retain idle capacity is conditional on the direction of prior period sales changes, 
in addition to the direction of current period sales changes. The direction of prior period 
sales changes affects both: 1) firms’ production capacity at the beginning of the current 
period (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2004), and 2) management expectations of future sales 
(e.g. Banker et al. 2014). Even though the bulk of the literature focuses on cross-sectional 
differences in cost behaviour when current sales decrease and typically assumes the 
change in cost-to-sale ratio when sales increase is similar across firms (e.g. Anderson et 
al. 2003, Balakrishnan and Gruca 2008 and Weiss (2010), Banker et al. (2014) show that 
cost behaviour in periods when sales increase may affect observed cross-sectional 
differences in cost stickiness, because firms’ behaviour may be conditioned by the sign 
of prior sales changes (which proxies for expectations of future demand).  
In essence, Banker et al. (2014) argue and show that in cases where prior sales increased, 
a current period sales decrease is likely to lead to a decrease in current costs that is 
proportionately less than the sales change. However, if prior sales decreases are followed 
by a current period sale decrease, the reduction in cost will likely be greater than the 
reduction in sales (Banker et al. 2014).  Even if current period increases in sales lead to 
symmetric increases in costs, the two situations above lead to sticky costs (in the case of 
the prior sales increase) and anti-sticky costs (in the case of the prior sales decrease). I 
explain Banker et al.’s (2014) reasoning in more detail below.  
Prior Sales Changes and Capacity Utilisation at the Beginning of the Current Period 
Banker et al. (2014) suggests two reasons why prior sales changes moderate the 
predictions of the firms’ cost behaviour. First, prior sales changes reflect managers’ past 
decision to retain idle capacity, which affects the capacity utilisation at the beginning of 
the current period. Prior literature suggests that firms’ decision to retain resources is 
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driven by their current capacity level (Balakrishnan et al. 2004 and Weiss 2010). If firms 
begin a period at capacity, managers are more likely to retain idle capacity if sales 
decrease during the period, implying that costs decrease by a lower proportion than sales. 
However, if a firm begins the current period at capacity, and demand once more increases, 
the firm will need to increase investment in capacity to meet this demand, and costs 
should increase at a rate relatively similar to that of sales. Thus, if a firm begins the current 
period at capacity, the combination of a relatively low sensitivity of cost to demand when 
demand falls, and a higher sensitivity of cost to demand if demand rises leads to cost 
stickiness.  
Banker et al. (2014) argue that, in cases where a firm has experienced a prior period 
increase in sales, the firm is more likely to be at (or near) capacity at the beginning of the 
current period than is the case for prior period sales declines. Thus, for cases of prior 
period sales increases, the greater likelihood that firms begin the current period at capacity 
suggests that cost stickiness is relatively likely to be observed.  
Conversely, for firms with prior period sales decreases, the firm is more likely to begin 
the current period with excess capacity. For these firms a current period increase in 
demand is less likely to require an increased investment in capacity, reducing the degree 
of expected stickiness (Balakrishnan et al. 2004 and Weiss 2010). Banker et al. (2014) 
present empirical evidence of greater cost stickiness for firms with prior sales increases, 
and greater cost anti-stickiness for firms with prior period sales decreases. 
Prior Sales Changes and Expectations of Future Demand 
The second impact of firms’ prior sales changes is as a source of information regarding 
future demand.  Banker et al. (2014) argue that the signs of sales changes are correlated 
over time and that past sales changes are a strong predictor of the future sales base. 
Therefore, the direction of prior sales changes may affect managers’ expectation of future 
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sales, and thus managers’ decision to retain capacity in the current period (Banker et al. 
2014). 
When firms experience a prior sales increase, managers are expected to regard this as a 
favourable sign of future sales. Consequently, if current period sales decrease, managers 
are more likely to view this downturn as temporary, and retain excess capacity to remain 
in expectation of improving sales in future. Conversely, if a prior sales increase is 
followed by a current period sales increase, managers the amount by which managers are 
prepared to expand capacity will be greater, as they have more confidence that the 
additional capacity will not be wasted in the future. Thus the signalling value of prior 
period sales increases amplifies the predicted cost stickiness resulting from the level of 
capacity utilisation at the beginning of the period. 
Opposite effects are predicted when firms experience a prior period decrease. If a prior 
period decrease is followed by a current period decrease, this is abnormally likely to 
signal a permanent decrease in demand, and thus a greater likelihood that firms reduce 
capacity. If a prior period decrease is followed by a current period increase, the extent to 
which manager are likely to increase capacity (if needed) will be lower, as they would 
have less confidence in the persistence of demand than in cases of prior sales increases.  
The combination of the two current period outcomes are consistent with cost anti-
stickiness.  Once more, the signalling value of sales decreases amplifies the effects of 
capacity utilisation on expected stickiness.  
In summary, Banker et al. (2014)’s central finding is that, for the average firm, cost 
stickiness will be observed more commonly in periods following an increase in sales; 
whereas periods following a decline in sales will tend to be characterised by anti-sticky 
cost behaviour. However, it appears reasonable to expect that the likelihood that a 
particular firm demonstrate sticky cost behaviour varies with the relative importance of 
cost minimisation and innovation, and to this end, I argue that the strategic typologies of 
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Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) which have been adapted for use in empirical-archival 
research in accounting literature (Ittner et al. 1997, Bentley et al. 2013 and Bentley-Goode 
et al. 2017), may signal differences in the likelihood of sticky cost behaviour. If this is 
true, and analysts recognise these traits, the impact of cost stickiness on forecast 
efficiency should be weaker (stronger) where cost stickiness in more (less) predictable. I 
develop these ideas in the section below. 
5.2.3. Corporate Strategy and Firm’s Cost Behaviour 
Prior management literature argues that corporate strategy affects a firm’s cost behaviour 
(e.g. Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) develop a strategic 
typology that identifies three viable strategic types (‘Prospectors’, ‘Analyzers’ and 
‘Defenders’) and a fourth, inefficient type (‘Reactors’). Within these, Prospectors and 
Defenders represent the opposite ends of a strategy continuum, while Analyzers adopt a 
balanced position between the two extremes.  Miles and Snow (2003) emphasise that the 
entrepreneurial objectives of a firm include identifying and investing in technology 
appropriate to produce and distribute the chosen products or services (the “engineering 
problem”) and adopting an organisational structure consistent with the firm’s strategy 
(the “administrative problem”), and that the choice of strategy represents various paths 
by which firms strive to meet these objectives. In the context of making decisions for a 
single product, firms’ strategic choice determines the firms’ investment in technology, 
cost-efficiency and other resource allocations, and this in turn affects the proportion of 
fixed and variable costs incurred by that firm.  Miles and Snow’s (2003) strategic 
typology may thus assist investors and analysts in understanding likely variations the 
degree of cost stickiness resulting from either long-term or short-term management 
decisions. While a rational manager aims to maximum the present value of firm’s 
expected profits (equal to the sales minus fixed and variable costs) over its life, corporate 
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strategy may influence the means by which they choose to achieve this.  I focus my 
discussion on the behaviour of Prospectors and Defenders, as it is these strategic types 
that have the clearest theoretical impact on asymmetric cost behaviour. Analyzers and 
Reactors (‘other firms’) are the base against which Prospectors and Defenders are 
compared. 
5.2.3.1. Prospectors  
The ‘Prospector’ strategy focuses on innovation, and requires firms to be constantly 
engaged in a process of enacting and responding to their environment in an effort to 
maximise their chance of securing any first-mover advantage (Miles and Snow 2003). 
Prospectors’ innovative focus implies means that such firms are more likely to invest in 
R&D, highly specialised labour and advertising for new product campaigns, in which a 
proportion of these costs are unrecoverable in the short-run.  
Prospector’s large investments in R&D and highly specialised human resources increase 
the relevant periods’ adjustment cost (e.g. the cost to hire and re-hire highly specialised 
labour or re-starting research projects) in the short-run (Venieris et al. 2015). This 
suggests that Prospectors may potentially suffer significant long-term economic harm if 
capacity is reduced significantly when the firms faces what is expected to be a short-term 
decline in demand. For example, if Prospectors cut R&D expenses radically in one period, 
this will likely impose greater long-term harm on these firms, given their particularly 
innovative focus. Therefore, following a prior sales increase, Prospectors should be 
abnormally reluctant to cut cost if current demand declines. Prospectors should be 
abnormally likely to retain idle resources such as 1) investments in R&D and specialised 
labour to facilitate future innovation and 2) marketing and advertising expenditures to 
continue promoting their new products. Ballas et al. (2017) provides evidence to support 
the contention that Prospectors exhibit greater cost stickiness in their SG&A expenses 
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(incl. advertising and salaries) compared to all other firms. Additional, I expect 
Prospectors to be particularly willing to increase investment where there are two 
consecutive increases in demand (to avoid losing their competitive advantage in 
innovation). If Prospectors behaviour as expected in cases of prior sales increases, sticky 
cost behaviour would be observed. 
The implications of the Prospector strategy for observed cost stickiness in the periods 
following a fall in demand are less clear. While Banker et al. (2014) predict that an 
average firm will exhibit anti-sticky costs in these circumstances, the factors that drive 
this prediction may be less strong for Prospectors. Prospectors’ reliance on innovation 
may mean that they are particularly willing to sacrifice short-term profitability to maintain 
flexibility to invest in innovative projects (Miles and Snow 2003). This implies that 
Prospectors may have higher tolerance of unused resources compared to ‘other firms’. 
When Prospectors experience two consecutive decrease in sales, they may be more likely 
than ‘other firms’ to continue investments in innovative activities (possibly allowing idle 
technology and specialised labour), because the long-term benefits of these activities are 
more crucial to their success than is the case with ‘other firms’. Conversely, if current 
sales increase, Prospectors may be more likely than ‘other firms’ to invest in proportion 
to the sales increase discarding the impact of excess capacity from prior sales decreases. 
In essence, Prospectors’ focus on innovation will delay their responses to potential 
decline in future sales compared to ‘other firms’, and this may induce Prospectors to 
exhibit sticky cost behaviour even in the periods following a prior sales decrease. To sum 
up, I expect Prospectors to exhibit greater cost stickiness (lesser cost anti-stickiness) than 
‘other firms’.  
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5.2.3.2. Defenders 
Defenders invest heavily in production and/or distributive technology to enhance cost 
efficiency and maintain market share in a narrow product range (Miles and Snow 2003). 
Miles and Snow (2003) suggest that Defenders are more likely to be subject to strong 
price competition and focus on maintaining economies of scale and market share for their 
products. Consequently, Defenders typically have large long-term investments in 
physical assets aimed at achieving production efficiencies, and these investments produce 
significant costs (e.g. depreciation) that are largely fixed in the short-run. Thus, under the 
cost structure hypothesis, Defenders appear more likely to exhibit sticky cost behaviour. 
However, Defenders’ cost-efficiency focus also implies that they are more likely than 
‘other firms’ to adjust labour and SG&A expenditure (which are not core to a Defender’s 
success) or selling price (Cannon 2014) when demand fluctuates. Therefore, Defenders 
are likely to have abnormally low tolerance of idle resources. Consistent with this theory, 
Ballas et al. (2017) finds that the SG&A costs of Defenders are indeed anti-sticky. In 
addition, because of Defenders’ narrow product range, they are likely to be particularly 
cautious when responding to a change in market environment (Miles and Snow 2003).  
Consequently, Defenders may wish to minimise the chance of future excess capacity and 
this may mean that they require a relatively strong signal of future demand to induce then 
to invest in additional new capacity.  While Banker et al. (2014) predict that the average 
firm will exhibit sticky costs following a prior sales increase, the factors that drive this 
prediction may be less strong for Defenders. For example, if there is a fall in demand 
following an increase in demand, Defenders may be less likely than ‘other firms’ to retain 
idle resources because of their low tolerance of idle resources. While under the scenario 
of two consecutives sales increases, Defenders may be less likely than ‘other firms’ to 
add new capacity (e.g. labour and SG&A expenses) in proportionate to the increase in 
 210 
 
demand to keep their focus on the core expenses. If this predicted behaviour is descriptive 
of reality, Defenders are less likely to exhibit sticky costs.  
In the periods following a fall in demand, Defenders may exhibit abnormally strong cost 
anti-stickiness.  Defenders low tolerance of slack should render them more likely to get 
rid of excess capacity in non-core expenses (e.g. by cutting human labour) when they 
experience sales decrease in two consecutives periods, implying that costs decrease in 
greater proportion to sales, to a stronger extent than ‘other firms’. Assuming that 
Defenders are at least as reluctant as ‘other  firms’ to expand capacity when a sales 
decrease is followed by a sales increase, Defenders should exhibit a greater degree of cost 
anti-stickiness in the periods following a sales decline.32   
In summary, the expected sticky cost behaviour of Defenders are more complicated than 
for Prospectors. On one hand, Defenders’ investments in physical production and 
distributive technology and focus on economies of scales make them more likely to 
exhibit sticky cost behaviour (the sticky-cost increasing effect).  On the other hand, the 
importance of efficiencies in labour and SG&A expenses indicates Defenders are more 
likely to be anti-sticky (the sticky-cost decreasing effect). Therefore, whether the sticky 
cost increasing effects dominate the sticky-cost decreasing effect is an empirical question 
that I address later in this study. 
5.2.3.3. Other Firms – Analyzers and Reactors 
Analyzers are firms that possess some of the attributes of both Defenders and Prospectors, 
and focus on achieving a balance between product efficiency, while efficiently exploiting 
new opportunities after Prospectors go into the new market (Miles and Snow 1978, 2003). 
                                                 
32 There is an argument that Defenders’ abnormal reliance on scale economies may mean that when current 
sales increase following a prior sales decrease, Defenders may be more likely to increase capacity, because 
they may have been more likely to have accommodated the prior period sales decline by temporarily cutting 
price rather than capacity. This would only lead to sticky cost behaviour if the temporary price decline was 
maintained when demand rose. 
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Therefore, Analyzers’ efficiency focus motivates them to adjust variable labour and 
SG&A costs as demand changes, while being more reluctant to invest in specific long-
term production and distributive technology than Defenders. Analyzers will invest in 
fixed advertising, R&D and specialised labour costs, but less intensively than Prospectors. 
The fourth type of strategy, Reactors, is the residual of the other three strategies. Reactors 
are firms whose pattern of adjustment to the environment is both inconsistent and unstable 
(Miles and Snow 2003). Due to the flexible focus of Analyzers and short-term orientation 
of Reactors, the cost behaviour of these firms is less likely to be driven by long-term 
investments in assets that produce fixed costs, and the impetrative to retain capacity for 
future innovation is likely to be weaker than is the case for Prospectors.  For these reasons, 
and because the empirical measure of strategy employed in the literature cannot 
distinguish Analyzers from Reactor, both Analyzers and Rectors are referred as the third 
strategic group ‘other firms’. 
To sum up, Prospectors are generally associated with greater cost stickiness compared to 
‘other firms’ and that this difference should be most clearly noticeable when prior period 
sales changes are positive. The potential impacts of the Defender strategy on asymmetric 
cost behaviour are mixed, and depend mainly on the relative size of long-term cost 
structure effects (which will induce cost stickiness) and short-term capacity adjustment 
effect (which may cause Defenders to have lower cost stickiness or greater anti-stickiness 
than ‘other firms’. 
5.2.4. Cost Stickiness, Strategy and Analyst Forecasting Efficiency 
In this section, I introduce the mathematical model used in Ciftci et al. (2016) that I 
employ to examine the implications of the extent to which analysts understand 
asymmetric cost behaviour and incorporate this in their forecasts, and the extent to which 
predictable variation in the degree of cost stickiness across firms conditions the 
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association between forecast efficiency and cost stickiness. I begin my discussion by 
demonstrating that direction of the association between asymmetric cost behaviour and 
analyst forecast accuracy is conditional on the perceived probability of future sales 
increases and decreases, but that the impact of cost stickiness on forecast bias is 
monotonic, and thus represents a potentially more powerful method of testing analysts 
understanding of cost behaviour.   
5.2.4.1. Cost Stickiness, Strategy and Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Bias 
To illustrate the conditional nature of the association between analysts understanding of 
cost stickiness and the perceived likelihood of future sales increases or decreases, I use 
the Ciftci et al. (2016) model of analysts’ expectation of earnings (X̂), which assumes that 
analysts employ a simple  fixed-variable cost model with an adjustment for asymmetric 
cost behaviour. In Equation (1) below, v represents the level of variable costs in 
proportion to sales and F0 is the level of fixed costs. Analysts are assumed to estimate 
expected profit by predicting future sales and the change in costs in two possible future 
states: unfavourable (sales decrease, with sales = SL) and favourable (sales increase, with 
sales = SH) scenarios, which occur with probabilities α and (1 − α) respectively: 
X̂ =  αXL + (1 − α)XH = (1 − v)Ŝ − F0 −  αβ(S−1 − SL)                                            (1) 
Where, XH represents the expected profit in the favourable scenario while XL represents 
the expected profit in the unfavourable scenario. β measures the degree of cost stickiness 
when sales decrease. Thus, -β(S-1-SL)>0 represents the additional costs incurred due to 
costs being sticky compared to costs under the traditional cost model, which, in turn, 
reduce the expected profits in the unfavourable scenario. Thus, the expected profit is 
equal to the expected profits in the favourable and unfavourable scenarios (XH and XL) 
multiple the probability of the occurrences of the two scenarios (α and 1-α).  
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The expected absolute forecast error of analysts’ forecasted earnings for the period is 
equal to absolute forecast errors for each possible outcome (sales increase or sales 
decrease) multiplied the respective probabilities of each outcome, as per Equation 2 
below. Equation 3 expresses the expected signed forecast error in a similar manner:  
E(AbsFE) =   α[abs(XL − X̂)] + (1 − α)[abs(XH − X̂) ]                                              (2) 
E(FE)        =    α(XL − X̂)  + (1 − α)(XH − X̂)                                                                 (3) 
 
Ciftci et al. (2016) use their models to demonstrate that the ratio of earning forecast errors 
to sales forecast errors is increasing in the level of cost stickiness if analysts fail to 
understand or predict this phenomenon. Because the focus of my thesis is on corporate 
strategy, measures of which are quite taxing on sample size, and analyst sales forecasts 
are also of limited availability, testing the role of strategy in analysts understanding of 
cost stickiness using the Ciftci et al. (2016) method is not practical. However, the same 
model can be used to demonstrate that the associations between each of forecast accuracy 
and bias, and analysts understanding of cost stickiness   Under   the assumptions in Ciftci 
et al. (2016), it can be shown that the accuracy of an expert analyst (one who perfectly 
understands and predicts asymmetric cost behaviour), and that of a naïve analyst (one 
who assumes symmetric cost behaviour) is identical, but that the expert and naïve analysts 
generate difference expected absolute forecast errors where α ≠ 0.5 . Table 1 reports the 
results of substituting the data from Ciftci et al.’s footnote 3 (p.59)  into the equations 
above (SH = 1100, SL = 900, F0 = 100, v = 0.5) , and varying probability of a sales decrease 
(α = 0.5, 0.25, 0.75) and the level of sticky costs (β = -0.2, 0.2), generates the following 
association between the degree of cost stickiness and the expected forecast errors of: a) 
an analyst with perfect understanding of asymmetric cost behaviour (‘expert analyst’) and 
b) an analyst who assumes that all firms exhibit symmetrical cost behaviour (‘naïve 
analyst’). Signed forecast errors are calculated as (actual earnings – forecast earnings) so 
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a positive forecast error implies a pessimistic forecast. Detailed calculations are available 
in Appendix 5.1: 
Table 5.1 Absolute and Signed Forecast Errors and Cost Stickiness 
 
The first two rows of Table 5.1 provides the illustrations of how the level of cost 
stickiness affects analysts’ expected (absolute) forecast errors when the probability of 
sales increase and decrease are equal (α=0.5). As shown in Ciftci et al. (2016)’s example, 
the expected value of absolute forecast errors for ‘expert’ analysts is $60. For ‘naïve’ 
analysts, who assume the firm follows a symmetric cost function, the signed forecast 
errors in the favourable scenario become $50 and the forecast errors in the unfavourable 
scenario are -$70, but the expected absolute forecast errors is $60 (0.5 x $50 + 0.5 x $70), 
which is the same as that of the ‘expert’. The same equality holds for firms with anti-
sticky costs (Row 2).  
However, if one varies the assumed probability of a sales decrease (Rows 3 to 6) it can 
be seen that the expected absolute forecast error for ‘expert’ and ‘naïve’ analysts is not 
equal. Specifically, where α < 0.5 the naïve analyst out performs the ‘expert’ in terms of 
accuracy (i.e. they make smaller absolute forecast errors); where α = 0.25  the absolute 
forecast error for  ‘experts’ is $45 and that for ‘naïve’ analysts is $42.4 (Row 3). The 
opposite is the case if α > 0.5; where α = 0.75, the absolute forecast errors for the ‘expert’ 
analyst is $30, while that for ‘naïve’ analysts is $32.4 (Row 5). These results suggest that 
 
  α Β E(AbsFE) E(FE) 
        Expert Naïve Expert Naïve 
Equal 
probability 
Sticky costs (per 
Ciftci 2015 
footnote 3) 
0.5 -0.2 60 60 0 -10 
Anti-sticky costs 0.5 0.2 40 40 0 10 
Low P (Sales 
Decrease) 
Sticky costs 0.25 -0.2 45 42.5 0 -5 
Anti-sticky costs 0.25 0.2 30 32.5 0 5 
High P (Sales 
Decrease) 
Sticky costs 0.75 -0.2 45 52.5 0 -15 
Anti-sticky costs 0.75 0.2 30 22.5 0 15 
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‘expert’ analyst only outperform the ‘naïve’ analysts in terms of forecast accuracy when 
the probability of a sales decrease is greater than 50% (α>50%) when costs are sticky. If 
costs are anti-sticky, the opposite average relation occurs.  
Collectively, the results suggest whether the understanding of firms’ asymmetric cost 
behaviour will improve analysts’ forecast accuracy is highly conditional on the actual 
probability of future sales increase/decrease.  
The association between analyst forecast bias, cost stickiness and analysts understanding 
of cost stickiness, however, is monotonic in the probability of sales decreases / increases. 
From Table 5.1 it can be seen that the expected signed forecast error of the ‘expert’ analyst 
is always zero, and that in the presence of sticky costs (β=-0.2), the expected value of the 
‘naïve’ analysts signed forecast error is always negative, and increasing in the probability 
of a sales decrease. ‘Naïve’ analysts make excessively optimistic forecasts, because they 
under-estimate costs when sales decrease, and the impact on the expected signed forecast 
error increases with the probability of this occurrence.33 Prior literature also recognises 
that cost stickiness affects analyst forecast bias without empirically robustly testing this 
association (e.g. Anderson et al. 2003, Weiss 2010, Banker et al. 2014 and Ciftci et al. 
2016).  Ciftci et al. (2016) suggest that analysts who fail to estimate the sticky costs within 
a firm will underestimate expected expenses, and in turn overestimate the expected 
earnings, which leads to forecast optimism (without directly testing this proposition).   
In conclusion, the ‘expert’ analyst only issues more accurate forecasts than the ‘naïve’ 
analyst when the probability of a sales decrease is greater than 50% when costs are sticky. 
Where costs are anti-sticky, the ‘expert’ outperforms the ‘naïve’ analyst when the 
probability of a sales decrease is less than 50%.  However, the ‘expert’ analyst issues 
forecasts with less optimistic bias than the ‘naïve’ analyst in the presence of cost 
                                                 
33 The terms ‘optimism/pessimism’ are synonymous with the terms ‘upward biased/downward biased’ in 
cost stickiness literature i.e. Chen et al.2013.  
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stickiness as long as the probability of a sales decrease is above zero. To the extent that 
analysts have imperfect knowledge of firms future cost stickiness, forecast optimism 
should be increasing in the level of cost stickiness, leading my first hypothesis, which 
assumes that at least some analysts have an imperfect understanding of cost stickiness 
(H1):   
H1: Forecast optimism is increasing with the level of cost stickiness.  
To test the extent to which at least some analysts understand firms’ asymmetric cost 
behaviour, I use information regarding firms’ strategic type as a proxy for the 
predictability of future cost stickiness. If it is possible to use publicly available 
information, such as that reveals firm’s chosen strategy discussed in Section 5.2.3, to 
predict variation in the direction and strength of asymmetric cost behaviour, one would 
expect at least some analysts to incorporate that information into their forecasts. Analysts 
who incorporate such information in their forecasts should exhibit a lesser degree of 
optimistic bias in their forecast errors (relative to analysts who assume a symmetric cost 
function). For example, as discussed in Section 5.2.3, firms following a ‘Prospector’ 
strategy are abnormally likely to retain excess capacity associated with R&D and 
specialised labour which leads to firms’ sticky cost behaviour. If at least some analysts 
recognise this, the expected sticky cost behaviour should be more predictable than for 
firms with lower propensities to exhibit sticky costs (e.g. Defenders).  Therefore, I 
propose, for a given analyst who understands Prospectors are associated with abnormally 
strong cost stickiness, the negative impact of H1 on forecast efficiency should be weaker 
in forecasts for Prospectors than those for all other firms. Thus, H2 predicts: 
H2: The association between forecast optimism and cost stickiness is weaker (stronger) 
for strategy types that demonstrate abnormally strong (weak) cost stickiness. 
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For brevity, I state a single hypothesis in regard to sticky or anti-sticky costs. I also test 
these hypotheses using multiple sub-samples defined by the sign of prior period and 
current period change in sales to examine the effects of strategy types incremental to those 
of prior sales changes. Prior to testing H2, I examine the empirical association between 
strategy types and the extent to which they are associated with different levels of cost 
stickiness (anti-stickiness). 
 
5.3. Methodology 
I now describe the empirical models that I employ to test all hypotheses. I first explain 
the measurement of cost stickiness and corporate strategy, and perform univariate tests to 
check the consistency between the theoretical and empirical association of the two factors, 
before introducing the models used for hypothesis testing.  
5.3.1. Measurement of Cost Stickiness and Corporate Strategy  
5.3.1.1. Cost Stickiness 
The measure of cost stickiness used in this study is based on Weiss (2010)’s alternative 
measure of stickiness (M_STICKY), which measures the difference in the logarithms of 
the average ratio of changes in costs to change in sales when sales decrease, and the same 
average ratio when sales increase. I employ this average measure to capture the 
perseverance of firms’ sticky cost behaviour, which more likely to be a product of firms’ 
strategy choice, than is Weiss’ principal measure which has a shorter-term focus. I 
multiply Weiss (2010)’s M_STICKY by -1 to obtain my measure (STICKY), so that 
positive values indicate greater stickiness, and negative values indicate anti-stickiness, as 
per Equation (4) below:  
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Where ∆C is the percentage change in costs (estimated as the difference between sales 
and earnings) over a quarter, ∆S is the percentage change in sales over a quarter, and τ* 
indicates the each of any of the past eight quarters that experienced a sales decrease, while 
τ indicates each of any the past eight quarters that experience a sales increase. The 
measure of cost stickiness is effectively the inverse of the difference between the mean 
slopes for downwards adjustments (when sales decrease) and the mean slopes for upward 
adjustments (when sales increase), and capture the average magnitude of firms’ cost 
stickiness observed over the past eight quarters.  
Following Ciftci et al. (2016), I employ a dichotomous measure of cost stickiness 
(DSTICKY) in my main tests, which is equal to 1 if firms’ change in cost to sales ratio is 
equal to or smaller than 0, otherwise 0. Therefore, DSTICKY indicates firms with a 
positive values of STICKY. Finally, consistent with Weiss (2010), my main tests focus 
on estimates of cost stickiness restricted to those of industrial firms (SIC Codes 2000-
3999).  
5.3.1.2. Firm’s Strategic Choices  
Following the method described in Study One, I first construct an ordinal strategy score 
and use this to identify the three strategy types described in Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) 
as: Prospectors - scores ranging from 24 to 30 inclusive; other firms – scores ranging 
from 13 to 23 inclusive, and Defenders - scores ranging from 6 to 12 inclusive. Therefore, 
our two dichotomous test variables measuring strategic types are defined as follows:  
PROS is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the discrete STRATEGY score is between 24 
and 30, and otherwise 0; and DEF is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the discrete 
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STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, otherwise 0. Each measure is lagged by one year 
to avoid look ahead bias.  
5.3.2. Models for Hypothesis Testing 
To test the association between cost stickiness and forecast bias (H1), I regress analysts’ 
signed forecast errors against continuous and dichotomous measures of cost stickiness, 
as per Model 1 below. To test whether corporate strategy moderates the relation between 
cost stickiness and forecast bias (H2), I augment Model 1, adding indicator variables for 
each of Prospector and Defender status, and interactions between these and the 
continuous and dichotomous measures of cost stickiness (as used in Ciftci et al. 2016). 
The control variables included in the models are largely based on Weiss (2010). For 
testing of both hypotheses, I first estimate the regressions on the full sample of all firms 
and then perform subsample analysis conditional on current and prior sales changes to 
examines the scenarios where the cost stickiness are most likely to be observed due to 
strategic choices. For brevity, year and industry subscripts have been omitted. All 
regressions are estimated using OLS and include untabulated year and industry fixed 
effects with firm clustering. The dependent variable and controls are winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles or transformed, as appropriate.  
FE = β0 + β3STICKY (DSTICKY) + β4PROS*DSTICKY 
+ β5DEF*DSTICKY + β2MV+ β3LOSS + β4DOWN 
+ β5VSALE + β6DISPERSION + β7OPLEV + 
β8SEASON + ε 
Model 1 
FE = β0 + β1PROS + β2DEF + β3DSTICKY + 
β4PROS*DSTICKY + β5DEF*DSTICKY + β2MV+ 
β3LOSS + β4DOWN + β5VSALE + β6DISPERSION 
+ β7OPLEV + β8SEASON +ε 
Model 2 
Where:     
FE = The consensus forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) 
deflated by lagged stock price, for all analysts covering the firm 
within the 30-day window leading up to the quarterly earnings 
announcement,  multiplied by 100. We estimate consensus 
manually using the I/B/E/S Detail History File.  
 220 
 
STICKY = an average measure of cost stickiness using the method of Weiss 
(2010). First, we compute the ratio of change in total costs to 
change in sales for the most recent eight quarters leading to the 
annual earnings announcement date (from time t-7 to time t). 
Then, we compute the difference between logarithms of the 
mean slopes for adjustments observed when sales decrease and 
the adjustments that occur when sales increase to capture the 
average magnitude of cost stickiness for each firm-quarter. 
Finally, we invert the sign of the measure so that STICKY is an 
increasing measure of cost stickiness. 
DSTICKY = A dichotomous variable indicating positive values of STICKY 
(as calculated above) where it equals to 1 if the firms’ change in 
cost to sales ratio is equal or smaller than 0, otherwise 0. 
PROS = an indicator variable for Prospector firm-years, equal to 1 if the 
STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise. 
DEF = an indicator variable for Defender firm-years, equal to 1 if the 
STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise. 
PROS*DSTICK
Y 
= the interaction between PROS and DUM_STICKY. 
DEF*DSTICKY = The interaction between DEF and DSTICKY.  
Controls:   
MV = log of market value of equity at quarter end using Compustat data 
(prccq*cshoq). 
LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the income before 
extraordinary items in the current quarter (COMPUSTAT: ibq) 
is negative for the covered firm, and 0 otherwise.  
DOWN = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if there is a negative earnings 
surprise corresponding to the consensus analyst forecast, and 0 
otherwise. 
VSALE = sales volatility measured by the ratio of standard deviation to 
mean of sales over the four quarters from t-3 through t. 
DISPERSION = the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts announced for 
firm i in quarter t in the month immediately preceding that of 
the earnings announcement, deflated by stock price at the end 
of quarter t −1 multiplied by 100. 
OPLEV = the ratio between SALE (COMPUSTAT: saleq) minus COGS 
(COMPUSTAT: cogsq) and SALE, where winsorised at value 
below 0 or above and 1 are winsorised. 
SEASON = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the change in earnings from 
the same quarter in the prior year is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
 
I estimate two forms of Model 1, in which the test variable is alternately the continuous 
stickiness measure (STICKY) as per Equation (4) or a dichotomous variable (DSTICKY) 
indicating positive values of cost stickiness (as per Ciftci et al. 2016). Because the 
presence of positive cost stickiness implies optimistic forecast errors if analysts cannot 
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perfectly control for its effects, the predicted signs for STICKY and DSTICKY are 
negative. In Model 2, the test variables are the interactions between each of indicators of 
strategic type (PROS, DEF) and DSTICKY. If, for example, analysts recognise that 
Prospectors have higher cost stickiness than ‘other firms’ in a given sample, one would 
expect the association between stickiness and forecast bias to be weaker, and thus would 
expect a positive interact term (PROS*DSTICKY).  β0 in Model 2 captures the impacts 
of following other strategies (e.g. Analyzer or Reactor) on analyst forecast error 
incremental to the impact from cost stickiness.  
The measurements of key variables are discussed below. 
5.3.2.1. Analyst Forecast Bias 
Following Weiss (2010), I study analysts ‘end-of-period’ forecasts, comprising the 
forecasts of quarterly earnings per share outstanding immediately prior to the earnings 
announcement, and restrict the sample used to construct consensus to forecasts issued 
within 30 days of the earnings announcement. The forecast error is winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles to control for outliers. I also multiply the calculated consensus 
forecast errors by 100 to help with interpretation of regression coefficients. However, 
unlike Weiss (2010), I base my analysis on signed, rather than unsigned, forecast errors, 
as per Equation (5): 
FE =  Actual EPS − Forecast EPS̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
Price
 x 100 
(5) 
 
5.3.2.2. Control Variables 
MV 
Following Weiss (2010), I control for firm size using the natural logarithm of market 
value of equity using the Compustat items: stock price (prccq) times numbers of ordinary 
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shares outstanding (cshoq) at quarter end. Prior literature suggests firm size has a positive 
association with the firm-specific disclosures available to analysts that affect analysts’ 
forecast accuracy (e.g. Atiase 1985, Collins et al. 1987, Bhushan 1989) and bias 
(Kolasinksi and Kothari 2008).  
LOSS 
I control for the potential impacts of firms’ profit or loss making on the distribution of 
analyst earning forecast errors using an indicator of loss-making firms (LOSS). LOSS is 
equal to 1 if the covered firm make a loss in the current quarter (COMPUSTAT: ibq<0), 
and 0 otherwise (Weiss 2010). Prior literature finds analysts’ absolute forecast errors are 
greater for firms reporting a loss than for profit-making firms because loss-reporting firms 
have relatively uncertain earnings, which increases the earnings variability in estimating 
expected earnings and in turn, increase absolute forecast errors (Das et al. 1998; Gu and 
Wu 2003). This effect flows through to signed forecast errors, because the magnitude of 
the earnings surprise is typically greater for loss-making firms (Brown 2001).  
DOWN 
Prior literature suggests managers can disclose voluntary earnings guidance to affect 
analyst forecast accuracy and in turn, help them to meet or sightly beat the analyst 
forecasts (e.g. Matsumoto 2002). Therefore, I control for negative earnings surprises 
using an indicator variable DOWN that is equal to one if there is a negative earnings 
surprise corresponding to the consensus analyst forecast, and zero otherwise. I expect a 
positive association between negative earnings surprises and forecast errors because 
analysts might have received less earnings guidance from firms’ with short-horizon 
negative earnings surprises.   
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VSALE 
Following Weiss (2010), I use sales volatility (VSALE) to control for outcome 
uncertainty in the market environment as greater volatility in the business environment is 
expected to create larger forecast errors. VSALE is measured by the coefficient of 
variation in sales (which is the ratio of standard deviation to mean) over the four quarters 
from t-3 through t. While volatility has clearer implications for absolute forecast errors 
than for signed forecast errors, it has the capacity to amplify the latter in either direction, 
and is likely to be correlated with my strategy variables. 
DISPERSION 
I also control for the environmental uncertainty facing the analyst community using 
DISPERSION. Prior literature suggests forecast dispersion is a complementary 
uncertainty aspects of firms’ earnings (e.g. Barron et al. 1998) and this reflects analysts 
have little or inconsistent information about firms’ future earnings (e.g. Graham 1999, 
Welch 2000). I measure DISPERSION as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecast 
announced for firm i in quarter t in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings 
announcement, deflated by stock price at the end of quarter t −1 multiplied by 100. I 
expect DISPERSION to increase absolute forecast errors, and potentially magnify the 
extent of average forecast bias observed.  
OPLEV 
Prior literature finds that operating leverage (proxied by the gross profit margin) is 
positively associated with forecast error (Adar et al. 1988, Lev and Thiagarajan 1993). 
This is because high operating leverage means the firms’ sales are highly dependent on 
the conditions of external environment and current macroeconomic indicators. Therefore, 
high operating leverage is likely to be associated with high earnings volatility and forecast 
error (Weiss 2010). OPLEV is the ratio between SALE minus COGS and SALE, 
winsorised at 0 and 1. I expect OPLEV to increase absolute forecast errors. Firms’ 
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operating leverage is also potentially correlated with corporate strategy as Defenders 
typically sell undifferentiated products which are associated with lower gross margins. 
SEASON 
Finally, I control for the potential of unexpected contemporaneous seasonal shocks to 
earnings using SEASON). It is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the change in 
earnings from the same quarter in the prior year is positive, and 0 otherwise. A positive 
relationship between unexpected change in earnings and forecast error as analysts may 
fail to predict the seasonal shocks (Matsumoto 2002). 
 
5.4. Data Collection and Sample Selection 
This section describes the data used to test hypotheses and the sample selection process. 
All analyst-related data are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). The data for corporate strategy, cost stickiness and controls are obtained from 
Compustat Annual and Quarterly Fundamentals. Following Weiss (2010), all analyses in 
this study focus on industrial firms (SIC codes 2000 – 3999) because these firms are more 
likely to face price-competitive markets, which may reduce the measurement error of the 
cost stickiness proxy (Weiss 2010, p.1453).  
Table 5.2 describes the sample selection process. The initial sample consists of U.S 
Industrial firms (SIC code 2000 – 3999) in the Compustat Quarterly Fundamentals file 
between 1992 and 2015, comprising 339,452 firm-quarters. Consistent with Weiss (2010), 
I require that costs move in the same direction as sales, reducing the available sample to 
270,499 firm-quarters. After matching to firms with sufficient available data to measure 
STRATEGY, the sample is reduced to 132,235 firm-quarters.  
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Table 5.2 Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample Selection from COMPUSTAT   
Descriptions  Observations  
Compustat quarterly earnings data for years 1992 and 2015 for all 
industrial firms (SIC 2000-3999 only)            339,452   
Less: Missing data for M-STICKY measure (68,953) 
Less: Missing data for STRATEGY measure  (138,264) 
Total firm-quarter observations           132,235   
  
Panel B: Sample Selection from I/B/E/S  
Firm-quarters with earnings forecasts in the 30-day window prior to 
earnings announcement  (1992-2015)          270,949   
  
Panel C: Matching data from I/B/E/S to Compustat  
Number of observations from Compustat          132,235   
Less: Firms with no analyst following during forecast window (73,297) 
Total Observations with both M-STICKY and STRATEGY 
measures            58,938   
Less: Missing values from control variables (18,839) 
 
 
Final Sample  available for hypothesis testing (firm-quarters) 
           40,099   
 
 
Panel D: Subsamples Conditional on Prior and Current Sales Changes 
Subsample of observations with prior sales increase and current 
sales increase            12,654   
Subsample of observations with prior sales increase and current 
sales decrease            10,907   
Subsample of observations with prior sales decrease and current 
sales increase            10,559   
Subsample of observations with prior sales decrease and current 
sales decrease              5,938   
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The sample for analyst forecast bias is obtained from the I/B/E/S Detail History file.34 
Consistent with Weiss (2010), I calculate the analyst consensus forecast errors using 
forecasts current during the 30 day window immediately prior to the quarterly earnings 
announcement. I obtain the actual earnings from I/B/E/S to ensure that the treatment of 
extraordinary and special items is consistent with the forecasts (e.g. Philbrick and Ricks 
1991). I obtain the earnings announcement date from I/B/E/S. Unlike Weiss (2010), my 
main tests do not exclude firms with stock prices under $3, although my results are 
unaffected if I apply this filter. The sample of observations with at least one quarterly 
forecasts in I/B/E/S comprises 270,949 firm-quarters.  
Finally, I match the observations in I/B/E/S to the Compustat file and this reduces the 
sample to 58,938 firm-quarters. Finally, after considering data requirements for control 
variables, the final sample for the ‘cost stickiness sample’ for hypothesis testing is 40,099 
firm-quarters for 1,995 firms, comprising 12,654 cases on consecutive sales increase, 
10,907 cases where a prior period sales is followed by a current sales decrease, 5,938 
cases of consecutive sales decreases and 10,559 cases of prior period sales decrease 
followed by a current sales increase. 
 
5.5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
In this section, I present the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of this Study. 
Subsection 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 provides the descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation 
matrix for the samples used to test all hypotheses. 
                                                 
34 Weiss (2010) and Ciftci et al. (2016) use the Summary File to calculate the forecast errors based the 
consensus forecasts provided by I/B/E/S. I use the Detail History File to calculate my own consensus 
forecast errors to avoid the potential measurement errors in I/B/E/S’s calculation. 
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5.5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.3 provides the descriptive statistics for the total available sample and for sub-
samples portioned on the sign of the cost stickiness measure.  
Panel A of Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of all firm-quarters. 
The distribution of the signed forecast errors is very similar to that in Weiss (2010)’s 
sample (allowing for the fact that my measure is scaled by a factor of 100).  The mean 
(median) value of STICKY is 0.023 (0.016) indicating that an average firm exhibits sticky 
cost behaviour (recall that my measure of STICKY is increasing in the degree of cost 
stickiness observed). The mean and median of STICKY are slightly greater than those in 
Weiss’s sample, and has greater variance, but this is understandable as my sample period 
extends through the global financial crisis of 2007-09.35 Prospectors and Defenders each 
comprise about 6-7% of my sample.  
The descriptive statistics for each of the control variables are comparable to those in 
Weiss (2010) except for firm size (MV), which is larger in my sample, due to the greater 
likelihood that larger firms will have sufficient data to estimate the strategy measure. 
Panel B and C, Table 5.3 provide the descriptive statistics for firms with sticky versus 
anti-sticky cost behaviour separately. It is apparent that mean forecast bias is more 
pessimistic (less optimistic) in cases of anti-sticky cost behaviour (DSTICKY =0) than 
for sticky cost cases (DSTICKY = 1), and the difference in both means and medians 
(untabulated) are significant at the 99% confidence level.  
                                                 
35 Weiss (2010)’s sample period spans 1986-2005. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
  
Panel A: All Firm-Quarters 
N= 40,099           
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY 0.362 0.799 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.127 0.337 4.348 8.919 
FE 0.046 0.876 -8.919 -3.054 -0.034 0.049 0.198 2.529 4.348 
STRATEGY 17.780 3.646 6.000 10.000 15.000 18.000 20.000 27.000 30.000 
PROS 0.064 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DEF 0.067 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STICKY 0.023 0.487 -4.343 -1.454 -0.144 0.016 0.192 1.518 4.455 
DSTICKY 0.538 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MV 7.554 1.765 1.490 3.918 6.305 7.424 8.685 11.921 13.483 
LOSS 0.213 0.409 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DOWN 0.431 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VSALE 0.117 0.118 0.002 0.014 0.050 0.082 0.139 0.595 2.000 
DISPERSION 0.198 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.078 0.183 2.277 3.677 
OPLEV 0.430 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.280 0.410 0.570 0.900 1.000 
SEASON 0.602 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Panel B: Firm-Quarters where DSTICKY = 1 (Sticky Costs) 
N= 21,575          
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY 0.370 0.837 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.124 0.330 4.348 8.919 
FE 0.004 0.915 -8.919 -3.552 -0.053 0.039 0.174 2.502 4.348 
STRATEGY 17.868 3.624 6.000 10.000 15.000 18.000 20.000 27.000 29.000 
PROS 0.068 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DEF 0.063 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STICKY 0.307 0.383 0.000 0.002 0.066 0.171 0.399 1.875 4.455 
MV 7.484 1.746 2.259 3.860 6.265 7.354 8.564 11.924 13.483 
LOSS 0.244 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DOWN 0.466 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VSALE 0.121 0.120 0.003 0.014 0.052 0.086 0.147 0.607 2.000 
DISPERSION 0.205 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.080 0.191 2.405 3.677 
OPLEV 0.431 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.281 0.415 0.575 0.895 0.999 
SEASON 0.628 0.483 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Panel C: Firm Quarters where DSTICKY = 0 (Anti-Sticky Costs) 
N= 18,524          
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY 0.353 0.752 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.132 0.343 4.348 8.919 
FE 0.094 0.825 -8.919 -2.531 -0.015 0.061 0.226 2.545 4.348 
STRATEGY 17.678 3.668 6.000 10.000 15.000 18.000 20.000 27.000 30.000 
PROS 0.060 0.238 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DEF 0.072 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STICKY -0.309 0.374 -4.343 -1.704 -0.407 -0.168 -0.061 -0.002 0.000 
MV 7.636 1.785 1.490 3.972 6.346 7.503 8.814 11.911 13.237 
LOSS 0.177 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DOWN 0.391 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VSALE 0.112 0.115 0.002 0.013 0.048 0.077 0.132 0.577 2.000 
DISPERSION 0.189 0.391 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.076 0.175 2.152 3.677 
OPLEV 0.428 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.280 0.404 0.564 0.906 1.000 
SEASON 0.571 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Panel D: Key Variables for Prospectors and Defenders 
Prospectors          
N= 2,581          
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY 0.503 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.188 0.496 4.897 8.919 
FE 0.009 1.116 -8.919 -4.897 -0.100 0.042 0.251 3.193 4.348 
STICKY 0.097 0.698 -2.675 -1.611 -0.234 0.062 0.393 2.646 4.455 
Defenders          
N= 2,692           
Variable Mean SD Min 1% Q1 Median Q3 99% Max 
          
ACCURACY 0.506 1.086 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.191 0.473 6.907 8.919 
FE -0.044 1.198 -8.919 -6.907 -0.110 0.043 0.238 2.866 4.348 
STICKY -0.007 0.454 -2.224 -1.320 -0.174 0.000 0.167 1.345 2.670 
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I also present the descriptive statistics for key variables for Prospectors and Defenders 
separately. Prospectors, on average are associated with sticky costs (0.097). However, 
even though the mean value of STICKY for Defenders is -0.007, the univariate test 
suggest that this value is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that Defenders,  
on average, exhibit symmetric cost behaviour. I examine the association between strategy 
types and cost stickiness in greater detail in a following section.  
5.5.2. Correlation Matrix 
The Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in hypothesis testing is presented in 
Table 5.4.  
Consistent with mean differences reported earlier, all strategy-related variables are 
significantly correlated with STICKY. Prospectors are associated with sticky costs and 
Defenders are associated with anti-sticky costs. Both the strategy indicators and cost 
stickiness are significantly correlated with signed forecast errors.  
Additionally, most of the correlations that are common to my paper and Weiss (2010) are 
similar except for that OPLEV variable and absolute forecast errors. In my sample, 
operating leverage (OPLEV) is negatively associated with absolute forecast errors.  
However, as expected, Defenders are associated with lower operating leverage and 
greater absolute forecast errors. With the exception of SEASON, all control variables are 
significantly correlated with signed forecast errors (the main dependent variable), but 
none of these exceed 20%.  
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Table 5.4 Correlation Matrix 
Where FE =  The consensus forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by lagged stock price, for all analysts covering the firm within the 30-day window 
leading up to the quarterly earnings announcement,  multiplied by 100, STICKY = the negative of the difference between the logarithms of the mean slopes of cost 
adjustments when sales decrease and those when sales increase, observed over the past 8 quarters,  DSTICKY = A dichotomous variable indicating positive values of 
STICKY (as calculated above) where it equals to 1 if the firms’ change in cost to sales ratio is equal or smaller than 0, otherwise 0, PROS = an indicator variable for 
Prospector firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF = an indicator variable for Defender firm-years, equal to 1 if 
the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, MV = log of market value of equity at quarter end using Compustat data (prccq*cshoq), LOSS = an 
indicator variable, equal to 1 if the income before extraordinary items in the current quarter (COMPUSTAT: ibq) is negative for the covered firm, and 0 otherwise, 
DOWN = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if there is a negative earnings surprise, and 0 otherwise, VSALE = sales volatility measured by the ratio of standard deviation 
to mean of sales over the four quarters from t-3 through t, DISPERSION = the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts announced for firm i in quarter t in the 
month immediately preceding that of the earnings announcement, deflated by stock price at the end of quarter t −1 multiplied by 100, and OPLEV = the ratio between 
SALE (COMPUSTAT: saleq) minus COGS (COMPUSTAT: cogsq) and SALE, where winsorised at 0 and 1
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) FE 1            
(2) STRATEGY 0.007 1           
(3) PROS -0.011 0.544 1          
(4) DEF -0.027 -0.496 -0.071 1         
(5) STICKY 0.048 -0.048 -0.04 0.016 1        
(6) MV 0.071 -0.077 -0.105 -0.03 0.039 1       
(7) LOSS -0.175 0.185 0.191 -0.013 -0.097 -0.328 1      
(8) DOWN -0.066 -0.03 -0.016 0.017 -0.06 -0.046 0.147 1     
(9) VSALE -0.035 0.175 0.152 -0.048 -0.036 -0.209 0.277 0.001 1    
(10) DISPERSION -0.185 0.014 0.053 0.055 -0.022 -0.266 0.348 0.059 0.201 1   
(11) OPLEV 0.08 0.337 0.087 -0.212 -0.011 0.125 -0.1 -0.07 -0.078 -0.174 1  
(12) SEASON 0.004 0.064 0.028 -0.03 -0.06 0.014 -0.065 -0.278 -0.015 -0.027 0.062 1 
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5.6. Results Analysis 
Before discussing the main regression results, I first present results from the univariate 
tests of the relationship between my cost stickiness measure and the proxies for firm 
strategic type, to assist in the interpretation of the following hypothesis tests. Then, I 
report results of tests of the association between corporate strategy, cost stickiness and 
analyst forecast bias for the pooled sample and subsamples defined by the direction of 
sales changes. Finally, I perform additional tests examining the empirical relationships 
between corporate strategy, cost stickiness and analyst forecast accuracy, to shed further 
light the association between corporate strategy and analyst accuracy observed in Study 
Two. 
5.6.1. Univariate Tests of the Relationship between Cost Stickiness and 
Corporate Strategy 
Table 5.5 describes the relationship between my cost stickiness measure and proxies for 
firm’s strategic choices in term of raw stickiness (whether firms following different 
strategies exhibit values of STICKY that are significantly different from zero in either 
direction) and relative stickiness (the difference in means of STICKY across strategy 
types). I perform univariate mean and median tests to examining this association within 
different sample variations.  
Panel A of Table 5.5 present the statistics from the pooled sample. It shows that 
Prospectors and ‘other firms’ on average demonstrate significant cost stickiness, and that 
the degrees of cost stickiness is greater for Prospectors than for both ‘other firms’ and 
Defenders. Defenders’ cost behaviour is, on average, symmetric with STICKY being 
insignificantly different to zero. 
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Table 5.5 Mean and Median Values of STICKY for Prospectors, Defenders and Other Firms 
Panel A:All Observations      
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Other Firms PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean  0.0974*** -0.0065 0.0192*** 0.1039*** 0.0782*** -0.0257*** 
Median 0.0619 0.0004 0.0160 0.0615*** 0.0459*** -0.0156*** 
% +ve 0.569*** 0.502 0.538*** 0.067*** 0.031*** -0.036*** 
N 2,581 2,692 34,826 Total 40,099  
Panel B: Prior Sales Increase      
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Other Firms PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean  0.1310*** 0.0176* 0.0369*** 0.1135*** 0.0941*** -0.0237*** 
Median 0.0867 0.0151 0.0233 0.0716*** 0.0634** -0.0082 
% +ve 0.591*** 0.533*** 0.554*** 0.058*** 0.037*** -0.021 
N 1,610 1,454 20,505    
Panel C: Prior Sales Increase and Current Sales Increase    
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Other Firms PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean  0.1643*** 0.0406** 0.0527*** 0.1237*** 0.1116*** -0.0121 
Median 0.1115 0.0253 0.0351 0.0861*** 0.0763*** -0.0098 
% +ve 0.615*** 0.548* 0.570*** 0.057** 0.045*** -0.012 
N 949 729 10,976    
Panel D: Prior Sales Increase and Current Sales Decrease    
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Other Firms PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean  0.0832*** -0.0057 0.0189*** 0.0889*** 0.0643*** -0.0246 
Median 0.0449 0.0019 0.0130 0.0430*** 0.0318* -0.0111 
% +ve 0.555*** 0.507 0.535*** 0.047* 0.020 -0.027 
N 661 723 9,523    
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Panel E: Prior Sales Decrease      
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Other Firms PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean  0.0415* -0.0341*** -0.0061 0.0753*** 0.0476*** -0.0278** 
Median 0.0280 -0.0146 0.0063 0.0426*** 0.0217 -0.0209*** 
% +ve 0.534** 0.467** 0.517*** 0.067*** 0.017 -0.048*** 
N 969 1,234 14,304    
       
Panel F: Prior Sales Decrease and Current Sales Increase     
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Other Firms PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean  0.1051*** -0.0126 0.0105** 0.1177*** 0.0946*** -0.0231 
Median 0.0671 -0.0009 0.0108 0.0562** 0.0562*** -0.0117* 
% +ve 0.578*** 0.498 0.528*** 0.079*** 0.050** -0.030 
N 625 703 9,231    
       
Panel G: Prior Sales Decrease and Current Sales Decrease    
    Differences 
 PROSPECTOR DEFENDER Other Firms PROS vs DEF PROS vs OTHERS DEF vs OTHERS 
Mean  -0.0740** -0.0626*** -0.0362*** -0.0114 -0.0378 -0.0264 
Median -0.0388 -0.0341 -0.0009 -0.0048 -0.0380* -0.0332*** 
% +ve 0.454* 0.426*** 0.497 -0.027 0.044 -0.070*** 
N 344 530 5,064    
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Of greater interest, however, is the association between STICKY and strategy types 
conditional on the direction of prior and current sales changes. Panel B to D present the 
univariate statistics and comparisons across strategy types for cases where prior period 
sales increased. Across all such cases (Panel B), all strategy types are associated with 
sticky cost behaviour. However, the extent of cost stickiness is greater for Prospectors 
than for both ‘other firms’ and Defenders, and Defenders have significantly lower cost 
stickiness than ‘other firms’. Panels C and D show comparative statistics for cases of 
prior sales increase followed by current sales increases (Panel C) and followed by current 
sales decrease (Panel D). It is clear from these Panels that cases of consecutive sales 
increase drive the bulk of the cost stickiness observed in Panel B, and once again, that 
Prospectors have consistently stickier costs than all other firms. 
In Panels E to G, I report similar statistics for cases where there is a prior period sales 
decrease, and for which Banker et al. (2014) predict that firms should exhibit cost anti-
stickiness. Results in Panel E, though, show that only Defenders have significant anti-
stickiness in a sample comprising all cases of prior period sales decreases, and that 
Prospectors average stickiness for these cases remains significant positive. However, 
when the sample is further portioned according to the sign of the current period sales 
change, it can be seen that all strategic types demonstrate significantly anti-sticky costs 
in cases of consecutive sales decreases, and that there are no significant difference in cost 
asymmetry across strategic groups in this case.36  
In summary, I find that Prospectors show the strongest and most consistent evidence of 
divergence in the degree and direction of asymmetric cost behaviour relative to ‘other 
firms’. Prospectors have significant positive values of STICKY, and significantly more 
positive values of STICKY than ‘other firms’, in all samples other than the case of 
                                                 
36 Extracting year and industry fixed effects from my analysis of mean stickiness, and differences in mean 
stickiness leads to similar conclusions to those discussed here. For simplicity, I focus on the simple 
differences in means and medians.  
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consecutive decreases in sales. I thus expect that, if analysts recognise the systematically 
different cost behaviour of firms with traits similar to Prospectors, I should observe a 
lower sensitivity of analyst forecast bias to cost stickiness in these cases. Defenders, 
exhibit significantly lower stickiness than ‘other firms’ (and Prospectors) in the case of 
prior period sales increases, which may lead to greater forecast bias associated with the 
incidence of stickiness in those samples. 
5.6.2. Results for Corporate Strategy, Cost Stickiness and Forecast Bias 
I now present and analyse the results of tests of the association between corporate strategy, 
cost stickiness and analyst forecasts bias in this section. I start with the results from the 
pooled sample. 
5.6.2.1. Results for Regressions Using All Observations 
Table 5.6, Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions of signed forecast errors against 
measures of cost stickiness, corporate strategy and their interactions. Corporate strategic 
types are indicated by the dichotomous variables PROS and DEF. I employ two proxies 
for cost stickiness, the continuous measure, STICKY (Columns 2 to 3) and a dummy 
variable, DSTICKY (Columns 5 to 6) indicating firms with positive values of STICKY.  
To assist interpretation, I first present the results of regressions of separate regressions of 
forecast errors against strategy measure and cost stickiness (Columns 1, 2, and 4, 5) 
before reporting the results of the fully specified models (Columns 3 and 6). 
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Table 5.6 Regressions of Signed Forecast Errors on the Pooled Sample 
Panel A: Interaction Models       
   FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pred. Sign Using Continuous STICKY Using Dummy DSTICKY 
          
PROS ? 0.0294  0.0397 0.0294  0.0697 
  (0.385)  (0.244) (0.385)  (0.135) 
DEF ? -0.0541  -0.0571* -0.0541  0.0077 
  (0.109)  (0.091) (0.109)  (0.857) 
STICKY (DSTICKY) -  -0.0667*** -0.0540***  -0.0556*** -0.0433*** 
  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
PROS*STICKY (DSTICKY) +   -0.0770   -0.0696 
  
  (0.148)   (0.225) 
DEF*STICKY (DSTICKY) -   -0.0791   -0.1283** 
  
  (0.241)   (0.014) 
MV  -0.0440*** -0.0420** -0.0429** -0.0440*** -0.0420** -0.0429** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
LOSS  -0.3365*** -0.3281*** -0.3292*** -0.3365*** -0.3300*** -0.3308*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DOWN  -0.0434*** -0.0397*** -0.0398*** -0.0434*** -0.0394*** -0.0396*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VSALE  0.1817* 0.1773* 0.1738 0.1817* 0.1812* 0.1775* 
  (0.087) (0.095) (0.102) (0.087) (0.088) (0.094) 
DISPERSION  -31.8365*** -31.9922*** -31.9721*** -31.8365*** -31.8918*** -31.8840*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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OPLEV  1.0925*** 1.0901*** 1.0897*** 1.0925*** 1.0874*** 1.0854*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEASON  -0.0196** -0.0148 -0.0152 -0.0196** -0.0153 -0.0156 
  (0.045) (0.130) (0.119) (0.045) (0.119) (0.110) 
Constant  -0.1083 -0.1213 -0.1148 -0.1083 -0.0924 -0.0912 
  (0.380) (0.328) (0.351) (0.380) (0.455) (0.459) 
        
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  40,099 40,099 40,099 40,099 40,099 40,099 
R-squared  0.063 0.065 0.065 0.063 0.064 0.065 
Number of firm group   1,995 1,995 1,995 1,995 1,995 1,995 
        
Panel B: Regressions Within Strategy Types       
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Using Continuous STICKY Using Dummy DSTICKY 
VARIABLES  Prospectors Defenders Other Firms Prospectors Defenders Other Firms 
          
STICKY (DSTICKY)  -0.1308** -0.1229** -0.0538*** -0.1212* -0.1627*** -0.0426*** 
  (0.032) (0.024) (0.000) (0.077) (0.002) (0.000) 
Constant  0.6684 -1.9712** -0.0862 0.7214 -1.8682** -0.0651 
  (0.181) (0.021) (0.494) (0.153) (0.030) (0.605) 
        
Controls Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
 241 
 
Two-tailed clustered robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE =  The consensus forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated 
by lagged stock price, for all analysts covering the firm within the 30-day window leading up to the quarterly earnings announcement,  multiplied by 100, 
STICKY = the negative of the difference between the logarithms of the mean slopes of cost adjustments when sales decrease and those when sales increase, 
observed over the past 8 quarters,  DSTICKY = A dichotomous variable indicating positive values of STICKY (as calculated above) where it equals to 1 if the 
firms’ change in cost to sales ratio is equal or smaller than 0, otherwise 0, PROS = an indicator variable for Prospector firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF = an indicator variable for Defender firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 
0 otherwise, MV = log of market value of equity at quarter end using Compustat data (prccq*cshoq), LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the income 
before extraordinary items in the current quarter (COMPUSTAT: ibq) is negative for the covered firm, and 0 otherwise, DOWN = an indicator variable, equal 
to 1 if there is a negative earnings surprise, and 0 otherwise, VSALE = sales volatility measured by the ratio of standard deviation to mean of sales over the four 
quarters from t-3 through t, DISPERSION = the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts announced for firm i in quarter t in the month immediately preceding 
that of the earnings announcement, deflated by stock price at the end of quarter t −1 multiplied by 100, and OPLEV = the ratio between SALE (COMPUSTAT: 
saleq) minus COGS (COMPUSTAT: cogsq) and SALE, where winsorised at 0 and 1. 
Observations  2,581 2,692 34,826 2,581 2,692 34,826 
R-squared  0.054 0.236 0.057 0.052 0.238 0.057 
Number of firm group   386 239 1,808 386 239 1,808 
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All models have an adjusted R2 of approximately 6.5%, which is reasonable for models 
that do not include the size of the current period earnings change.37 In Column 1 (and the 
identical regression in Column 3), I report results of regressions against my strategy 
indicators and controls. The results suggest that the forecast errors for Prospectors are no 
different from those for ‘other firms’ (PROS: β = 0.0294, p = 0.385), while the coefficient 
on DEF is close to significant in a two-tailed test (β = -0.0541, p = 0.109) suggesting that 
Defenders are likely to be, on average,  associated with more optimistic forecast errors 
relative to ‘other firms’. In Column 2 and 5, I report regressions of forecast errors against 
STICKY and DSTICKY, respectively. Both coefficients are significantly negative, 
confirming the prediction in Hypothesis 1 that the degree (incidence) of cost stickiness is 
associated with forecast optimism if analysts are not able to fully understand past and 
future cost stickiness and incorporate this into their forecasts. In Columns 3 and 6, I 
examine the extent to which the impact of cost stickiness on forecast bias is moderated 
by corporate strategy. Recall from Table 5.5, that for the sample of all firm-quarters, 
Prospectors demonstrated significantly greater cost stickiness than ‘other firms’, who in 
turn demonstrated greater cost stickiness than Defenders. The average cost stickiness of 
Defenders is, indeed, insignificantly different to zero, and so when a Defender does 
demonstrate sticky costs this is less likely to be predictable than when ‘other firms’ or 
Prospectors do so. The results in Columns 3 and 6 provide some evidence to support my 
contention that the impact of cost stickiness on forecast bias is reduced (increased) for 
strategic types where the occurrence of sticky cost should be more (less) predictable. The 
coefficient for STICKY (DSTICKY), which measures the average effect of cost 
stickiness for ‘other firms’ is negative and significant for both stickiness measures. The 
interaction term DEF*DSTICKY is negative and significant (β = -0.1283, p = 0.014), 
consistent with lower predictability of the cost stickiness for Defender reinforcing the 
                                                 
37 If I control for the change in earnings my adjusted-R2 statistics climb to over 30%, with no substantive 
effect on the coefficients for the test variables.  
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impact of cost stickiness on forecast errors when such stickiness occurs. Even though the 
interaction term of DEF*STICKY is insignificant, it is still consistent with the predicted 
sign (β = -0.0791, p = 0.241). However, the coefficients for the interaction terms 
involving Prospector and cost stickiness are both insignificant (PROS*STICKY: β = -
0.0770, p = 0.148; PROS*DSTICKY: β = -0.0.0696, p = 0.225), suggesting that the 
impact of realised cost stickiness on forecast errors is no different between Prospectors 
and ‘other firms’. Together, these results suggest analysts seem to only recognise the 
lower probability of Defenders’ costs being sticky, but not the greater predictability of 
cost stickiness for Prospectors.  
In Panel B of Table 5.6, I report the results of regressions of forecast errors within samples 
defined by strategy types. Again, the first three columns are based on the continuous 
measure of stickiness (STICKY) and the last three columns use the dichotomous measure 
of stickiness (DSTICKY).  In Column 4 to 6, Defenders, who have the lowest likelihood 
of demonstrating asymmetric cost behaviour, exhibit the strongest association between 
DSTICKY and the optimistic forecast errors. This is consistent with the incidence of 
stickiness for these firms being relatively surprising. However, the coefficient on 
STICKY (DSTICKY) for Prospector are both negative and significant, greater than the 
equivalent coefficient for ‘other firms’. Once more, this is consistent with analyst not 
recognising Prospectors’ greater likelihood of demonstrating sticky cost behaviour. 
5.6.2.2. Results for Subsamples Conditioned by Prior Sales Changes 
In Table 5.7, I report results of regressions on samples defined by the sign of the prior 
period sales change. Banker et al. (2014) predict and show that average cost stickiness is 
only positive in cases where the prior period sale change was positive, and that firms, on 
average, have anti-sticky costs (i.e. –ve values of STICKY) when prior period sales 
changes are negative. For ease of interpretation and brevity, I tabulate results using the 
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  Table 5.7 Regressions of Forecast Errors Conditional on Signed of Prior Period Sales Change    
 FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Prior Sales Increase Prior Sales Decrease 
        
PROS 0.0188  0.0565 0.0282  0.0845 
 (0.599)  (0.273) (0.586)  (0.251) 
DEF -0.0478  0.0145 -0.0424  0.0410 
 (0.182)  (0.718) (0.378)  (0.548) 
DSTICKY  -0.0597*** -0.0489***  -0.0634*** -0.0438*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003) 
PROS*DSTICKY    -0.0609   -0.1081 
   (0.401)   (0.238) 
DEF*DSTICKY    -0.1185**   -0.1906** 
   (0.017)   (0.028) 
MV -0.0753*** -0.0737*** -0.0742*** -0.0104 -0.0081 -0.0092 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.684) (0.754) (0.719) 
LOSS -0.3334*** -0.3250*** -0.3255*** -0.2775*** -0.2718*** -0.2726*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DOWN -0.0214 -0.0161 -0.0164 0.0267 0.0347* 0.0350* 
 (0.153) (0.284) (0.275) (0.136) (0.054) (0.051) 
VSALE 0.4121*** 0.4119*** 0.4077*** -0.2264* -0.2279* -0.2321* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.099) (0.096) (0.089) 
DISPERSION -6.7306 -6.7032 -6.6626 -46.3260*** -46.4354*** -46.4635*** 
 (0.425) (0.427) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPLEV 0.8344*** 0.8254*** 0.8252*** 1.2501*** 1.2463*** 1.2413*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEASON -0.0352*** -0.0320** -0.0321** -0.0198 -0.0153 -0.0158 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.252) (0.378) (0.363) 
Constant 0.1737 0.1976 0.1959 -0.4688*** -0.4573** -0.4556** 
 (0.179) (0.128) (0.131) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 23,226 23,226 23,226 16,855 16,855 16,855 
R-squared 0.042 0.044 0.044 0.087 0.088 0.089 
Number of firm group 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,825 1,825 1,825 
Two-tailed clustered robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE =  The consensus forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated 
by lagged stock price, for all analysts covering the firm within the 30-day window leading up to the quarterly earnings announcement,  multiplied by 100, 
STICKY = the negative of the difference between the logarithms of the mean slopes of cost adjustments when sales decrease and those when sales increase, 
observed over the past 8 quarters,  DSTICKY = A dichotomous variable indicating positive values of STICKY (as calculated above) where it equals to 1 if the 
firms’ change in cost to sales ratio is equal or smaller than 0, otherwise 0, PROS = an indicator variable for Prospector firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY 
score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF = an indicator variable for Defender firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 
0 otherwise, MV = log of market value of equity at quarter end using Compustat data (prccq*cshoq), LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the income 
before extraordinary items in the current quarter (COMPUSTAT: ibq) is negative for the covered firm, and 0 otherwise, DOWN = an indicator variable, equal 
to 1 if there is a negative earnings surprise, and 0 otherwise, VSALE = sales volatility measured by the ratio of standard deviation to mean of sales over the four 
quarters from t-3 through t, DISPERSION = the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts announced for firm i in quarter t in the month immediately preceding 
that of the earnings announcement, deflated by stock price at the end of quarter t −1 multiplied by 100, and OPLEV = the ratio between SALE (COMPUSTAT: 
saleq) minus COGS (COMPUSTAT: cogsq) and SALE, where winsorised at 0 and 1. 
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dichotomous indicator of the direction of observed cost stickiness (DSTICKY) only, 
however untabulated regressions using the continuous measure STICKY lead to similar 
inferences in all subsequent tests. Columns 1 to 3 (Columns 4 to 6) report regressions for 
the sub-sample of cases where prior period sales increased (decreased). 
Turning initially to the regressions of forecast errors against strategy type (Columns 1 
and 4), there is no evidence to suggest that the forecast errors for Prospectors (Defenders) 
differ according to the sign of prior sales changes. The impact of cost stickiness on 
forecast errors (Columns 2 and 5), however, is barely (and insignificantly) different across 
the two samples.38  
In Column 3, I report tests of the potential moderating effect of corporate strategy on the 
association between cost stickiness and forecast errors for cases of prior period sales 
increases. Recall, that for the sample of cases with prior period sales increases, 
Prospectors demonstrated an abnormally high degree of cost stickiness, and Defenders 
demonstrated an abnormally low degree of cost stickiness (Table 5.5, Panel B). The 
coefficient for DSTICKY is, once more, negative and significant (β = -0.0489, p = <0.01), 
and while the coefficient on PROS*DSTICKY is not significant (β = 0.0609, p = 0.401), 
and the aggregate effect of stickiness on forecast errors for Prospectors (DSTICKY + 
PROS*DSTICKY = -0.1098, p = 0.128) is insignificant in a two-tailed test. Once more, 
the interaction between DSTICKY and Defender status is significantly negative (β = -
0.1185, p = 0.017); Defenders are less likely to exhibit sticky costs than ‘other firms’, so 
when Defenders do experience such cost behaviour it is more of a shock to analysts. 
However, the contrast between the effect size of DSTICKY across Prospector and 
Defenders (PROS*DSTICKY-DEF*DSTICKY: β = 0. 0575, p = 0.507) is positive but 
                                                 
38 This is not inconsistent with the findings in Banker et al. (2014). The coefficient for DSTICKY in the 
case of prior sales declines (when the average firm should exhibit anti-sticky costs) can be thought of as 
the inverse of a coefficient for a dummy variable indicating anti-stickiness. There is no reason why analysts 
should understand anti-stickiness any more thoroughly than they understand stickiness. 
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insignificant which may suggest that analysts’ understanding of the association between 
strategy and cost stickiness are asymmetric. 
In Column 6, I report the results of similar tests for the subsample of prior sales decreases. 
The coefficient for STICKY is negative and significant (β = -0.0438, p = 0.003). While 
Banker et al. (2014) predicted that the average firm will exhibit cost anti-stickiness in 
such cases, the mean comparisons reported in Table 5.5 reveal that Prospectors, on 
average, have sticky costs in these cases, and that their costs are significantly more sticky 
than ‘other firms’ and Defenders. Inconsistent with analysts recognising this trait, the 
coefficient for the PROS*STICKY is negative and insignificant for this sample. Once 
more, Defenders have a significantly lower level of cost stickiness (and indeed significant 
anti-stickiness), and thus the incidence of positive cost stickiness should be relatively 
surprising to the market. Consistent with this proposition, the interaction between DEF 
and DSTICKY (β = -0.1906, p = 0.028) is once more negative and significant.  
5.6.3.3. Results from the Subsamples Conditioned by Prior and Current Sales 
Changes 
Table 5.8 presents the results of regressions conditioned on both the sign of the prior 
period sales change and the sign of the current period sales changes. For brevity, I report 
only the fully specified models. In all sub-samples, the coefficient for DSTICKY is 
negative and significant, consistent with prediction for Hypothesis 1. Column 1 provides 
results regressions estimated on cases of prior and current sales increases. In this sample 
the difference between Prospectors cost stickiness and that of ‘other firms’ and Defenders 
is at its greatest. However, the coefficient for PROS*DSTICKY is positive but 
insignificant (β = 0.0332, p = 0.722) which suggests that analysts do not recognise the 
greater expected level of stickiness for Prospectors in these cases. Unlike the full sample, 
the cost stickiness exhibited by Defenders in cases of consecutive sales increases is not 
significantly different to that of ‘other firms’, and thus it would seem less likely that 
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Defender status would condition the analyst response to cost stickiness. Consistent with 
this conjecture, the coefficient for DEF*DSTICKY is insignificant.  
Table 5.8 Regressions of Forecast Errors Conditional on Both Prior and Current 
Sales Changes 
  FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Prior Inc/ 
Curr Inc 
Prior Inc/ Curr 
Dec 
Prior Dec/ Curr 
Inc 
Prior Dec/ Curr 
Dec 
      
PROS -0.0251 0.1487** 0.1254 -0.0034 
 (0.656) (0.025) (0.118) (0.984) 
DEF 0.0686 0.0400 -0.0230 0.0489 
 (0.291) (0.445) (0.661) (0.714) 
DSTICKY -0.0306** -0.0414*** -0.0566*** -0.0460 
 (0.023) (0.008) (0.000) (0.172) 
DSTICKY*PROS 0.0332 -0.0801 -0.1136 -0.2612 
 (0.722) (0.352) (0.272) (0.195) 
DSTICKY*DEF -0.0690 -0.2376*** -0.1756** -0.1842 
 (0.296) (0.006) (0.023) (0.255) 
Constant 0.0182 -0.3731* 0.1497 -0.6377* 
 (0.900) (0.069) (0.429) (0.064) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 12,654 10,907 10,559 5,938 
R-squared 0.049 0.079 0.047 0.097 
Number of firm 
group 1,603 1,711 1,668 1,348 
Two-tailed clustered robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE =  The 
consensus forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by lagged stock price, for all 
analysts covering the firm within the 30-day window leading up to the quarterly earnings 
announcement,  multiplied by 100, STICKY = the negative of the difference between the 
logarithms of the mean slopes of cost adjustments when sales decrease and those when sales 
increase, observed over the past 8 quarters,  DSTICKY = A dichotomous variable indicating 
positive values of STICKY (as calculated above) where it equals to 1 if the firms’ change in cost 
to sales ratio is equal or smaller than 0, otherwise 0, PROS = an indicator variable for Prospector 
firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF = an 
indicator variable for Defender firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 
12, and 0 otherwise, MV = log of market value of equity at quarter end using Compustat data 
(prccq*cshoq), LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the income before extraordinary items 
in the current quarter (COMPUSTAT: ibq) is negative for the covered firm, and 0 otherwise, 
DOWN = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if there is a negative earnings surprise, and 0 otherwise, 
VSALE = sales volatility measured by the ratio of standard deviation to mean of sales over the 
four quarters from t-3 through t, DISPERSION = the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts 
announced for firm i in quarter t in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings 
announcement, deflated by stock price at the end of quarter t −1 multiplied by 100, and OPLEV 
= the ratio between SALE (COMPUSTAT: saleq) minus COGS (COMPUSTAT: cogsq) and 
SALE, winsorised at 0 and 1. 
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Column 2 reports results for cases of prior sales increases followed by a current sales 
decrease.  Although Prospectors have significantly greater mean cost stickiness than 
‘other firms’ in this sample, the proportion of positive observations of DSTICKY is not 
different for Prospectors relative to ‘other firms’ (Table 5.5, Panel D). I find no evidence 
that the association between DSTICKY and forecast errors is weaker for Prospectors. 
This seems to further support that analysts’ inability to deal with cost stickiness for 
Prospectors. For Defenders, the results from the prior sales increase and currents sales 
decrease subsample are consistent with the findings in the pooled sample. The coefficient 
on DEF*DSTICKY is negative and significant (β = -0.2376, p = 0.006). While the mean 
differences tabulated in Table 5.5 Panel D suggest that Defender’s observed cost 
stickiness is not significantly lower than that of ‘other firms’, the difference is negative 
and would be significant in a one-tailed test of differences (two-tailed p-value = 0.156). 
This may suggest that it is possible for analysts to have sufficient confidence in the 
predictability of Defenders’ cost behaviour to enable them to incorporate this into their 
forecasts. 
The regressions in Column 3 are estimated on cases of prior sales decrease and current 
sales increase, a sub-sample for which Prospectors exhibit significantly greater stickiness 
than ‘other firms’. The coefficient for PROS*DSTICKY is still negative and insignificant 
(β = -0.1136, p = 0.272), but the aggregate coefficient for DSTICKY + PROS*DSTICKY 
is significant at 10% suggesting analysts fail to recognise the greater likelihood of cost 
stickiness for Prospector in this situation. For Defenders, for whom earlier mean 
comparisons (Table 5.5, Panel F) showed some evidence of a lower degree of cost 
stickiness than ‘other firms’, the coefficient for DEF*DSTICKY is negative and 
significant (β = -0.1756, p = 0.023). This is consistent with the incidence of sticky costs 
being more likely to surprise analysts. The contrast across the incremental effects of 
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Prospector and Defender status on the association between stickiness and forecast errors 
is still insignificant (PROS*DSTICKY – DEF*DSTICKY = -0.0769, p = 0.765). 
Finally, Column 4 presents results of regressions results estimated on case of consecutive 
sales decreases. Within this sample, all strategic types demonstrate anti-sticky costs, and 
the only differences across groups concern Defenders and ‘other firms’. While Defenders 
appear to demonstrate less stickiness (stronger anti-stickiness) than ‘other firms’, the 
mean difference in the depth of stickiness was not significant across Defenders and ‘other 
firms’. However there are significant differences in medians and in the proportion of 
positive observations of STICKY (Table 5.5, Panel G).  The coefficient for 
DEF*DSTICKY is negative but insignificant (β = -0.1842, p = 0.255). This may suggest 
that analysts are less surprised by the incidence of sticky costs because of the cost 
differences between Defenders with sticky and anti-sticky costs are very small in these 
cases.  
5.6.3.4. Robustness Tests 
Non-Linearities in the Forecast Error-Cost Stickiness Relation 
Because my strategy types are associated with different mean levels of STICKY, it is 
plausible that they may be associated with non-linearities in the association between 
forecast errors and the degree and direction of stickiness. To control for this possibility I 
re-estimated the regressions including the square of STICKY (the negative of the square 
of STICKY where STICKY < 0), and the interaction between this non-linear term and 
each of the strategy types.  The addition of these variables universally increased the 
strength of the tabulated results because, to the extent that non-linearities exist in any 
particular tabulated model, they work against my findings; that is, the association between 
forecast errors and STICKY is mildly declining in the absolute value of STICKY.  
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Alternate and Additional Controls 
The tenor of my results is unaffected by the exclusion of controls that are a function of 
current period outcomes (DOWN, LOSS, SEASON), or the addition of a controls for the 
magnitude of current period sales changes, the change in earnings and firm life cycle. My 
tabulated models follow Weiss (2010) and included year fixed effects. Substituting 
quarter fixed-effects (as per Ciftci et al. 2016) has no substantive impact on the tabulated 
results.  
Fama-Macbeth Regressions 
I re-estimated my tabulated models using the Fama-Macbeth technique, thereby allowing 
for the models to assume different functional form in each quarter. The results from these 
regressions are similar to those tabulated, with the significance of interactions between 
STICKY and DEF being slightly lower in regressions conditioned on prior sales increases 
(though still significant at the 10% confidence level).  
In summary, the tests of the association between cost stickiness and analyst forecast 
accuracy find that the incidences of cost stickiness increases analyst forecast optimism in 
all samples (the pooled and also subsamples conditional by the directions of prior and 
current sales changes). Further, the tests of the moderating impacts of corporate strategy 
on the association between cost stickiness and forecast optimism suggests this association 
between cost stickiness and forecast optimism reduces (increases) for strategy types that 
are more (less) likely to exhibit cost stickiness. For example, Prospectors who exhibit 
sticky cost behaviour are associated with lower forecast optimism than ‘other firms’ and 
Defenders in general, in periods of prior sales decreases and in periods of two consecutive 
prior sales increases. Whereas, Defenders who exhibit sticky cost behaviour are 
associated with greater forecast optimism than all other firms in general and in cases of 
prior sales increases and prior sales decreases (followed by both a period of current period 
sales increase and decrease). 
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5.6.3. Additional Tests  
Even though the primary purpose of my study is to examine how analysts’ understanding 
of firms’ asymmetric cost behaviour affect forecasting efficiency reflected in signed 
forecast errors, my results may enhance our  understanding of how firms’ strategic choice 
affects analyst forecast accuracy, as observed in Study Two. Therefore, I re-estimate 
Models 1 and 2 using analysts’ forecast accuracy (the negative of the absolute forecast 
error) as the dependent variable, similar to Weiss (2010).39 Like my signed forecast errors, 
I scale absolute forecast errors by a factor of 100 to aid interpretation of regression 
coefficients. 
Table 5.9  provides the results from OLS regression of absolute forecast errors against 
measures of cost stickiness, corporate strategy and their interactions using the full sample, 
and samples conditioned on the sign of prior period sales changes.  
The adjusted R2 of the various models ranging from 36.2% to 43.4%, with stronger 
explanatory power in regressions for samples with prior sales decreases. The results of 
regression against the strategy dummies and controls using the full sample are reported 
in Column 1.  The results suggest that the forecast accuracy for both Prospectors and 
Defenders are indifferent from those for ‘other firms’, even though the two coefficients 
have opposite signs (PROS: β = 0.0100, p = 0.679; DEF: β = -0.0043, p = 0.863). These 
results are not inconsistent with results in Study Two as I include different controls in this 
regression (e.g. DISPERSION). Further, I examine whether the association between 
accuracy and corporate strategy is conditioned by the level of cost stickiness, by including 
STICKY and its interaction with each strategy indicator in the regression reported in 
Column 2. It appears that the forecast accuracy for both Prospectors and Defenders are  
                                                 
39 Weiss (2010) uses the absolute forecast error, rather than the negative transformation of this variable. 
For consistency with Study Two, and Bentley-Goode et al. (2017), I use the negative transformation.  
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Table 5.9 Regressions of Forecast Accuracy on the Pooled Sample and Conditional on Sign of Prior Period Sales Change    
   ACCURACY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pred. Sign Full Sample Prior Increase Prior Decrease 
          
PROS + 0.0100 0.0124 0.0331 0.0335 -0.0431 -0.0385 
  (0.679) (0.608) (0.229) (0.232) (0.296) (0.355) 
DEF - -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0074 -0.0071 -0.0020 -0.0048 
  (0.863) (0.861) (0.789) (0.797) (0.957) (0.903) 
STICKY ?  0.0045  0.0079  0.0029 
   (0.627)  (0.439)  (0.853) 
PROS*STICKY  ?  -0.0278  -0.0079  -0.0704 
   (0.434)  (0.844)  (0.242) 
DEF*STICKY  ?  -0.0153  -0.0147  -0.0532 
   (0.761)  (0.772)  (0.521) 
MV + 0.1874*** 0.1874*** 0.1649*** 0.1650*** 0.2081*** 0.2085*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS - -0.1164*** -0.1166*** -0.1356*** -0.1365*** -0.0818*** -0.0812*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DOWN + 0.0492*** 0.0492*** 0.0444*** 0.0441*** 0.0532*** 0.0537*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VSALE - -0.3619*** -0.3625*** -0.3310*** -0.3305*** -0.3463*** -0.3526*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISPERSION - -88.2968*** -88.2990*** -81.3144*** -81.3064*** -92.6843*** -92.7215*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPLEV - 0.0827 0.0837 0.0397 0.0401 0.1086 0.1104 
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  (0.321) (0.316) (0.707) (0.705) (0.372) (0.364) 
SEASON - 0.0118* 0.0118* -0.0014 -0.0018 0.0349*** 0.0354*** 
  (0.093) (0.095) (0.866) (0.824) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant  -1.4021*** -1.4027*** -1.2462*** -1.2466*** -1.5755*** -1.5788*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  40,099 40,099 23,569 23,569 16,507 16,507 
R-squared  0.298 0.298 0.259 0.259 0.337 0.337 
Number of firm group   1,995 1,995 1,870 1,870 1,795 1,795 
Two-tailed clustered robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ACCURACY =  the negative of the absolute value of the consensus 
forecast error (actual EPS – forecast EPS) deflated by lagged stock price, for all analysts covering the firm within the 30-day window leading up to the quarterly 
earnings announcement,  multiplied by 100, STICKY = the negative of the difference between the logarithms of the mean slopes of cost adjustments when sales 
decrease and those when sales increase, observed over the past 8 quarters,  DSTICKY = A dichotomous variable indicating positive values of STICKY (as 
calculated above) where it equals to 1 if the firms’ change in cost to sales ratio is equal or smaller than 0, otherwise 0, PROS = an indicator variable for 
Prospector firm-years, equal to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 24 and 30, and 0 otherwise, DEF = an indicator variable for Defender firm-years, equal 
to 1 if the STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, and 0 otherwise, MV = log of market value of equity at quarter end using Compustat data (prccq*cshoq), 
LOSS = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the income before extraordinary items in the current quarter (COMPUSTAT: ibq) is negative for the covered firm, 
and 0 otherwise, DOWN = an indicator variable, equal to 1 if there is a negative earnings surprise, and 0 otherwise, VSALE = sales volatility measured by the 
ratio of standard deviation to mean of sales over the four quarters from t-3 through t, DISPERSION = the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts announced 
for firm i in quarter t in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings announcement, deflated by stock price at the end of quarter t −1 multiplied by 
100, and OPLEV = the ratio between SALE (COMPUSTAT: saleq) minus COGS (COMPUSTAT: cogsq) and SALE, where winsorised at 0 and 1.  
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not explained by the incidences of cost stickiness (PROS*STICKY: β = 0.0367, p = 0.243; 
DEF*STICKY: β = -0.0501, p = 0.270). As shown in Section 5.2.4.1, the association 
between accuracy, cost stickiness and analysts’ understanding of cost stickiness differs 
according to the likelihood of sales decreases / increases. Analysts with an ability to 
predict the degree of positive cost stickiness only generate lower absolute forecast errors 
if the probability of a sales decrease exceeds 50%, and are outperformed by naïve analysts 
if the probability of a sales increase is greater than 50%. Consequently, in Columns 3 to 
6, I report results of regressions on samples defined by the sign of the prior period sales 
change, which Banker et al. (2014) argue may proxy for average expectations of future 
sales changes. Columns 3 and 4 (Columns 5 and 6) report regressions for the sub-sample 
of cases where prior period sales increased (decreased).  
For the regression that include strategy indicators only (Columns 3 and 5), it can be seen 
that, on average, strategic type has no significant effect in either case of prior period sales 
increased or decreased. 
Recall from Table 5.5, Panel E, that for the sample of cases with prior period sales 
decreases, Prospectors demonstrated an abnormally high degree of cost stickiness, and 
Defenders demonstrated an abnormally low (negative) degree of cost stickiness. Further, 
recall that under the Ciftci model, superior understanding of cost stickiness only improves 
accuracy (reduces absolute forecast errors) in cases where there is a greater than 50% 
probability of a sales decline.  Thus, in the sample where there is a greater chance of a 
future decline, and assuming analysts have some understanding of cost stickiness, 
absolute forecast errors increase  (accuracy decreases) where realised cost stickiness is 
greater than the level of stickiness normally associated with a strategic type. However, 
there is no evidence that cost stickiness explains the accuracy of forecasts for both 
Prospectors and Defenders in the sub-sample of prior sales decreases (Column 6). 
Similarly, for the sub-sample of prior period sales increases (Column 4), there is no 
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evidence that the level of cost stickiness mediates the association between strategic types 
and absolute forecast errors. However, if the predictions of the Ciftci et al. (2016) model 
hold true empirically, greater understanding of cost stickiness may actually result in larger 
absolute forecast errors (even though average forecast bias will be closer to zero), and 
this may partially explain the insignificant results of the prior sales decrease and prior 
sales increase regressions.  
In sum, the accuracy tests provide no evidence to support that cost stickiness has a 
potential impact on the association between firm strategy and analyst forecast accuracy, 
regardless of the likelihood of future sales changes (indicated by prior sales changes).40 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
Study Three examines the extent to which corporate strategy (as proxied by Miles and 
Snow’s strategic types) is associated with asymmetric cost behaviour, and the extent to 
which historic trends in the strategy-cost behaviour relationship are associated with more 
efficient analyst response to the level and incidence of sticky cost in earnings. My findings 
show that Prospectors are generally associated with more sticky costs than both Defenders 
and ‘other firms’. Defenders, on the other hand have a lesser degree and incidence of cost 
stickiness than ‘other firms’. Regressions of analyst signed forecast errors against 
measures of cost stickiness show a significant negative relation (i.e. stickiness induces 
excess optimism), consistent with analysts being unable to perfectly incorporate realised 
cost stickiness in their earnings forecasts. However, I find that for strategic types with a 
                                                 
40 A further reason to treat these results cautiously is that the average association between ACCURACY 
and STICKY and my regressions differs from findings reported by Weiss (2010). Weiss (2010) finds that 
the equivalent measure of stickiness significantly reduces accuracy (increases absolute forecast errors). 
Untabulated regressions omitting strategy variables generate an insignificant positive coefficient for 
STICKY (p = 0.149).  However, if I test the association between STICKY (Weiss’ M_STICKY) over Weiss’ 
sample period (1985-2005), I observe a negative coefficient for STICKY with a two-tailed p-value of 0.18. 
The average empirical association between STICKY and accuracy appear to be quite sensitive to variation 
in sample years. 
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lesser likelihood of demonstrating sticky cost behaviour, that the association between 
signed forecast errors and the degree or incidence of cost stickiness is increased, but not 
the opposite in true. My findings support the argument that, at least to some extent, 
analysts recognise differences in the likelihood of sticky cost behaviour across firms 
according to fundamental attributes.  
The findings in this study have implications for our understanding of analyst behaviour. 
While earlier research (Ciftci et al. 2016) cast severe doubt on analysts’ ability to adjust 
their forecasts to accommodate future asymmetric cost behaviour, I show that in 
circumstance where future cost behaviour should be more predictable, that analyst 
forecast errors associated with stickiness appear to be reduced, consistent with analysts 
having an understanding of asymmetric cost behaviour. My study emphasise that there is 
a difference between analysts’ understanding the principles of asymmetric cost behaviour 
and being able to predict when such behaviour will impact expected earnings, because 
the impact on predicted earnings is conditional on expectations of future demand. My 
findings may also shed a light on the literature related to the impacts of cost stickiness on 
predictability of firms’ earnings (e.g. Weiss 2010), to discuss circumstances where cost 
stickiness might have a differential impact on analyst forecast accuracy. 
The findings from the additional test also enhance our understanding of how firms’ 
strategic choice affects analyst forecast accuracy, as observed in Study Two. My result 
seems to suggest that cost stickiness do not affect the observed positive association 
between firm strategy and analyst forecast accuracy. Both my Study Two and Bentley-
Goode et al. (2017) find that Defenders are generally associated with lower forecast 
accuracy, even though these firms have lower ex ante information asymmetry because of 
the stability of their business operations. Bentley-Goode et al. (2017) explain this 
association by the impact of Defenders’ low disclosure that increases the analyst task 
complexity in forecasting earnings. My findings rule out an alternative explanation that 
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may affect the observed association between firm strategy and forecast accuracy. 
However, these results may be driven by the limitation of using prior sales changes to 
proxy for the probability of future sales changes. Future research may consider to examine 
this association further by using the analyst sales forecasts as an expectation of future 
sales changes as the association between cost stickiness and forecast accuracy may be 
non-linear based on the theoretical model by Ciftci et al. (2016). 
My study extends the literature on how firms’ cost behaviour affect analyst forecasting 
process and help use to understand how analysts can use strategic information to improve 
the predictability of firms’ cost behaviour, and in turn increase their forecasting efficiency. 
It might be interesting to examine whether this impact of improved efficiency (reduced 
bias) in analyst forecasts are translated into reduced bias in analyst recommendations. 
Also, it is possible to examine whether analysts understand the association between 
corporate strategy and firms’ sticky cost behaviour by their decision to cover a firm 
following a particular strategy, as it is shown in this study that Prospectors are likely to 
exhibit sticky costs, while Defenders’ asymmetric cost behaviour are more complex. 
Therefore, the lower coverage associated with Defenders compared to Prospectors 
observed in Study One might be affected by analysts’ understanding of firms’ asymmetric 
cost behaviour as well. 
Finally, my study provide some insights for investors, especially less sophisticated 
investors who are less likely to detect the association between business strategy and its 
firms’ asymmetric cost behaviour, and therefore are misled by analyst forecasts. The 
findings form my study may help investors to differentiate between situations where 
analysts are more likely to make biased forecasts by the corporate strategy the firm is 
following. 
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Appendix 5.1 Calculation of the Absolute and Signed Forecast Errors in Table 5.1 
 
X̂ =  αXL + (1 − α)XH = (1 − v)Ŝ − F0 − αβ(S−1 − SL)                                              (1) 
E(AbsFE) =   α[abs(XL − X̂)] + (1 − α)[abs(XH − X̂) ]                                               (2) 
 
E(FE)        =    α(XL − X̂)  + (1 − α)(XH − X̂)                                                                  (3) 
 
From Ciftci et al.’s (2016) footnote 3 (p.59):  
 SH = 1100, SL = 900, F = 100, v = 0.5, S-1=1000 
 Probability of a sales decrease (α = 0.5)   
 The level of sticky costs (β = -0.2). 
 
The calculation of the absolute and signed forecast errors for ‘expert’ analysts: 
 Ŝ   = 0.5*900 + (1-0.5)*1100 = 1000 
 XL = SL – CL = 900 – [100 + 0.5*900 – 0.2*(900-1000)] = 900 – 570 = 330 
 XH = SH – CH = 1100 – [100 + (1- 0.5)*1100] = 1100 – 650 = 450 
 X̂ = (1 – 0.5)*330 – 0.5*450 or (1-0.5)*1000 -100 - 0.5*0.2(1000 - 900) = 390 
 E(AbsFE) = 0.5*[abs (330 – 390)] + (1 - 0.5)*[abs (450 – 390)] = 0.5*60 + 0.5*60 = 60 
 E(FE) = 0.5*(330 – 390) + (1 – 0.5)*(450 – 390) = 0.5*-60 + 0.5*60 = 0 
 
The calculation of the absolute and signed forecast errors for ‘naive’ analysts (who 
forecast asymmetric costs): 
 XL = SL – CL = 900 – [100 + 0.5*900] = 900 – 570 = 350,  XH = 450  
 X̂ = (1 – 0.5)*350 – 0.5*450 or (1-0.5)*1000 -100 = 400 
 However, the true expected profits are still XL =330 and XH=450. Thus, 
 E(AbsFE) = 0.5*[abs (330– 400)] + (1 - 0.5)*[abs (450 – 400)] = 0.5*70 + 0.5*50 = 60 
 E(FE) = 0.5*(330 – 400) + (1 – 0.5)*(450 – 400) = 0.5*-70 + 0.5*50 = -10 
 
Therefore, there is no difference in the absolute forecast errors between expert and naïve 
analysts (60-60=0); while there is difference in the signed forecast errors between expert 
and naive analyst by -10 indicating an abnormal forecast optimism of 10 for naïve 
analysts.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
My dissertation investigated whether and how corporate strategy, as proxied by Miles and 
Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic types, affects analysts coverage decision and forecasting 
efficiency. Both firm and industry level strategic information are important inputs to 
analyst reports which are useful to investors in a market where information asymmetry 
exists between the firms and their (potential) shareholders. Thus, my thesis first examined 
how firm strategy and industry strategic orientation affects the demand of analysts’ 
service as well as the difficulty they face in covering the firm. I also presented evidence 
of the potential impacts of analysts’ self-interest on the association between firm strategy 
and analyst coverage. I then explored whether the impacts of task complexity associated 
with firm strategy and industry strategic orientation separately extend to cases where firm 
strategy is not aligned with the overall industry orientation and in turn affect analyst 
coverage and forecast accuracy. Finally, I investigated whether knowledge of firms’ 
strategic choices can help analysts’ understanding of firms’ asymmetric cost behaviour 
and in turn, reduce the bias in their forecasts. In this thesis, I employ Miles and Snow 
(1978, 2003)’s strategy typology to classify corporate strategies into three categories: 
Prospector strategy (innovative focused), Defender strategy (focussing on cost-efficiency) 
and ‘other strategies’ (including Analyzer strategy and Reactors). 
 
6.1. Study 1  
Study One examined how corporate strategy affects the demand for and supply of analyst 
coverage through its impacts from ex ante information asymmetry, voluntary disclosure 
(Bentley-Goode et al. 2017) and analyst incentives to attract investment banking business, 
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at both firm and industry level. I argued that the Prospector strategy is associated with 
high ex ante information asymmetric and high voluntary disclosure and higher analyst 
incentive for investment banking transactions while the Defender strategy is associated 
with low ex ante information asymmetry, low voluntary disclosure and low analyst 
investment banking (IB) incentive.  
Employing both a traditional regression of aggregate coverage against strategy indicators, 
as well as logit regressions modelling the probability that a given analyst will follow a 
particular firm in a given year, I found that Prospectors (Prospector-oriented industries) 
receive greater analyst coverage than ‘other firms’ (industries with ‘other strategic 
orientations’). This results is consistent with the contention that high ex ante information 
increases the ‘demand effect’, and this dominates the task complexity arising from that 
ex ante information asymmetry; and also with the reduced task complexity effect of high 
voluntary disclosure (the ‘supply effect’) dominating any reduction in potential value-
adding to investors caused by greater access to public information (the ‘demand effect’). 
My results also suggest that Defenders (Defender-oriented industries) receive lower 
analyst coverage than ‘other firms’ (industries with ‘other strategic orientations’). This is 
consistent with the reduced task complexity decreasing cost of supply from low ex ante 
information asymmetry being dominated by the reduced demand for analyst service; and 
also with the increase supply cost of low voluntary disclosure dominating any potential 
benefit from providing analyst service. 
My tests examining the extent of ‘expert coverage’ provided evidence on the relative 
strength of the strategic impacts from information asymmetry and discretionary 
disclosure on analysts’ choice to cover a firm. My findings support the contention that 
reduced task complexity associated with voluntary disclosure plays a significant role in 
the decision to cover Prospectors (Prospector-oriented industries), and outweighs any 
negative effects on coverage caused by the extra difficulty faced by analysts covering 
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firms with greater inherent uncertainty. On the other hand, Defenders (Defender-oriented 
industries) abnormally high coverage by expert analysts suggest that the high task 
complexity associated with weaker disclosure dominates any coverage-inducing effects 
of lower complexity arising from relative stability of Defender strategy.  
To bring stronger evidence on the mediating effect of voluntary disclosure on the 
association between firm strategy and analyst coverage, I performed additional tests and 
show that voluntary disclosure partially mediates this association. However, the findings 
suggest that other factors have significant effect on this association, because the direct 
effects of firms’ strategy choices on analyst coverage are still significant after control for 
voluntary disclosures. Thus, I performed further tests of the impact of investment banking 
incentives and find that the average size of the brokerage houses (a proxy for the likely 
provision of investment banking services by the analysts’ employer) following 
Prospectors (normally associated with high IB incentive) declines after the Global 
Settlement. This finding is consistent with an investment banking incentives partially 
explaining Prospector’s greater coverage. However, the overall level of analyst coverage 
for Prospectors increases after the GS, which is inconsistent with an investment banking 
explanation.  
 
6.2. Study 2 
The second study extended Study One by examining the intersection of firm strategy and 
industry strategic orientation to explore whether any additional task complexity effects 
arising from a reduction in information spillovers affect both analyst coverage and 
forecast accuracy. I also investigated the possibility of a profitability-related impact of 
firm strategy not aligning with the industry strategic orientation, as this may affect firms’ 
chance of survival and, in turn, analysts’ decision to cover a firm and their forecast 
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efficiency. I identified two cases of firm strategy deviated from the industry strategic 
orientation: 1) industry strategic misalignment and 2) extreme strategies. Industry 
strategic misalignment occurs when firms adopt an extreme firm-level strategy of the 
opposite nature to the industry orientation (e.g. Prospectors in Defender-oriented 
industries); while firms employed an extreme strategy when they adopt an aggressive 
firm-level strategy of the same nature of the industry orientation (e.g. Prospectors in 
Prospector-oriented industries).  
Employing regression models and samples similar to those used in Study One, I find that 
the ‘profitability effect’ of strategic misalignment has a strong impact in Defender-
oriented industries, as misaligned firms (Prospectors) are generally associated with lower 
coverage and forecast accuracy than ‘other firms’. For Prospector-oriented industries, the 
task complexity associated with low information spillovers only affect analysts’ decision 
to cover the misaligned firms, and this impact does not flow on to affect forecast accuracy. 
Results from tests on extreme strategies suggest that analysts are less likely to cover 
Extreme Prospectors than ‘other firms’ in Prospector-oriented industries, but more likely 
to cover Extreme Defenders than ‘other firms’ in Defender-oriented industries. This is 
partially inconsistent with the argument that extreme strategies indicate low value of 
industry information spillovers and potential unprofitability. Further, the results from 
accuracy tests suggest no main effect of extreme strategy on forecast accuracy; however, 
firms following extreme strategy still subject to the impact of low value of intra-industry 
spillovers, which is moderated by analyst expertise. Overall, the findings from my study 
suggest the industry strategic misalignment, compared to extreme strategy, seems to have 
a larger impact on analyst behaviour in all aspects.  
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6.3. Study 3 
Study Three examined the extent to which firms’ strategic choice influences analysts’ 
understanding of firms’ asymmetric cost behaviour, and in turn affects analyst forecast 
efficiency as reflected in a reduction in forecast bias. Cost stickiness reflects the 
asymmetric behaviour of the cost to sales ratio when sales increase and decrease 
(Anderson et al. 2003); costs are described as ‘sticky’ (‘anti-sticky’) if the rate of change 
in costs when demand falls is smaller (greater) than the rate of change in sales when 
demand rises. I showed that Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) strategic types are associated 
with systematically different degrees and directions and asymmetric cost behaviour. 
Prospectors, for example, focus on innovation and will typically have large R&D and 
marketing expenditures, which they are reluctant to cut in the short run and in turn, are 
more likely to exhibit sticky cost behaviour than firms following ‘other strategies’. I 
hypothesised that, if analysts recognise these differences in the likelihood of sticky cost 
behaviour occurring, that the bias in their forecasts should decrease. Saliently, I also 
showed that the association between firms’ cost stickiness and forecast bias are not 
conditional on the likelihood of a future sales increase/decrease, while analysts’ 
understanding of cost stickiness might not improve forecast accuracy if the likelihood of 
future sales decrease do not excess 50% using the theoretical model from Ciftci et al. 
(2016). 
Regressions of analyst signed forecast errors against measures of cost stickiness show a 
significant negative relation (i.e. stickiness induces excess optimism), consistent with 
analysts being unable to perfectly incorporate realised cost stickiness in their earnings 
forecasts. More importantly, I also found evidence that, in cases where the combination 
of prior and current sales changes suggest that observed cost stickiness should be greatest, 
analyst forecasts for firms following strategies that suggest that the level of cost stickiness 
should be most easily predicted, exhibit forecast errors that are less sensitive to the impact 
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of cost stickiness than is the case for ‘other firms’. Finally, I performed additional analysis 
to investigate whether there is any evidence that my earlier findings of differences in 
forecast accuracy across firms following different strategies (in Study Two) may in part 
reflect the effects of cost stickiness. While I reported significant associations between 
accuracy, strategy type and cost stickiness across a sample of all firm-quarters, the 
unconditional effect of cost stickiness in insignificant, and thus these findings should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 
6.4. Implications 
The findings of this dissertation have several implications to investors, regulators and 
researchers. First, the results from Study One, Two and Three show how corporate 
strategy affects analyst behaviour, ranging from their decision to cover a firm to the 
efficiency in their earnings forecasts. These results may be of interest to investors, 
especially less sophisticated investors who are more likely to have limited knowledge of 
business strategy and its association with analyst behaviour, to better use strategic 
information provided by analysts in their decisions to follow analysts’ recommendation 
to buy/sell a stock. Second, my thesis presented some evidence that analysts may have 
self-interested incentives to cover Prospector firms in the hope of obtaining investment 
banking businesses for their employer. Regulators who are interested in evaluating the 
validity of current regulatory policies intended to reduce the dysfunctional consequences 
of analysts’ incentive conflicts (e.g. NASD Rule 2711, Rule 351 and 472) may use the 
results from my thesis to assist them in determining whether observed bias arises from 
conscious misrepresentation or other sources. 41  Further, I synthesise the literature 
                                                 
41 The major policies consist of 1) prohibiting the conduct of linking analyst compensation based on specific 
investment banking transactions, 2) forbidding the covered firms from reviewing the analysts’ reports 
before publication except for checking factual accuracy, and 2) requiring analysts to disclose all potential 
conflicts of interest to NASD including the proposition of “Buy”, “Sell” and “Hold” recommendations. 
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examining corporate strategy and analyst coverage by developing a comprehensive 
framework incorporating the impacts of ex ant information asymmetry, voluntary 
disclosure and analyst incentive that future research may be incorporated in their strategy-
related research. The results reported in Study 2 extend current research in firm strategy 
by showing that the association between corporate strategy and forecast accuracy are not 
explained by a pure disclosure explanation (Bentley-Goode et al. 2017) and that there are 
other potential drivers of this association (e.g. firms’ cost stickiness).  The findings of 
Study Three indicate that corporate strategy may be systematically associated with 
differences in average cost stickiness and future research may consider using firms’ 
strategic choice to identify the incidence and level of cost stickiness in their research. 
Finally, I contribute to the research methodology in analyst research by developing a 
method for testing the probability that individual analysts cover a given firm.  
 
6.5. Limitations 
There are several limitations to consider when studying corporate strategy and analyst 
behaviour in the content of my thesis. First, I rely exclusively on the strategy measure 
developed in Bentley et al. (2013) to capture individual firm strategy, which mostly 
consists of measures from the financial statements. It is likely that there are considerable 
divergences between my classification of firms, and how analysts’ perceive firm strategy. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that there are commonalities between the measures used here 
and the factors considered by analysts when studying a firm, some utility should prevail.  
Further, my proxies for analyst expertise and analyst incentives are obviously imperfect 
and sometimes inter-changeable. For example, prior literature uses the size of the 
brokerage house (brokersize) to capture analyst expertise (e.g. Clement 1999) and also 
analysts’ self-interest (e.g. Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007), which makes this 
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measure a noisy indicator of any individual underlying construct. In Study Two, the 
sample size of the misaligned firms and firms following extreme strategies are less than 
10% of the industry population, and that may affect both the statistical interpretation, and 
generalisability of the findings. Finally, the measure of cost stickiness (as per Weiss 2010) 
used in Study Three is subject to considerable potential measurement errors because it 
assumes a piecewise linear specification of the cost function which is only estimable for  
periods when change in sales and change in costs move in the same direction. I perform 
robustness tests to control for the non-linearity of the association between cost stickiness 
and forecast errors, but only partially mitigate this issue. Finally, Weiss (2010)’s sticky 
measure do not capture all the potential sticky cost behaviour in reality (e.g. from slippery 
prices), therefore, the results of Study 3 may not fully capture the impacts of cost 
stickiness on analyst forecast errors. 
 
6.6. Future Research Opportunities  
My dissertation also indicates several areas of future research. First, in relation to the 
empirical measure of corporate strategy, future research may consider using the narratives 
from analyst reports (as presented in Chapter 2) to better represent analysts’ view of firms’ 
strategic choice and relevant industry strategic information in analyst research. Second, 
future research may consider to better examine the results related to investment banking 
incentives from additional test in Study One, by using an event study methodology to 
capture analyst the change in analyst behaviour before and after the actual investment 
banking activities of analysts’ employers. Also, the results from Study Two indicate that 
profitability is crucial to analysts’ coverage decisions and forecast efficiency for 
misaligned firms (Prospectors) in Defender-oriented industries. Therefore, when analysts 
abnormally make overly optimistic forecasts for Prospectors in Defender-oriented 
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industries (shown in addition tests), this may be an indication of influence from analysts’ 
self-interested incentive (i.e. potential investment banking activities). Future study may 
formally examine the association between corporate strategy, analyst self-interests and 
analyst behaviour extending to forecast and recommendation bias.  Future research may 
also consider examining the potential drivers of the association between extreme 
strategies (Extreme Prospectors and Extreme Defenders) and analyst coverage as my 
findings from Study Tow are inconclusive.  Finally, in Study Three I examine the 
association between analysts’ understanding of firms’ asymmetric cost behaviour and 
forecast accuracy and show that this association is conditional on the probability of future 
sales changes. Further studies can formally test this theoretical association by identifying 
cases of high probabilities of sales decreases using analyst sales forecasts.  
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